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Abstract
Following Joseph Stalin’s death in 1953, Nikita Khrushchev became leader of
the Soviet Union and ushered in a liberalization campaign that reverberated
outward to certain Eastern European nations. Canadian officials recognized that
limited freedom of maneuver was conceded to certain Eastern European nations, in
addition to Yugoslavia’s existing independent position. This proved important, as
Communist Eastern Europe became a deliberate and considered factor in Canada’s
foreign policy. Canadian Soviet policy thus evolved into a Canadian policy towards
Communist Eastern Europe, equipped with various nuances. Specifically, this
project examines Canadian policy with Yugoslavia, Poland, and the Soviet Union.
By the mid 1950s, a general strategic stasis existed in the Cold War, which
led to something of a political balance; as a result, discovering strategies to engage
in the Cold War by “other means” became necessary. Prime Minister John
Diefenbaker’s Progressive Conservative government was committed to preventing
the spread of communism, and this was an integral component of its foreign policy
with Communist Eastern Europe.
This dissertation argues Canadian policy towards Communist Eastern
Europe during the Diefenbaker-Khrushchev period was not solely driven by
traditional geopolitical and geostrategic considerations, but was also concerned
with non-military Communist tactics. As a result, Canadian officials pursued closer
political, economic, and socio-cultural bilateral relations with select Communist
Eastern European countries in order to challenge Soviet hegemony in that region
and to combat Eastern European communism generally. Despite the differences
among Poland, Yugoslavia, and the USSR, Canada’s broad policy objective was
consistent: promote positive relations to expose Communist nations to Western
modalities in hopes of lessening communist influence globally. The Canadian
government during this period did not have a “grand strategy” that governed its
policy with the region. Instead, pragmatism prevailed as a number of ad hoc
developments in the fields of economic and cultural foreign relations contributed to
the growing sense that Canada was engaged in Cold War diplomacy by “other
means.”
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Introduction
CANADA’S COLD WAR BY “OTHER MEANS”

By the mid-1950s, Cold War tensions hardened and nuclear stalemate
ensued. As historian Larry Collins writes, “victory would no longer be measured in
terms of conventional warfare; winning would become too concrete a concept, so
the contest would devolve into a constant striving for ‘success’ and the struggle
would, in [Prime Minister] Louis St. Laurent’s phrase, become essentially a contest
for the ‘minds of men.’”1 Indeed, as historian Odd Arne Westad argues, the Cold War
was an ideological struggle for competing visions of modernity.2 Canadian officials
believed Canada represented the quintessential good nation: politically able,
economically sound, and socially and culturally promising.
It is true that John Diefenbaker was a Cold War warrior, and that Canada
under his leadership remained a Cold War nation committed to what
contemporaries perceived as the struggle against communism. Likewise, many of
the Department of External Affairs mandarins, old and new, were Cold War
warriors. In fact, the struggle between democracy and communism, even if
oversimplified, was entrenched in the very core of Canada’s Communist Eastern
Europe policy. In a speech to the International Junior Red Cross Study Centre,
Diefenbaker outlined how advances in sciences contributed to a population boom
that would constitute added challenges to mankind. He argued,

1

Larry Collins, “Canadian-Soviet Relations During the Cold War,” in Aloysius Balawyder, ed.,
Canadian-Soviet Relations, 1939-1980 (Oakville, ON.: Mosaic Press, 1981), 47
2 Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
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men everywhere are demanding new living standards, greater
equality of opportunity and the hope of better things, rather than despair
which has been the lot of so many through the ages. The greater the
population, the greater the need of raising economic standards so that
there will be sufficient [resources to meet] the needs of the additional
multitudes of mankind.
It is under these circumstances that the battle for the minds of men
is taking place between those who believe in freedom under law, and
those who contend that communism is the hope of mankind.3
Imbedded in this statement are two important elements: Diefenbaker’s strident
anti-communism and fear of communisms potential global spread, and his
awareness of the importance of economics to the future of nations. These factors,
among others, contributed to Canada’s policy toward Communist Eastern Europe
during the Diefenbaker period.
This dissertation focuses primarily on the period Prime Minister John
Diefenbaker’s Progressive Conservative government was in office, 1957-1963.
Where appropriate, the project considers the actions of the Liberal governments
that preceded and followed the PC’s tenure, either for contextual purposes or to
demonstrate consistency across administrations, a theme understated within
existing historiography. The time frame under examination coincides with Nikita
Khrushchev’s time as leader of the Soviet Union, so the Diefenbaker-Khrushchev
period will mark this project’s studied period.
Prime Minister Diefenbaker’s PC government was committed to preventing
the spread of communism, and this was an integral component of its foreign policy
3

Department of External Affairs (hereafter DEA), Statements and Speeches (hereafter S & S), 59/26,
“The Aims of Capitalism.” Speech by P.M. Diefenbaker to the International Junior Red Cross Study
Centre, Toronto, Ontario, 12 August, 1959.
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with Communist Eastern Europe. Yet, Canadian officials were dedicated to reducing
international tensions through East-West bridge building, increased communication
through diplomatic, economic, and cultural contacts, consistent support for détente,
and the de-ideologization of Canadian trade.4 The St. Laurent Liberal government
established the general framework for this policy direction, and the Progressive
Conservatives, once in power, continued its application. The global strategic stasis
that emerged led to something of a political balance; as a result, discovering
strategies to engage in the Cold War by “other means” became necessary.
To be certain, this period was not without conflict. In fact, the period
witnessed some of the most heated global conflicts in the Cold War, as historian
Michael R. Beschloss’ book The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960-1963
attests.5 The 1958 Berlin Crisis, which led to the construction of the Berlin Wall in
1961, the 1960 U-2 incident, and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis are testaments to the
fact that this period was replete with global political and military crises. While
Premier Khrushchev and American President John F. Kennedy expressed desire to
reduce Cold War tensions, they often clashed on important issues. In June 1961, the
two leaders met in Vienna to discuss various issues, including the Berlin question.
The talks did not go smoothly. In one instance, Khrushchev told Kennedy “in cold
anger” that “American intentions [in Berlin] led to ‘nothing good.’” Khrushchev
complained that the US “stripped the Soviet Union of its rights and interests in West

4

Costas Melakopides, Pragmatic Idealism: Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1995 (Montreal & Kingston:
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1998), 43.
5 Michael R. Beschloss, The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960-1963 (New York: Edward
Burlingame Books, 1991).
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Germany [… and] the United States could no longer follow its policy of ‘I do what I
want.’”6 Reflecting on the meeting, Kennedy bemoaned how Khrushchev “just beat
hell out of me […] If he thinks I’m inexperienced and have no guts, until we remove
those ideas we won’t get anywhere with him.”7 The fact that a strategic stasis
existed in this period should not suggest that tensions did not run high.
As his biographer, William Taubman argues, “Khrushchev tried bravely to
humanize and modernize the Soviet system.” While former Soviet leader Joseph
Stalin tried to isolate the country from the West, Khrushchev “tried awkwardly to
improve relations with the West. He also attempted to revitalize areas of Soviet life –
agriculture, industry, and culture, among other things – that had languished under
Stalin.” But, as Taubman also suggests, “too often Khrushchev made a bad situation
even worse.” Despite engaging in several summits with Western leaders and coauthoring the partial test ban of 1963, “he also provoked the Berlin and Cuban crises
and escalated the arms race he had set out to diminish.”8
Still, the death of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin in March 1953 had ushered in a
series of important changes in the Soviet Union, which reverberated outward
behind the Iron Curtain; Eastern European nations experienced various degrees of
liberalization. Canadian officials recognized that limited freedom of maneuver was
conceded to certain Eastern European nations, in addition to Yugoslavia’s existing
independent position. This proved important, as Communist Eastern Europe
6

Beschloss, The Crisis Years, 219.
Beschloss, The Crisis Years, 225.
8 William Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man and His Era (New York & London: W.W. Norton &
Company, 2003), xix.
7
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became a deliberate and considered factor in Canada’s foreign policy. Canadian
Soviet policy thus evolved into a Canadian policy towards Communist Eastern
Europe, equipped with various nuances.
For Canadian officials, certain Communist Eastern European nations were of
more interest than others. In addition to the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Poland
were seen as viable points where communism might be challenged through nonmilitary means. In 1959, in a speech titled, “Coexistence, The Communist Challenge,”
Robert Ford, one of the Department of External Affair’s (DEA) foremost experts on
the Soviet Union with career postings as ambassador to Yugoslavia and the USSR,
stated, in the past
Any victories for communism meant victories for the USSR. But
already in the present period it is becoming clear that this is no longer
strictly accurate. Yugoslavia resisted the thesis that communism is
synonymous with the word of Moscow, and still refuses to accept it.
[…] And considerable concessions have had to be made for Poland.9
Canadian officials understood potential ramifications to global communism of bloc
disintegration and any further departure by Yugoslavia and were eager to exploit
any degree of schism within Communist Eastern Europe. The Canadian government
pursued closer relations with Poland and Yugoslavia as a way of encouraging their
autonomy vis-à-vis the USSR, hoping to provide models for other Eastern European
nations to follow. Thus, as a middle power, Canada sought to exercise modest

9

Library and Archives Canada (hereafter, LAC), MG31 E73, Robert Ford Papers, Vol. 2, File 14.
Address to the Heads of Mission meeting, Paris, “Coexistence: The Communist Challenge,” October
1959.
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influence in this period in an attempt to subtly shift the international balance of
power in favour of the West through non-military means.
Former diplomat and civil servant Arthur Andrew states that Canada was
“the prototype, if not the inventor, of the middle power concept.”10 In the minds of
many Canadians, the nation “had done its full share in fighting and winning the
[Second World] War. All this more than justified its claim to be a ‘middle power.’”11
Historians Norman Hillmer and J.L. Granatstein accurately state, “if there were no
formally recognized middle powers, then the meaning of the term would simply
have to be adjusted to reflect what Canada was doing and could do on the world
stage.”12 The idea of a middle power remained imbedded in the minds of Canada’s
civil servants throughout the Diefenbaker period, and, as a result, they sought to
utilize the concept’s flexibility in multilateral organizations and in bilateral relations
with select Communist Eastern European nations.
For the purpose of this study, the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Poland will
be examined, since, as will be demonstrated, various Canadian officials centered out
these nations as viable points for combating European communism. An
investigation of the USSR is fundamental to this project since Soviet actions
motivated Canadian officials to rethink their foreign policy direction in Eastern

10

Arthur Andrew, The Rise and Fall of a Middle Power: Canadian Diplomacy from King to Mulroney
(Toronto: James Lorimer & Company Ltd., 1993), x.
11 Norman Hillmer and J.L. Granatstein, From Empire to Umpire: Canada and the World into the 21st
Century (Toronto: Thomson Nelson, 2008), 161.
12 Hillmer and Granatstein, From Empire to Umpire, 163.
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Europe. Additionally, Canadian officials viewed the Soviet Union as the epicenter of
international communism.
Yugoslavia, while a committed communist nation, was independent of the
USSR (with the Yugoslav-Soviet split in 1948) and was not part of the Warsaw Pact.
Since Yugoslavia was a strong proponent of non-alignment, and, as some would
argue, the unofficial leader of the movement, Canadian officials saw the nation as a
“battleground” from where Canada could challenge European Communism. As
Canadian officials saw it, if Canada could help “win over” Yugoslavia, other nations
could potentially be influenced to follow suit, attenuating Soviet influence in that
region.
Unlike Yugoslavia, Poland fit tightly within the Soviet bloc. Despite Poland’s
unbridled commitment to communism, led by Wladyslaw Gomulka, it rejected
subservient dependence on the USSR. Thus, Polish authorities wielded a degree of
independence that shaped their foreign policy. As a result, Canadian officials sought
to cultivate closer relations with Poland to encourage that nation’s independent
course. Despite the differences among Poland, Yugoslavia, and the USSR, Canada’s
broad policy objective was consistent: promote positive relations to expose
Communist nations to Western modalities, in hopes of lessening communist
influence globally. A history that addresses this policy framework from a larger
regional perspective, covering the USSR, Yugoslavia, and Poland, has yet to be
written; the general aim of this project, then, is to fill this void.
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This dissertation argues Canadian policy towards Communist Eastern
Europe during the Diefenbaker-Khrushchev period was not solely driven by
traditional geopolitical and geostrategic considerations, but was also concerned
with non-military Communist tactics. As a result, Canadian officials pursued closer
political, economic, and socio-cultural bilateral relations with select Communist
Eastern European countries in order to challenge Soviet hegemony in that region
and to combat Eastern European communism generally. The Canadian government
during this period did not have a “grand strategy” that governed its policy with the
region. Instead, pragmatism prevailed as a number of ad hoc developments in the
fields of economic and cultural foreign relations contributed to the growing sense
that Canada was engaged in Cold War diplomacy by “other means.”
This project demonstrates that, during the Diefenbaker-Khrushchev period,
Canada pursued a pragmatic, yet rational, policy that marks a decisive moment in
Canada’s Communist Eastern Europe policy. Moreover, it highlights how, at times,
Canada nuanced its approach to the Cold War. By pursuing closer relations with
select countries in this region, Canada created some room for maneuver as a middle
power within the alliance constraints of the Cold War, occasionally challenging the
Cold War consensus that supposedly governed international power structures.
Overall, Canada’s policy towards the superpowers amounted to a sensitive
synthesis. Clearly, Canada was committed to the Western bloc and actively
contributed to this alliance. Yet, it was committed to moderation in both Cold War

12
rhetoric and in corresponding actions.13 By examining Canada’s foreign policy in
this region, we de-centre the master narrative that has traditionally suggested the
respective blocs deferentially followed the rigid trajectories of their superpower
patrons. Additionally, this study suggests the Canadian government pursued a
three-pronged approach in the context of its pragmatic policy by “other means,”
consisting of political, economic, and cultural diplomacy.
This project builds on and extends more traditional approaches to diplomatic
history. In the Canadian historical context, at least until the end of the 1960s, a focus
on the foreign policy elite is entirely justified. Foreign policy was undoubtedly
shaped to varying degrees by the structural realities of international politics and
domestic political considerations, but the power to shape policy in Ottawa was
exercised by a relatively select group of individuals. As will be shown, Canadian
diplomats – particularly Canada’s ambassadors – worked to nurture diplomatic ties,
even during times of Cold War tension. Given this, the study does recognize the
particular importance of elaborating an intellectual history of Ottawa’s civil
servants’ fundamental beliefs and assumptions.14 By doing so, it will be possible to

13

Melakopides, Pragmatic Idealism, 42.

14 For this, memoirs and biographies play an integral role: George Ignatieff, The Making of a

Peacemonger: The Memoirs of George Ignatieff (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985); Patrick
Kyba, Alvin: A Biography of the Honourable Alvin Hamilton, P.C. (Regina: Canadian Plains Research
Center, 1989); Robert Ford, Our Man in Moscow: A diplomat’s reflections on the Soviet Union (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1989); Charles A. Rudd, The Constant Diplomat: Robert Ford in Moscow
(Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009); John G. Diefenbaker, One Canada:
Memoirs of the Right Honourable John G. Diefenbaker, Vols. I & II (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1975,
1977); Thad McIlroy, ed., Personal Letters of a Public Man: The Family Letters of John. G. Diefenbaker
(Doubleday: Toronto, 1985); Peter Newman, Renegade in Power: The Diefenbaker Years (Toronto:
McClelland and Stewart, 1973); Basil Robinson, Diefenbaker’s World: A Populist in Foreign Affairs
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989); Denis Smith, Rogue Tory: the Life and Legend of John G.
Diefenbaker (Toronto: Macfarlane Walter & Ross, 1995).
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trace the degree to which such personal beliefs and assumptions transcended into,
and survived as, foreign policy.
In The Ottawa Men, historian J.L. Granatstein traces the development of
Canada’s civil service from 1935-1957 and argues that a gifted group of mandarins
collectively shaped Canada’s policy and steered the country into a new direction by
creating a sophisticated economic policy for Canada that recognized the nation
needed to trade to survive. He also underscores the fact that the mandarins created
a foreign policy for Canada “that was at once nationalist and internationalist,
aggressive and responsible, practical and idealistic.”15 Granatstein shrewdly insists
that this special group of individuals were driven by openness to ideas, which set
them apart from the rest of the bureaucracy and determined their reaction to the
country’s problems.16 The study ends at 1957, presumably because that year clearly
demarks the end of a long period of Liberal reign. This dissertation suggests the
timeline can be extended, with new mandarins added to the list, such as George
Ignatieff and Robert Ford.
The progressive thinking and pragmatic policy development that began
during the post-war Liberal government continued with the Progressive
Conservatives, even as the international situation changed significantly. It is
important to recognize that many of the civil servants responsible for policy
development during the Diefenbaker years were part of, or at least shaped by,

15 J.L. Granatstein, The Ottawa Men: The Civil Service Mandarins, 1935-1957 (Toronto: Oxford
University Press, 1982), xii.
16 Granatstein, The Ottawa Men, xi.
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Granatstein’s “original” mandarins. As such, their commitment to carving out a niche
for Canada in world affairs remained strong, pragmatic, and nuanced. Working to
engender closer political relations with Communist Eastern Europe, while
simultaneously promoting commercial links and cultural exchanges, were methods
developed and executed by the Ottawa Men just as consistently before and during
Diefenbaker’s time as Prime Minister.
Understanding the fact that many of these individuals believed Canada could
and should go beyond traditional geostrategic and geopolitical methods for
influencing global affairs is crucial. If this is accepted, then the importance of
Canada’s commercial and cultural relations with Communist Europe can be
foregrounded and studied as real and significant approaches used to bridge East and
West. If developing political relations with Communist Eastern Europe was still in
its nascent phase, doing business and pursuing exchanges with these countries was
even less developed.
The Canadian government’s second foreign policy prong in this region was
developing economic and commercial relations. To many contemporaries, the
postwar world witnessed the solidification of the world into two broad ideological
camps. On the one side, led by the United States, were nations with economies
grounded in the basic tenets of capitalism and free market enterprise, countries that
were generally anti-communist. The other side, led by the Soviet Union, practiced
Marxism, were primarily driven by state-run economies, and were committed to the

15
global spread of communism.17 When considering its foreign policy objectives, the
Canadian government appeared content to adopt a simplified ideological
framework. It was generally understood by Canadian officials that the Cold War
economy that emerged after the Second World War pitted two rival economic
systems against each other, each radically different in terms of character and design.
The Western capitalist order was based on (at least theoretically) cooperation,
compromise, and shared mutual interests (recognizing there is an inherent
contradiction between the ideas of capitalism and cooperation). Conversely, the
Soviet bloc was founded on coercion, control, and dependency. While the Western
model “sought to create an open, multilateral world economy, the Soviet economic
order shunned international trade and foreign investment in favour of a closed,
state-controlled autarkic system.” 18 Yet, as the Cold War fundamentally shaped
global politics, the two systems edged closer to one another.
International relations expert Ian Jackson contends that while the political,
diplomatic, and security aspects of the Cold War have received substantial analysis,
“the economic factors behind the Cold War have received scant attention in the
literature.” Jackson further observes, “This is surprising given the centrality of
economics in the ideological conflict between Western capitalism and Soviet

17

Canadian officials generally adopted a simplified perspective of Cold War divisions, often framing
it as a struggle between democracy and communism. It is important to remember, however, that this
perspective is simplistic and ignores the Cold War’s manifestations in the Third World and other
parts of the globe, including Francisco Franco’s Spain, António de Oliveira Salazar’s Portugal, Park
Chung-hee’s South Korea, Chiang Kai-shek’s Taiwan, and Anastasio Somoza’s Nicaragua, for example.
18 Ian Jackson, “Economics and the Cold War,” in Richard H. Immerman and Petra Goedde eds., The
Oxford Handbook of the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 53.

16
communism.”19 Speaking on Canada specifically, historian and international trade
expert Michael Hart laments how Canadian historians “tend to be fascinated by
security and political events and pay insufficient attention to the trade dimensions
of Canada’s international relations.”20 A study of Canada’s commercial relations with
Eastern Europe can helpfully supplement historical attention already paid to
summit meetings and East-West crises, by addressing some of the many other
“battlegrounds” on which the Cold War was engaged.21
The role ideology played in the Canadian government’s approach to its
commercial dealings with Communist Eastern Europe is significant. When dealing
with the Soviet Union, Canadian officials adopted a dualistic approach. While Soviet
progress in trade and industrial output was viewed as an “economic offensive,” to be
regarded cautiously and even suspiciously, when the Canadian government sought
new markets for the country’s growing surpluses of wheat, ideology seemed less
important, and the USSR, as well as other Communist Eastern European nations,
were welcomed as customers. In other words, this region, particularly the Soviet
Union, was seen as both a competitor and customer. There is a link between these

19

Jackson, “Economics and the Cold War,” in Immerman and Goedde eds., The Oxford Handbook of
the Cold War, 50.
20 Michael Hart, A Trading Nation: Canadian Trade Policy from Colonization to Globalization
(Vancouver & Toronto: UBC Press, 2002), 482, note 2.
21 To date, the subject of American economic domination in Canada has been well researched – the
account by Liberal Finance Minister Walter Gordon, A Choice for Canada: Imperialism or Colonial
Status (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1966), is a fine testament of contemporary thinking.
Essentially, Gordon argues that Canada had become free from Britain’s colonial influence only to fall
prey to American economic imperialism. See Also, Stephen Azzi, Walter Gordon and the Rise of
Canadian Nationalism (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999). The significance of
understanding Canadian history through colonial or neocolonial frameworks has been well
established. This perspective, however, is only part of the equation, admittedly an appropriately
important part.
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two perceptions. When engaged in commercial dealings with the USSR, Yugoslavia,
and Poland, the Canadian government hoped doing business with this region would
expose it to Western economic protocols, highlight the benefits of the capitalist
system, promote bridge building, and generally weaken European Communism.
Thus, doing business with the region represents a pragmatic component of the
government’s economic statecraft.
While Canadian commercial relations may not have improved dramatically
during the Diefenbaker era, they did slowly develop in new and promising
directions. Of course, relative to Canadian-American foreign economic relations,
trade with Communist Eastern Europe paled in quantitative terms. However, it is
important to remember that improving bilateral relations with communist countries
was more about the broader political context within which these interactions
occurred. So, Canada’s economic relations with the region were political, ideological,
and economical. The same principle can be applied to Canada’s efforts in the field of
cultural diplomacy.
The final strategy of Canada’s Cold War policy by “other means” during this
period was cultural diplomacy. A growing number of scholars are recognizing the
important contribution of cultural diplomacy to traditional geopolitical agendas in
an historical context. Increasing awareness in Canada of the merits of cultural
diplomacy developed from the mid-1950s onward and was largely spearheaded by
Ottawa’s civil servants. As the Cold War became more a competition to win the
hearts and minds of individuals, the use and abuse of hard power – the ability to

18
coerce through military and economic might22 – was no longer the primary driving
force of the international system. A growing number of scholars (mainly those who
have contributed to the rich and extensive American historiography on cultural
diplomacy) argue that the Cold War conflict was fought less with weapons that
could kill, and more with words, ideas, and exchanges.23
Political scientist Andrew Cooper argues that cultural diplomacy “is intended
to serve a variety of purposes [… and that] a degree of promotion and support of
international cultural relations by a government is an essential element of cultural
diplomacy.”24 Corroborating this, historian Graham Carr adds:
… like classic foreign relations, cultural diplomacy supports “objectives
which have been defined through normal policy channels.” However, it
is less focused on immediate outcomes and aims instead to broadly
“influence the elite or mass public opinion of another nation for the
purpose of turning the policies or views of that target nation to
advantage.”25
And this was precisely what many in the DEA strove to do. Spearheaded in
particular by Canadian ambassadors, Canada’s foreign policy elite promoted cultural
relations, scholarly exchanges, and various media communications as a means of
engendering closer ties between regions and exposing Communist Eastern Europe
22

Evan H. Potter, Branding Canada: Projecting Canada’s Soft Power Through Public Diplomacy
(Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 2009), ix.
23 Kenneth S. Osgood, Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006); Yale Richmond, Cultural Exchanges and the Cold War:
Raising the Iron Curtain (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003).
24 Andrew Fenton Cooper, Canadian Culture: International Dimensions (Centre on Foreign Policy and
Federalism, University of Waterloo/Wilfrid Laurier University & The Canadian Institute of
International Affairs, 1985), 3-4.
25 Graham Carr, “‘No Political Significance of Any Kind’: Glenn Gould’s Tour of the Soviet Union and
Culture of the Cold War,” The Canadian Historical Review, Vol. 95, No. 1 (March 2014), 3-4; Robert J.
Williams, “International Cultural Programmes: Canada and Australia Compared,” in Canadian Culture,
ed. Cooper, 85; and Potter, Branding Canada, 32-33.
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to Western modalities, thus bridging the ideological divide with the hopeful
expectation of slowly, but ultimately, undermining global Communism.
Similar to other international history scholars, this perspective is inspired by
the cultural turn in diplomatic history. This particular aspect of the dissertation
explores how Canadian authorities pragmatically engaged in ongoing efforts to
assess how Canada should associate with Communist Europe in ways that would
effectively employ its middle power position to modestly influence global affairs.
Cultural diplomacy was still in its embryonic phase in Canada and proved
potentially useful because of the major changes that had occurred east of the Iron
Curtain, but also because of the forward thinking attitudes of Canada’s foreign policy
elite. This element of the dissertation further supports the notion that this period
was a key moment in Canada’s foreign relations with Communist Eastern Europe.
A full assessment of Canada’s ultimate success in the non-military realm of
the Cold War would require an in-depth examination from the immediate post-war
period through to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, a time frame well beyond
the scope of this project. This dissertation, focusing as it does primarily on the
Diefenbaker-Khrushchev years, nonetheless provides an in-depth examination of
Canada’s Cold War by “other means” during a key time when the possibilities of
middle power engagement in cultural and economic diplomacy with Communist
Eastern Europe were beginning to be realized. It is certainly not suggested that the
Diefenbaker government’s policy toward this region contributed directly to the
collapse of communism and the eventual downfall of the Soviet Union. But, as many

20
historians have shown, the non-military fronts proved to be vital “battlegrounds”
during the Cold War, ones that undoubtedly influenced the conflict’s eventual
outcome. Arriving at a definitive, quantifiable conclusion regarding the longer-term
impacts of Canada’s Communist policy during the Diefenbaker government would
be an overly ambitious goal for this study, but it will be shown that Canada’s pursuit
of closer ties with select Eastern European nations and the Soviet Union itself
helped to bridge the divide between East and West.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS

On the international front during the Cold War, the Soviet Union weighed
more heavily on Ottawa’s mind than did Canada on the Kremlin’s. Yet, Canada’s
strategic position was never ignored by the USSR, primarily, “as the record suggests,
because of its proximity to the USSR’s principal rival, the United States.” 26 As
expected, the US figured prominently in the formulation of Canada’s Soviet policy.
As Leigh Sarty argues, Canadian-Soviet relations can be understood “as one side of a
larger triangle, in which ties between Moscow and Ottawa were shaped by their
respective concerns” with the West’s leading power, the United States.27 In other
words, “international relations between Canada and the Soviet Union were shaped
by developments elsewhere in the international system, and in particular by the two
sides' respective dealings with Washington.”28 This framework is useful because it
acknowledges that while Canada and the USSR recognized the strategic importance
26
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of one another, even if the recognition was lopsided, their relations were still
governed by broader global Cold War trends.29 This framework also proves valuable
for recognizing and analyzing any idiosyncrasies in the general trend of CanadianSoviet relations, and it corresponds with the well-established notion that Canada
utilized international organizations, such as the United Nations (UN) and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), to mitigate the asymmetrical nature of its
bilateral relations with the US. This framework effectively showcases how, at times,
Canadian-Soviet relations contradicted the more global political trends of the Cold
War. Yet, it omits the fact that other geographical regions contributed to Canada’s
Soviet policy and suggests a degree of passivity that is somewhat unwarranted. This
project reveals that Canadian officials were acutely aware of changes occurring
behind the Iron Curtain and pursued a policy based on those changes. In addition to
the impact of American-Soviet relations on Canadian foreign policy during the Cold
War, Canadian officials were aware of developments within the USSR, or between
the Soviet Union and other Communist Eastern European nations, and this also
guided their policy decisions as they determined policy directions.
Complementary to Sarty’s framework is historian Costas Melakopides’ study
Pragmatic Idealism: Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1995. One of Melakopides’
principal arguments is that “post Second World War Canadian foreign policy has
been marked by impressive consistency, in both style and substance.” This
consistency, he argues, was a result of a conscious and sustained pursuit of a
29
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coherent set of foreign policy ends and means, and can be best designated as
Canadian internationalism, “which should be understood as a balanced synthesis of
idealism and pragmatism or as pragmatic idealism.” One of the central values of
Melakopides’ definition of idealism, and crucial to this project, is Canada’s belief in
“the importance of moderation, communication, generosity, and cooperation in
international affairs.” Regarding pragmatism, Melakopides suggests that one of
Canada’s major foreign policy goals since 1945 “has been to satisfy Canada’s
interests in the context of broader interests.” As a result, “the pragmatic – that is,
flexible, adaptable, and workable – pursuit of Canada’s interests and values should
suffice to show that Canadian internationalism” exhibited calculated and sensible
foreign policy goals.

30

Specifically, Melakopides examines Canada’s role in

peacekeeping and peacemaking, arms control and disarmament, human rights,
ecological concerns, and foreign development assistance. The pragmatic idealism
framework, however, can be extended. In fact, it provides a useful lens to examine
Canadian political, cultural, and commercial policy with Communist Eastern Europe.
As this project demonstrates, Canadian officials understood the importance of open
lines of communication, moderation, and cooperation in the political, cultural, and
commercial realms, and proved willing, and indeed eager, to modify their policy
direction as international currents changed. Utilizing this perspective contributes
effectively to the notion that the policies of Prime Minister John Diefenbaker’s
Progressive Conservative (PC) government were less an aberration in the history of
Canadian foreign policy than has been typically argued by historians.
30
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HISTORIOGRAPHY

To date, Jamie Glazov’s Canadian Policy Toward Khrushchev’s Soviet Union
remains an authoritative work on Diefenbaker’s foreign policy with the Soviet Union
and is closest in subject matter to this dissertation. Yet, Glazov acknowledges his
work is not intended to be an examination of Canadian-Soviet bilateral relations.
Generally, Glazov focuses primarily on traditional geopolitical aspects of the history.
His work also does not examine socio-cultural dimensions of Canadian-Soviet
relations. By covering the whole Khrushchev period, he examines foreign policy
towards the Soviet Union under both the St. Laurent (1948-1957) and Diefenbaker
(1957-1963) governments. Glazov builds on Larry Collins’ thesis that Canada’s
guiding principle was containment without ostracism: “[Canada] maintained that
lines of communication must be kept open to avoid exacerbating the conflict’s
intensity.” Collins summarized Canada’s policy toward the Soviet Union as
“containment with a ‘human face.’” 31 In step with Collins’ assertion that as
international tensions increased Canadian sovereignty waned, Glazov proposes that
Canada adopted a policy of “containment with accommodation,” serving as an
intermediary in the East-West conflict that was “in league with middlepowerism.”32
Reinforcing much of the scholarship on post-WWII Canadian foreign policy,
Glazov’s interpretation of Diefenbaker’s Soviet policy unfavourably compares the
dismal failures of the Progressive Conservative leader to the so-called ‘golden age’ of
Canadian foreign policy shaped by preceding Liberal governments. Early
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scholarship laid the groundwork for such interpretations, and few scholars have
subsequently challenged this orthodox view.33
Scholars are correct to recognise the major international changes that
occurred during the 1940s and 1950s, changes that resulted in a new,
unprecedented global context within which Canada might expect to play a role
commensurate with its middle power status. The focus of these histories, however,
is less on the new international climate that allowed for Canada to play such a role.
Instead, they examine and trumpet the achievements of a Department of External
Affairs that rapidly expanded in numbers and stature to enable the Canadian
government to assume a more pronounced role in international affairs from the
mid-1940s through to the late 1950s,34 contributing to the conception of the golden
age in Canadian foreign policy.
Initial scholarship on Canada’s early Cold War diplomacy also tends to pay
less attention to the global context that created the very conditions that allowed for
Canada’s diplomatic and political elite to shine. Political scientist Denis Stairs notes
the irony in how “the mandarins’ realist praxis [had] left them with an idealist
reputation.”35 According to historian Adam Chapnick, at the outset of the Cold War,
America was “unusually open to ‘developing an extensive network of alliances
33
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throughout the free world,’ […] enabling a temporary and disproportionately
effective team in Ottawa to engage actively at the most senior of international
levels.”36 “As the idea of a golden age entrenched itself within the Canadian foreign
policy lexicon,” Chapnick suggests, “academics and policy practitioners began to add
rigour to the standard understanding.” 37 Before long, the histories of Canada’s
golden age cast a tall and dark shadow on most foreign policy subject matter that
fell outside the confines of this period.
By the time Diefenbaker gained power in 1957, Canada’s international
influence appeared to be waning, and not necessarily for reasons entirely under the
government’s control. Juxtaposed against the golden age, Diefenbaker’s foreign
policy has been portrayed, somewhat unjustly, in an overly negative light. It appears
that many scholars paid little consideration to Trevor Lloyd’s, Canada in World
Affairs, 1957 – 1959, where he argues Canada’s fall from grace was natural and
unavoidable.38 To understand the received interpretation of Diefenbaker’s foreign
policies, one need only look to the chapter titles of some of the works that address
his time in office: “The Demented Decade, 1957-1968;”39 “Nuclear Nightmares, 1957
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– 1963;”40 “Crisis Years, 1957-63;”41 “The Time of Troubles, 1957 – 1968;”42 “The
Unraveling: Conflicts of Interest in Diefenbaker’s Policy after 1961.”43 Significantly,
with the exception of all but the last, these chapters appear in monographs that
examine Canadian-American relations or Canada’s Cold War history, and focus
primarily on issues related to nuclear weapons, the Cuban Missile Crisis,
Diefenbaker-Kennedy relations, and continental defence generally.44 Geostrategic
and geopolitical focuses dominate the history. Specific examination of CanadianSoviet, and Canadian-East European, relations is much less common. Moreover,
these histories do not cover the Diefenbaker period exclusively; rather, they
typically portray the Progressive Conservative government as a six-year interlude in
an otherwise lengthy Liberal era.45
To some degree, it was a case of unfortunate timing for Diefenbaker because
he assumed power just as important developments in international politics at that
time threatened to curtail any middle power prominence Canada had earlier
achieved. It is not inconceivable that Diefenbaker has disproportionately shouldered
the blame for Canada’s declining international stature. There is certainly a
discrepancy in how many historians have harshly and fervently criticized his policy,
40
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even as others caution that it “is well to remember […] that many of the changes that
came over Canada after 1957 were not of that government’s making, or even in the
control of Canadians.”46 Indeed, this is a key inconsistency in the historiography that
this dissertation probes. Consider, in 1963, just months before the PC government
was voted out of office, diplomat and scholar John Holmes stated,
To be quite frank, I will say that, having served both Liberal and
Conservative governments, I am less inclined to […] regard 1957 as a
watershed in our foreign policy. However important internal changes
may seem, external changes had been more important.47
Specific examinations of Canadian-Soviet relations have received relatively
little attention, and the vast majority, with the exception of Glazov’s monograph,
comes in the form of edited collections. Balawyder’s Canadian-Soviet Relations,
1939-1980, explores a number of themes, driven by the common argument that the
relationship between Canada and the USSR followed the general pattern of broader
Cold War trends and East-West relations. Balawyder maintains that Canada’s
relationship with the Soviet Union went through five phases; phase four, from 1955
to 1968, encompassing the Diefenbaker years, marked a transition period when
relations between the countries slowly began to improve on many fronts.
Unfortunately, this theme goes underexplored.
The gap is helpfully filled to some degree by John English’s “Lester Pearson
Encounters the Enigma,” in Canada and the Soviet Experiment. English asserts
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Pearson was vehemently anti-communist in the 1930s, referring to the Soviets and
their dictatorship as sub-human.48 America’s strident and public anti-communism,
however, led Pearson to want to keep lines of communication open between East
and West generally, and Canada and the USSR specifically. 49 Essentially, while
Pearson’s 1955 visit to the USSR marked the beginning of the transition period in
Canadian-Soviet relations, much is left to be said about this period. Broadly
speaking, David Davies’ edited volume (in which English’s chapter appears) argues
Canada “discovered Russia following the revolution, and viewed the country as both
an opportunity and a threat, and that Canada’s (and Canadians’) perception and
conception of Russia has been in constant flux, depending on the circumstances and
situation. 50 In the end, Davies’ overall thesis reinforces existing claims about
Canadian-Soviet relations.
In his essay titled “Trade, Aid, and Economic Warfare,” Robert Mark
Spaulding reinforces the importance of economic factors to Cold War power
structures: “Subsidized trade with client states was a form of aid, but embargo trade
between the blocs became a type of economic warfare; foreign aid programs were a
form of East-West competition that was also seen as a variety of economic warfare.”
Adding further nuance, Spaulding stresses, “all this economic activity went hand-inhand with geopolitical and cultural strategies of competition between rival powers.
Communist and capitalist governments often deployed trade, aid, and economic
48
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warfare to reinforce incentives and dissuasions designed to influence foreign
behaviours.”51 Canada was no exception, yet its tactics have gone virtually unnoticed
within the historiography.
While the importance of economics to Cold War dynamics are slowly
entering the Cold War master narrative, so too are other important factors. That
said, understanding how the Cold War by “other means,” including cultural
diplomacy and the role of non-state actors, contributed to Canada’s Cold War lags
behind current historiographical trends. By comparison, the exploration of
American cultural diplomacy during the Cold War is receiving considerable
attention in the United States.52
Equivalent scholarship to address the Canadian context is lacking, with some
notable and valuable exceptions. Hector Mackenzie 53 and Graham Carr’s 54
innovative work on Canadian pianist Glenn Gould’s 1957 concert tour of the Soviet
Union are two notable examples. Janice Cavell’s “Canadiana Abroad: The
Department of External Affairs’ Book Presentation Programmes, 1949-1963”
highlights the DEA’s modest ability to create and nurture “the first sparks of
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international interest in Canadian books.”55 Much is still to be written on the history
of Canadian cultural diplomacy and how it contributed, even if only modestly, to
Canadian foreign policy objectives. What scholars must do, however, is pay less
attention to the degree to which cultural diplomacy impacted relations and, instead,
recognize it as part of Canada’s pragmatic strategy for containing communism; the
precise impacts of cultural diplomacy are not easily quantified. Similar to
conventional foreign relations, cultural diplomacy supports “objectives which have
been defined through normal policy channels.” Immediate outcomes, however, are
not the force driving cultural diplomacy. Rather, it aims to broadly “influence the
elite or mass public opinion of another nation for the purposes of turning the
policies or views of that target nation to advantage.” 56 It is important to integrate
cultural diplomacy as one component of the historical narrative, and as one of
Canada’s non-military strategies, alongside other policy practices.
CHAPTER SUMMARIES

The project is broken down into three case studies, examining the Soviet
Union in chapters one and two, Yugoslavia in chapters three and four, and Poland in
chapters five and six. Chapter one summarizes the Canadian-Soviet relationship
from the Second World War to 1957, when Diefenbaker’s Progressive Conservatives
took office. Then, it examines how changes behind the Iron Curtain caused a
reexamination, and ultimately a reevaluation, of Canada’s policy direction. Due to
55
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the strategic stasis that existed between the Cold War superpowers, Canadian
officials viewed the Soviet Union not exclusively as a potential military threat; they
also saw the USSR’s non-military advances, particularly its economic offensive, as
dangerous to Western democracy. Canadian officials cultivated closer bilateral ties
with the Soviet Union in an attempt to disrupt Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe
and to contribute to the West’s fight to contain communism. This chapter also
highlights the growing awareness amongst Canadian officials that perhaps Canada
could utilize its middle power position to effectively build bridges between East and
West and fight communism from behind the Iron Curtain.
During the Cold War, Canada was entrenched firmly within the Western bloc
and politically supported its NATO allies. However, it also carved out a more
independent position towards the USSR in the economic and cultural realms; this is
the subject of chapter two. On the domestic front, surplus Canadian wheat
accumulated as a result of the United States’ PL 480 program. New markets were
sought, and the Soviet Union proved an expedient customer of Canadian wheat, as
seen with the renegotiation of the 1956 trade agreement in 1959. Despite the
relative commercial insignificance of the trade agreement, it was an important
bridge-building exercise for the two nations, with economic ties proving important
to Cold War political relations. Cultural exchanges also served to advance Canada’s
interests in exposing Soviet society to Western modalities and cultural life, and this
chapter also explores the benefits and difficulties associated with Canadian-Soviet
cultural diplomacy.
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Chapter three focuses on Canadian-Yugoslav diplomatic relations. Ongoing
tensions between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union provided a fortuitous
opportunity for Canada to cultivate closer ties with Yugoslavia. Canadian officials,
particularly Canada’s ambassadors in Belgrade, utilized Canada’s middle power
status to find common ground and entice Yugoslavia out of isolation, hoping to lure
it closer to the Western camp, despite its commitment to non-alignment. The visit to
Ottawa by Yugoslavia’s Foreign Minister Koča Popović highlights the importance
each country attributed to personal contacts on their mission to improve bilateral
relations. In addition, the visit demonstrates the challenges of pursuing foreign
policy objectives that were at odds with some domestic Yugoslav minority
communities.
Chapter four examines the various cultural exchanges and commercial
relations between Canada and Yugoslavia. While not numerous, artistic, academic,
and research exchanges helped bridge political and ideological divides. Trade
between the two nations was also relatively small, with the sale of Canadian wheat
accounting for the majority of exports to Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, Canadian officials
understood the political significance of such dealings, and trade with Yugoslavia
became an important factor in Canada’s economic statecraft.
Canadian-Polish diplomatic relations are the subject of chapter five. Poland’s
national art treasures were hidden in Canada following the Nazi invasion of Poland,
and disputes surrounding their return were a constant issue between the Canadian
and Polish governments. Once the treasures were returned to Poland, diplomatic
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relations improved. Canada cautiously sought to expose Poland to Western
modalities, and each nation sought to minimize Cold War political hostilities. The
nexus of middlepowerism ultimately governed Canadian-Polish relations, as each
nation sought to navigate the often contentious Cold War atmosphere.
Finally, chapter six examines Canadian-Polish cultural exchanges and
commercial relations. Cultural relations between the two nations were modest, but
the importance of exposing Poland to Western modalities made exchanges an
important component of Canadian policy. This chapter explores how the activities of
the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation-International Service (CBC-IS) Polish
Division dovetailed with External Affairs’ policy of increasing Polish autonomy visà-vis the Soviet Union. Expanding commercial relations with Poland was also an
important component of Canada’s Polish policy. Among other things, Canada agreed
to sell Poland wheat under Section 21 of Canada’s Export Credit Insurance Act,
which highlighted the Canadian government’s ability to be pragmatic in its dealings
with Communist Europe.
A NOTE ON PRIMARY SOURCES

Research for this dissertation relied on archival materials from Library and
Archives Canada (LAC) in Ottawa. Because LAC has undertaken a reorganization of
its collection, some materials normally accessible and that might have proved useful
to the dissertation were closed pending processing, the Arthur Andrew Fonds for
instance. While I was able to review many government files on Canadian relations
with the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Poland, access was at times inconsistent, with

34
various restrictions still imposed on many files. Private collections, including the
papers of G. Hamilton Southam, Canada’s ambassador to Poland from 1960-62, also
have textual material embargoed by varying restrictions, for reasons that are
unclear. Put simply, gathering material on these three countries was an ongoing
challenge. Additional insights may be possible, if and when archival materials are
released in future.
Other Archives, including the Diefenbaker Canada Centre (DCC), University of
Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, and Trinity College Library (TCL) were consulted. While
the John Holmes papers at TCL yielded some useful material, the personal papers of
George Ignatieff were not especially helpful for this dissertation. At the beginning of
this project, I was eager to consult the rich archival collection of Soviet sources of
the Centre for Research on Canadian-Russian Relations (CRCR). I was both
surprised and disappointed to learn that the collection, previously located at
Georgian College, Barrie, Ontario, had been boxed up and shipped to the University
of Alberta, Edmonton. Given the complexity of organizing the collection, four years
later, it remains unavailable. Admittedly, this was one of the project’s major
disappointments.
In addition to archival materials, this project uses various government
publications, including Documents on Canadian External Relations (DCER),
Statements and Speeches, and House of Commons debates. Foreign Relations of the
United States (FRUS) was also consulted to provide American context. Various
contemporary newspapers were also consulted.
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Chapter 1

Changes Behind the Curtain, the Soviet Economic Offensive & Canadian-Soviet
Diplomatic Relations

As author Larry Collins suggests, “in a world dominated by hostile great
powers, small states must always conduct their foreign affairs with due regard for
their uniquely vulnerable positions.”1 In fact, the vulnerability of a small state may
not always stem solely from ideological nemeses, but also from close allies. Prime
Minister John Diefenbaker trumpeted Canadian independence in international
affairs – especially in the face of American encroachment – and adjusted his policies
accordingly. Assessing Canadian reactions to Soviet non-military offensive activity
in the Cold War provides an opportunity to acknowledge the varied dimensions of
this global conflict and allows the Cold War to be understood with greater
complexity and in more nuanced ways, particularly beyond the strictly military and
strategic fields.
To understand Canadian-Soviet relations, we must first examine how
Canadian officials perceived the situation east of the Iron Curtain. Canadian decision
makers recognized the limitations of their foreign policy initiatives, but still
understood well developments that occurred within the USSR. This knowledge, in
conjunction with broader Western policy, drove their initiatives. Canadian
diplomats and other officials closely assessed the motivations and actions of Russian
authorities and derived policies commensurate with Canada’s middle power
1
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position; their analyses were driven less by rigid ideological imperatives,
particularly when compared to the United States, and more by political and
ideological changes that occurred throughout the Communist world.
As Stalinist agendas that had traditionally dominated Eastern Europe were
replaced with more liberal Khrushchevian policies, Canadian officials knew the
region had to be reassessed. Their findings indicated that Eastern Europe needed to
be seen as less homogenous than previously perceived. Inevitably, this complicated
Canada’s Soviet policy by adding another important dimension to consider when
developing regional policy towards Communist Eastern Europe generally.
A NEW CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Writing in the early 1980s, Collins suggested Canada’s guiding principle in
policy toward the Soviet Union was containment without ostracism. Canada, Collins
argued, “maintained that lines of communication must be kept open to avoid
exacerbating the conflict’s intensity.” He summarized Canadian policy toward the
Soviet Union as “containment with a ‘“human face.”’2 Building on Collins’s assertion,
historian Jamie Glazov proposes that Canada adopted a policy of “containment with
accommodation.” Glazov presses his argument further, however, and asserts that
Diefenbaker single-handedly distorted Canadian Soviet policy with his noted 1960
UN General Assembly address, 3 a speech that Glazov maintains “shattered the
Canadian strategy of accommodation.”4 Further analysis, however, suggests that this
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interpretation goes too far. Collins’ initial interpretation – which argues that
continuity prevailed despite Diefenbaker’s UN address – remains valid and, in fact, is
reinforced when various other dimensions of Cold War foreign policies, such as
cultural and economic relations, are integrated into the overall analysis. If we set
aside Glazov’s argument that Diefenbaker shattered Canada’s accommodationist
strategy, his label “containment with accommodation” still has merit. This
interpretation does, however, suggest a degree of Canadian policy passivity. As this
project demonstrates, Canadian policy makers and civil servants proffered and
implemented quite pragmatic approaches to cultivating closer political, economic,
and cultural ties to build bridges between East and West. So, the interpretative label
can be extended: Canada’s policy toward the Soviet Union and Communist Europe
during the Diefenbaker-Khrushchev period might best be described as ‘containment
with accommodation, through pragmatic cultivation’.
CONTEXT: CANADIAN-SOVIET RELATIONS FROM WWII TO THE 1950s

From the beginning of the Second World War, Canadian-Soviet relations
typically mirrored broader Western and shifting trends with the USSR. When Nazi
Germany and the Soviet Union signed the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact in 1939,
Canada had two ideological adversaries. Nazism marked the extreme right and the
Soviet Union occupied the extreme left of the political-ideological spectrum.
Standing firmly with its British ally, the Canadian government and Canadians
viewed the Soviet Union and domestic communists, by extension, as enemies. Just
under two years later, however, the Nazis turned on their once expedient ally;
Canada and the Soviet Union became allies. At once, the former communist menace
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became the juggernaut of freedom, confronting the tremendous Nazi onslaught on
the Eastern front. Canadians generally and sincerely admired Soviet heroics. Such
positive views quickly evaporated with the conclusion of hostilities in Europe,
Soviet cipher clerk Igor Gouzenko’s defection to Canada, and his revelations of an
extensive spy network operating in North America. The once adversary-turned-ally
was, once again, an enemy.
Historian David Bercuson recognizes that it is difficult, and somewhat risky,
to summarize the views of a group as diverse as Canadian officials in the
Department of External Affairs (DEA). Overall, though, the Ottawa mandarins who
dominated DEA policy certainly to the time of Stalin’s death in 1953 viewed the
Soviet Union as inherently aggressive and driven by both historical imperatives and
communist ideology to obtain global domination.5 Escott Reid, then assistant undersecretary of state for external affairs, and Hume Wrong, then associate undersecretary of state for external affairs, believed Soviet policy to be essentially selfinterested and nationalistic. According to Bercuson, Wrong asserted that Soviet
leaders were “‘unmoved by […] humanitarian considerations.’ Neither Reid nor
Wrong feared imminent war, but only because of the relative weakness of the Soviet
Union.”6 Reid produced one of the first comprehensive studies of American-Soviet
relations and the implications of the Cold War for Canadian foreign policy. He
argued that the Cold War was a conflict between ‘“two governing classes,’ and

5

David J. Bercuson, “‘A People so Ruthless as the Soviets’: Canadian Images of the Cold War and the
Soviet Union, 1946-1950,” in David Davies ed., Canada and the Soviet Experiment: Essays on Canadian
Encounters with Russia and the Soviet Union, 1900-1991 (Toronto: Canadian Scholars’ Press, 1994),
90.
6 Bercuson, “‘A People so Ruthless as the Soviets,’” 90.

39
though operating under incompatible economic and political structures, [the United
States and Soviet Union] each sought security through expansion.”7 Expansion, of
course, was not strictly territorial and military, but also political, commercial,
ideological, and cultural. From abroad in the mid 1940s, Canadian Ambassador to
the Soviet Union Dana Wilgress, who had spent ten years in the USSR before the war
and spoke Russian, shared the so-called ‘hard line’ endorsed by American Chargé
d’Affaires in Moscow George F. Kennan. Wilgress described the Soviet Union “as
hard, opportunistic, and ready to take advantage of any sign of Western weakness.”8
Bercuson considers the American military to have been “periodically more
radical in its assessment of Soviet intentions than was the Canadian,” primarily
because the US Chiefs of Staff “held the whole burden of defending the West on their
shoulders.”9 Clearly, though, Canadian officials also viewed the Soviet Union in a
negative light; their assessments could be just as one-sided and alarmist, and their
antidotes for combating ostensible Soviet aggression just as tough as their US
counterparts.
The mid-1940s witnessed frustration on the bilateral Canadian-Soviet front.
For instance, when the Soviet military attaché in Ottawa requested permission to
visit the Arctic, or Soviet officials wanted to visit metallurgical laboratories and
mining operations, or Soviet scientists requested technical data, Canadians
requested reciprocity. Much to the frustration of Canadian officials, they were
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turned down or more often ignored by their Soviet counterparts.10 How much
information Canadian officials would have granted the Soviets is unknown.
Information and technology were sources of power and tools to be wielded to
propel the nation forward in its quest to advance society.
While bilateral Canadian-Soviet relations in this period were complicated, so
too were multilateral relations between the two countries. Historian William
McGrath accurately argues, “Canadian-Soviet relations in the UN reflected and
contributed to the general trends in East-West relations, through the Cold War and
Détente decades.”

11

During the early post-war years, both countries had

reservations. For instance, the Soviets were wary of potential control of the UN by
the Americans and British, who were expected to have the support of their allies and
client states. While Canada undoubtedly shared policy objectives with its key
western allies as the Soviets expected, it was nonetheless keen to enable middle
powers to play an effective role at the UN, knowing the organization would be
dominated by the great powers. Historian Adam Chapnick argues the main goal of
Canadian representatives at the UN’s founding San Francisco conference was to
highlight the importance of the “functional principle,” which rationalized that states
with the capacity and willingness to contribute would receive influence
commensurate with their contributions.12
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From the very outset, the Canadian-Soviet relationship in the UN was
troubled when the Soviets vetoed Lester Pearson as the first Secretary-General. This
was not, however, the most significant Canadian disappointment. With the onset of
the Cold War, Canadian officials quickly recognized the UN would not be the
effective international institution they had imagined. The UN Charter was largely
based upon an assumption of great power unanimity, which disintegrated almost
immediately.13 Confidential commentary prepared for the delegation to the UN’s
first General Assembly reveals the Canadian government was generally unhappy
with the Security Council. The Council was seen to have “done little more than
provide additional means of publicly expressing differences between the great
powers,” and the Soviet Union was particularly blamed. The Canadian delegation
was advised, “The Security Council has been used, especially by the Soviet
Government, as an instrument in the war of nerves. It was not meant to be such an
instrument or to be an arena for gladiatorial contests between national
champions.”14 Western-Soviet, and therefore Canadian-Soviet, relations at the UN
continued in a strained manner. Whether issues were about political security,
economic or social problems, or organizational matters, the Great Powers typically
disagreed.
In August 1949, the Soviets joined the Americans in the exclusive
thermonuclear club, and Cold War political tensions were amplified and widened
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into the economic realm. Just months prior, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) was formed, and Canada played a notable role in its creation. As a founding
member, Canada participated in multilateral Western efforts to regulate exports to
the Soviet Union and its allies, through the NATO Coordinating Committee (COCOM).
Two years prior in 1947, the Export and Import Permits Act provided authority for
an export controls list to ensure that “articles having a strategic nature or value will
not be made available to any destination wherein their use might be detrimental to
the security of Canada.”15 In other words, through the strict control of exports, a
form of economic warfare was adopted by the NATO alliance and used against the
USSR and the socialist camp.
Anxieties continued to escalate until Joseph Stalin – the Soviet dictator who
had ruled the country with an iron fist since the mid 1920s – died in March 1953. In
the immediate period following Stalin’s death, there were many questions
surrounding Soviet motivations and intentions. Secretary of State for External
Affairs (SSEA) Lester B. Pearson visited the Soviet Union in 1955, keen to discover
what he could about Soviet intentions. This proved to be a watershed year in
Canadian-Soviet relations. “The prospect of improved trade relations was an
additional but decidedly secondary motive,”16 according to George Ignatieff, who
accompanied Pearson on his visit. Associate Deputy Minister of Trade and
Commerce, Mitchell Sharp, and diplomat John Holmes and Ray Crépault of External
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Affairs also accompanied Pearson.17 The visit proved especially significant because
it marked the inauguration of Canadian wheat sales to the Soviet Union, which
continued steadily, albeit in varying degrees, thereafter. Yet the most memorable,
and perhaps comical, event of the visit was the extraordinary drinking party that
occurred when Pearson and his party joined Premier Khrushchev and Chairman of
the Council of Ministers Nikolai Bulganin for what has been described as “the most
extraordinary personal encounter between Canada and the Soviet Union during the
Cold War.”18 While the visit brought trade advantages and possibly advanced an
agenda of scientific, technical, and human exchange, Pearson was convinced that not
much had changed regarding Soviet aims. The USSR’s main objective remained
“security for the Soviet Union and the triumph of communist ideology in a world of
communist states controlled and dominated by Moscow.”19 Overall, the visit did not
alleviate Canadian fears; it may have heightened them. According to historian John
English, Pearson “returned more concerned, even fearful of the future. […] If the
visit’s aim was to allay fears, build confidence, and respect, it failed to do so. He
came home knowing that the Cold War would not soon lose its chill.”20 It is quite
possible that Pearson’s visit to the USSR set a precedent for Canada’s political elite
to visit in the future not only the USSR, but other select East European nations as
17
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well. According to Soviet specialist Leigh Sarty, Pearson’s visit entrenched in the
Soviet leadership “a certain appreciation of the qualities that defined Canada’s
favourable self-image as a ‘middle power’ in this period.” Moreover, it appeared that
the Soviet leadership recognized the role of Canada as an “honest broker,” which
could “usefully contribute to a reduction in East-West tensions.”21
CHANGES BEHIND THE CURTAIN

Little attention has been paid to how Canada’s Soviet policy was shaped by
its relations with select Eastern European states. Even less attention has been given
to Canadian officials’ awareness of the domestic conditions of certain Eastern
European countries (including the USSR), and how changing political trends within
these countries impacted Canadian policy toward these nations, as well as the USSR.
While the Kremlin controlled the Eastern bloc tightly during Stalin’s reign, these
countries increasingly regained various degrees of autonomy after Khrushchev
came to power; this is in addition to Yugoslavia’s independent position. As a result,
Canadian officials began envisioning new policy directions, taking into consideration
the new conditions spreading across the region.
The Twentieth Party Congress of the Soviet Union convened in February
1956. Emissaries from fifty-five Communist workers’ parties attended, including the
leaders of all Eastern European Communist countries, except Yugoslavia. Since this
was the first congress since Stalin’s death, “the gathering presumably was to clarify
the post-Stalin party line, including the posthumous status of Stalin himself.”
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Foreshadowing what was to come, “when delegates first entered the hall, they saw a
large statue of Lenin in its usual place of honour. But there was not even a picture of
Stalin.” According to Taubman, “the foreign policy section of Khrushchev’s speech
broke significantly with Stalinist dogma.” Khrushchev stated that a new world war
was “not fatalistically inevitable,” and that “different countries could take different
roads to socialism.”22
In March 1957, following the dismantling of the Soviet conservative old
guard and just months before the election of John G. Diefenbaker’s Progressive
Conservative government, the DEA’s European Division issued a memorandum
titled “The Canadian Attitude Toward the Soviet Satellites,” which reiterated how
important effective control over the Eastern European satellites was to the USSR’s
power position. Fundamentally, the memo questioned the very foundations of
Canada’s Soviet policy. In the previous four years, since Khrushchev’s rise to power,
it was recognized that a “more liberal policy has caused various Soviet blocs to
develop a more nationalistic and less pro-Soviet orientation.” Treating the various
blocs as a uniform appendage of the Soviet Union, the memo asserted, was
counterproductive; instead, “it would be in [Canada’s] best interest to recognize and
encourage hopeful trends in these countries without encouraging violence, and to
modify our attitudes toward each state as the situation seemed to warrant.”23 In
other words, Canada should no longer simply view the USSR as the overarching
22

William Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man and His Era (New York & London: W.W. Norton &
Company, 2003), 270-271.
23 Documents on Canadian External Relations (hereafter DCER), Vol. 23. 523. Memorandum by
European Division, “The Canadian Attitude Toward the Soviet Satellites,” Ottawa, March 18, 1957.
DEA/50128-B-40.

46
policy steward of the Eastern European region. In fact, various communist nations
should be encouraged to follow their own foreign policy initiatives. Awareness that
the Eastern bloc was less homogenous than once believed continued under the
Diefenbaker government, and this perception began to shape policy.
A few months following the European Division’s memorandum, a new
assessment was conducted on the impact of recent Soviet events (namely the
changing of the old guard) on the satellite states. The change to the Soviet balance of
forces caused a ripple effect throughout the Eastern bloc countries. However, the
shift in Soviet leadership was not exactly mirrored in the Soviet satellites, as had
typically occurred under Stalin. Traditionally, if Stalin modified the power structure,
“like water flowing between inter-connected vessels,” the satellites would have
followed suit. But, since the Twentieth Party Congress, the former automatic
adjustments had been “subject to some modification.”24 Ultimately, for the Eastern
bloc satellites, Khrushchev’s solidification of power meant “an affirmation of the
new, more independent relations between the USSR and the satellites.” The
memorandum concluded:
The proof that the satellite leaders are no longer the complete puppets
they were under Stalin is demonstrated by the varied reactions in each
satellite to the defeat of the conservative leaders in the USSR, and in
particular, by the expulsion of moderates in Bulgaria while extremists
in Rumania were dismissed. The establishment of collective
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leadership in the Soviet Union has greatly limited the personal
dependence of satellite leaders.25
The European Division’s recognition that the satellites acquired at least some
autonomy became integral to future policy development towards that region as a
whole. Effectively, Khrushchev’s relaxation of control of the Eastern bloc prompted
Canada to nurture closer ties with select Eastern European countries and the Soviet
Union itself.
In a reexamination of the international balance of power, Robert Ford,26 who
at this time was Canadian ambassador to Colombia but still a preeminent authority
on the Soviet Union, explained that Canada was actually entering an era of greater
flexibility in the international arena, since the “very overwhelming power held in
equal strength by the two superpowers in a way balances out and permits greater
independence to the second rank powers,” Canada included. Echoing the European
Division’s view, Ford argued, “the only area where [Canada has] a good chance of regaining ground is in Central and Eastern Europe, and this may prove to be the area
of the greatest importance in the struggle with Soviet communism.”27 This train of
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thought was embraced by civil servants and ministers alike. Addressing the subject
of exchanges between Canada and the communist bloc, SSEA Sidney Smith advised
Cabinet to consider these on their merits. He suggested, “On exchanges with Poland
and Yugoslavia, the government should be as forthcoming as possible, in order to
weaken the ties of these countries with the Soviet bloc and to increase their political
and commercial links with the west.” 28 Crucially, Poland and Yugoslavia were
singled out as countries to pursue, for reasons the present work will explore below.
Importantly,

the

recognition

that

Communist

Europe

was

increasingly

heterogeneous clearly had reverberated up through the Department to the Minister,
who now also espoused this view.
It is important to understand that Canada’s Soviet and Eastern European
policy was driven by events and developments east of the Iron Curtain, either within
individual countries or between the USSR and other socialist states. While broad
East-West Cold War events and trends did influence Canadian policy, Canadian
officials’ awareness of the domestic trends occurring within Eastern European
states also contributed to their policy choices. The forces driving Khrushchev’s
foreign policy, such as the change in Soviet leadership, were clear to Canadian
officials. Behind the scenes, the European Division critically and rationally examined
the changes occurring in the Soviet Union and paid particular attention to
transformations within the top political apparatus. They recognized changes
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occurring as a result of Khrushchev’s slow liberalization and believed the Soviet
Union was no longer governed by unyielding Stalinist ideology. In a memorandum
to Smith, Under-Secretary of State of External Affairs (USSEA) Jules Léger discussed
the changes in the Soviet Presidium29 and Council of Ministers and their impact on
Soviet foreign policy. Many of Stalin’s conservative old guard – namely Vyacheslav
Molotov, Lazar Kaganovich, and Georgy Malenkov – and others, including Dmitri
Shepilov, Maksim Saburov, and Mikhail Pervukhin, were removed from positions of
power and charged with obstructing the fulfillment of the decisions of the Twentieth
Party Congress, where Khrushchev denounced Stalin’s dictatorship. According to a
Kremlin communiqué, they were “guilty of obstructing the development of peaceful
co-existence, opposing decentralization of Soviet industry, opposing the granting of
material incentives in agriculture, and opposing the abolition of all manifestations of
the cult of personality.”30 Molotov was singled out because he opposed the idea that
a reduction of tension in international affairs could be achieved by personal contacts
between Soviet and Western leaders.31
By mid-1957, Khrushchev had secured power after a transitional phase of
jockeying among party leaders. As a modernizer, he ushered in a new phase in
Soviet foreign policy and laid the ideological, institutional, and policy foundations
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for Soviet international behaviour up to and including the Gorbachev period.32
Under-Secretary Léger believed Khrushchev’s motives to be not only political and
ideological but also economic:
We can expect an unrestrained effort to accomplish the economic ends
which Khrushchev has made clear are close to his heart – at home,
equality with the United States in per capita production, especially in
agricultural products; abroad, competitive co-existence until world
socialism is achieved. […] The foreign policy which we have come to
associate with Khrushchev during the past three years, and which was
interrupted by Hungary, will probably continue.33
Marginal notes recorded, “PM has read and remarked that this is an excellent
paper”, 34 suggesting Diefenbaker shared Léger’s opinion. Frequently, historians
have argued that Diefenbaker was continuously at odds with the DEA, particularly at
the beginning of his term, but this suggests otherwise; here, his stance regarding the
new Soviet direction aligned with that of the Department.
Diefenbaker and DEA officials also shared the view that Khrushchev was
different from his predecessor. Khrushchev welcomed competition with the US
throughout the world, because he truly believed in the moral and eventual material
superiority of his socioeconomic system.35 According to historian Vladislav Zubok,
Khrushchev “genuinely thought that the Soviet Union could catch up with and
surpass the United States in the fields of science, technology, consumer goods, and
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overall living standards.”36 Oleg Troyanovsky, Khrushchev’s assistant for foreign
affairs, states that immediately following Stalin’s death in 1953 the international
situation was so tense that “another turn of the screw might have led to disaster.”37
Yet, the screw initially loosened following Khrushchev’s ascension to power, and
international tensions lessened temporarily. Troyanovsky argues, “Khrushchev was
the driving force behind the effort to move the world away from the edge of the
abyss, where it stood at the beginning of 1953.”38 Whether Khrushchev actually
moved the world away from the edge of the abyss in the late 1950s is secondary to
the point that he was unlike his predecessor, a fact Canadian officials had
recognized.
Some within the DEA were concerned that because Khrushchev’s position
was not as authoritative as Stalin’s, his policy aims were also not as unshakeable and
definite. If Khrushchev’s grip on power ultimately proved not as tight as Stalin’s,
there could be negative repercussions. In a note on Soviet intentions prepared for a
summit meeting in 1958, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
John Holmes, who also served briefly in the USSR in the late 1940s, warned that
Khrushchev “must also listen to, and in some cases give way to, powerful economic
interests and to lobbies or cliques within the Central Committee or among Ministers.
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We can never be sure, therefore, whether the pure Khrushchevian conception will
triumph at any particular moment.”39 Somewhat optimistically, Holmes stated,
there is a certain amount of good evidence for accepting, at least to some
extent, the interpretation of Khrushchev as the force of liberalism which
is given to us by Tito and Gomulka. In spite of the crudities of his
propaganda and the vehemence of his language, there is in Khrushchev a
certain rationality and sober common sense with which one might come
to terms.40
In the end, however, Holmes preached prudence. He was nervous that, in its study of
Soviet intentions, the DEA could not know the extent to which Soviet intentions
were firm or transient. “Khrushchev is probably quite sincere in his desire for
peaceful co-existence,” stated Holmes. But the real trouble had less to do with
Khrushchev’s intentions and more to do with the fact “that Khrushchev might so
easily be pushed aside by someone else equally sincere but with an even less
attractive interpretation of the interests of the Soviet Union.” To drive the point
home, Holmes presented a cautionary rhetorical question:
What if we were to accept Khrushchev’s intentions as fixed Soviet policy
and reach with him an agreement which would be a perfectly
satisfactory agreement so long as Khrushchev’s policy maintained, only
to find out that the man in whose conception of Soviet interests we had
placed our trust was deposed a few months after a Summit meeting or
had lost his influence to a group which would exploit the settlement in a
different way?41
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In other words, while Holmes may have been willing to cautiously trust
Khrushchev’s policies and intentions, he did not necessarily trust the capricious
political dynamic – whether real or perceived – that existed in Soviet Russia.
Canadian officials’ awareness of the changing dynamics behind the Iron
Curtain resulted in a renewal of existing policy, originating from the European
Division. A firm understanding that the region was no longer dominated like it once
was under Stalin led officials to see the benefits of pursuing bilateral foreign
relations with the USSR as well as select Eastern European nations, particularly
Poland and Yugoslavia. This highlights how, during this earlier period, Canadian
officials were pragmatic in their thinking. It also suggests that Canadian officials’
attempt to reduce Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe was not simply an
afterthought related to broader East-West trends, but rather a calculated move
pursued by the government to exercise influence as a middle power against Eastern
European communism.
By studying the dynamic between Canada – a secondary power – and certain
Eastern European countries – secondary powers relative to the USSR – we see how
the Cold War was not simply a rigidly binary contest between two superpowers.
Instead, conflicts played out in a much more fluid and complex manner, with
countries pursuing policies that, at times, could be driven more by their own needs
and less by stiff dualistic conceptions of ideological division. This highlights the
importance of middlepowerism to the Cold War conflict, and illustrates how some
secondary powers calculated changing trends within other similarly powerful
states.
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THE ECONOMIC OFFENSIVE

The recognition of changing tides behind the Iron Curtain contributed to the
perception of the Soviet Union as more than simply a political and military threat.
For Canadian officials, Soviet non-military actions were also considered real
challenges to Western democracy and normal international commercial relations. In
particular, Soviet advancements in trade and commercial relations were viewed
through an ideological lens. Consequently, Soviet economic competition became
inextricably associated with the global spread of communism. Canadian officials,
adopting contemporary Cold War parlance, deemed this competition an economic
offensive. The so-called economic offensive was seen as a direct challenge to Canada
and the West’s economic, political, and social systems. When expedient, however,
Canadian officials viewed the Soviet Union not only as a potential economic threat,
but also a commercial possibility. Said differently, the USSR was seen as both a
competitor and customer. “Canadians, more so than any other people in the world,”
stated Holmes,
depend on trade for their national prosperity. […] So we must be
energetic in promoting our commerce and exploiting our resources. We
must take a very earnest interest in international trade and monetary
organization, encourage investments, and keep sweet our general
political relations with countries all over the world – whose habits and
governments we may not like but with whom we have to buy and sell.42
To fully understand Canadian-Soviet relations during this period, the significance of
the so-called Soviet economic offensive must be woven into the fabric of our
understanding of Canadian-Soviet diplomacy, just as fears of Soviet military
expansionism and their nuclear capabilities were recognized as integral to the
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political discourse of the late 1940s and early 1950s. Concern over Soviet nonmilitary advances was rooted not simply in political ideology, but was also related to
Canadian officials’ pragmatic approach to Cold War diplomacy with respect to
political and foreign economic relations and to their recognition of Canada’s
position as a middle power in the fight against Soviet communism.
The fact that the fear of Soviet non-military advancements was widespread
among officials and politicians alike in Ottawa is an important factor in appreciating
the significance of what they perceived to be a real and potential threat to Western
democracy. In 1954, Robert Ford argued in a paper titled, “Relations with the USSR:
A Reassessment,” that the “primary Soviet threat was not military; it was one of
economic and political disintegration.”43 Shortly after the Twentieth Party Congress
in February 1956, the Soviet government released 100,000 copies of Yu. B. Borisov’s
booklet, “On Peaceful Coexistence and the Co-operation of Two Systems.” It
optimistically explained that socialism would win a complete victory on an
economic battleground, and that new countries emerging from colonialism would
adopt the Soviet model. Moreover, Borisov stressed how peaceful co-existence was
not only possible, but also necessary to ensure international socialism’s success.44
As leader of the opposition in 1956, Diefenbaker recognized that the
hydrogen bomb brought equality in military preparedness and argued that the USSR
would not try and overrun the world by force. In the House of Commons, he
reasoned,
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the USSR has changed its course to an economic offensive. […] They
have changed from a reliance on military force to a reliance on
economic infiltration. […] In other words, this new scheme shows a
flexibility of policy under the present leaders that Stalin never achieved
or never tried to achieve.45
Diefenbaker recognized the shift in Soviet policy from the hardline Stalinist position
to Khrushchev’s more pragmatic policies and emphasized that it was the Soviet
market, not Soviet missiles, that posed a threat to Canada. Once in office, he did not
stray from his belief that the Soviets were a clear economic competitor. In a speech
delivered in Montreal, addressing the challenges of Soviet technology, Diefenbaker
discussed Russia’s successful launch of the first artificial satellite. He stated that one
lone scientist pouring over his books or working with a few associates in a
laboratory did not accomplish the feat. Diefenbaker emphasized the “vast
combination of scientific institutions and factories, carrying out the ideas of an army
of the most highly trained scientists, engineers, and technicians.”46 Diefenbaker
highlighted the Soviet arsenal of people pushing forward what was perceived as the
juggernaut of Soviet industry; he recognized that the industrial and economic
footing was vast, strong, and continuing to develop. While the launch of a space
satellite certainly showcased Soviet missile delivery capabilities, Diefenbaker chose
to emphasize the industrial and technological capacity required behind the scenes
for such an impressive accomplishment that would contribute to the further
development of Soviet industry.
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Canadian officials generally believed that Khrushchev was sincere about
peaceful co-existence. The general consensus was that the Soviets were pushing to
outflank, and ultimately overtake, the West through economic tactics. Assistant
Under-Secretary for External Affairs J. B. C. Watkins, 47 who also served as
Ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1954-56, stressed the military stalemate that
confronted the US and USSR. With a dash of dark humour and bleak candidness
Watkins stated,
[b]oth the US and the USSR now had enough hydrogen bombs to
annihilate each other if either one of them had a sufficiently strong
suicidal impulse to attack, or if somebody on either side made a
mistake. The Russians are as much the prisoners of this new situation
as the Americans. In NATO parlance, they are "interdependent" —
with a vengeance. While it is fairly obvious that neither particularly
relishes this constrained bedfellowship, so to speak, the Russians
seem to have adjusted to it more quickly than the Americans, possibly
because they seem to have been thinking on the basis of an atomic
stalemate at least since 1954, and the full implications of the new
weapons have had more time to penetrate.48
As Canadian officials began conceptualizing the USSR as an economic threat, they
began seeing firsthand the potential impact of Soviet commercial advancements.
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Even Commonwealth connections were not impervious to Soviet economic
competition. Historian Ian Drummond explains that Canadian-Soviet competition
always related to “fabricated materials inedible” (FMI).

These goods are

comparatively simple manufactures, like lumber, plywood, paper, aluminum, and
other non-ferrous metals. During the late 1950s and 60s, Canadian exporters began
to meet new Soviet competition in several of these commodities, including
aluminum for the first time.49 The competition was especially noticeable in the
United Kingdom, a comparatively open market that had traditionally imported most
of it lumber and aluminum. Minister of Trade and Commerce Gordon Churchill
addressed Canadian aluminum exports specifically, in the House of Commons:
[w]e have looked into that threat. We have made representations to the
United Kingdom, one of the great buyers of our aluminum, asking them
to continue to purchase the Canadian product despite offers that might
be made by the Russians at a much lower figure. […] We are fully aware
of the threat posed by the economic warfare of communist countries.”50
By this time, Canadian exporters were complaining that Soviet competition was
“unfair,” that Soviet producers “did not know what their goods cost,” or even that
Soviet exporters deliberately dumped commodities so as to disorganize world
markets. These views were less frequently voiced as time passed, and according to
Drummond, “there can be little doubt that Soviet competition became less ‘unfair’
with each succeeding year.” Besides, Soviet producers and exporters certainly knew,
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in ruble terms, whether or not they were making a profit or a loss on each export
transaction.51
Drummond explains that Soviet aluminum exports were part of a broader
export drive in Western Europe, but from the Canadian point of view, the export
drive seemed to be concentrated on FMI, and especially on aluminum and softwood
lumber. From 1957 to 1959, Soviet sales of aluminum to Western Europe rose by 40
percent, and to the UK by approximately 70 percent.52 One year after Churchill’s
statement to the House of Commons, the Commonwealth Liaison Committee
reported that the USSR had agreed to limit its sales of aluminum to the UK. The
report warned, however, that the threat was not abated, since “there is a continuous
danger that bloc exports of this commodity could be channeled from the Eastern
European satellites.”53 Moreover, the USSR sought to export aluminum to West
Germany, India, and Spain, all important markets for Canadian aluminum. 54
Canadian forest exports also faced competition, since the USSR had “substantially
increased its softwood lumber exports to the United Kingdom.”55 Soviet economic
advances, then, directly challenged exports in Canadian resources. Even longstanding Commonwealth connections were at times in jeopardy due to the enticing
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prices offered by the Soviet bloc. Essentially, the Soviet drive to increase exports
represented potentially dangerous political and ideological leverage on a global
scale.
Liberal Leader of the Opposition Lester Pearson also recognized the
competition posed to Canadian trade by Soviet economic advancement and asserted
that the Soviets were dumping goods onto the world market for more than simply
economic reasons. Pearson summed up the situation by stating, “experience in
Europe during recent months has shown that with respect to commodities such as
lumber, pulp, aluminum, oil, and rails, [the Soviets] are putting these goods into the
market at a price with which on this side we cannot compete.”56 The economic
offensive was not just a propaganda ploy used by the Diefenbaker government to
justify its foreign policies or to raise fear; rather, Canadian politicians, regardless of
political party, perceived the Soviet economic offensive as a real challenge to
Canadian commercial relations.
The increased Soviet presence in global markets was reinforced with refined
and insistent business tactics. The Russians were not only advanced weapons
makers, but also shrewd businessmen. In the House of Commons, Conservative MP
Joseph Van Horne asserted the Soviets have “more aggressive and more expert
selling agents and the impression they give to buying countries is this: ‘We want the
business and we will do what we have to do to get it.’”57 Van Horne explained that
while on a business trip in Paris, he and Commercial Attaché Robert Campbell Smith
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visited the presidents of two of the largest buyers of pulpwood in France. Each
previously purchased the product from Canadian companies and had done so for
many years, but they had switched to purchasing pulpwood from the Soviet Union.
According to both French businessmen, the quality of Russian wood was good,
contracts were carried out to the letter, and no complaints arose about the quality
or quantity involved. In the end, “they get a better deal from [the Soviet Union] than
they get from Canada.” Van Horne added, “Russia will accept [France’s] currency
while we sit back and insist on dollars. Russia does business how and where it can
be done.”58
In the House of Commons, Secretary of State for External Affairs Sidney
Smith asserted that “[b]y economic penetration, by barter systems and loans and
other means [the Soviet Union is] making advances. […] To me, that might mean that
they will win the victory without ever firing a shot. I regard this as one of the most
urgent aspects of our foreign relations.” 59 Soon afterwards, Smith warned the
Cabinet Defence Committee that “Soviet economic strength and the use made of that
strength throughout the world, poses a threat to the West as formidable as is the
Soviet military threat.”60
By the late 1950s, anxiety over what contemporaries considered the Soviet
economic offensive was reinforced in a number of ways: by Soviet Deputy Premier
Kozlov’s visit to American industrialists; by the five-year Anglo-Soviet trade
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agreement, which called for greatly expanded trade; by the global dip in tin prices as
a result of increased Soviet sales; by the USSR’s agreement to loan $100 million to
Ethiopia, another $100 million to Argentina, and $378 Million to India; and by 4,000
Communist bloc technicians who “roam the world.”61 Since Canada and Russia share
similar geographical and natural environments, the export of natural and
manufactured resources was of particular concern to Canadian officials and
exporters. A 1958 report by the Commonwealth Liaison Committee stated that the
very nature of the Soviet bloc economic system could destabilize global markets.
Considerations of price and cost and the pressure of private interests that are
normal to a capitalist system could largely be ignored by these countries.62 As a
result, these tactics were expected to prove particularly problematic for Canadian
exports. The fear of the economic offensive was political and ideological with
respect to the global spread of communism, but these Canadian concerns
demonstrate how global commercial relations are rarely isolated from international
politics.
In 1959, the prime minister delivered a speech titled “A Re-Assessment of
Soviet Attitudes,” in which he highlighted his understanding that Khrushchev had
altered his foreign policy course from Stalin’s: “Mr. Khrushchev is a realist. He
knows that modern warfare is self-defeating and cannot be employed in the
traditional way to back up the aims of foreign policy. The thought of nuclear war is
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no less appalling to Mr. Khrushchev than it is to the West.” 63 Diefenbaker
understood that Khrushchev had recognized world domination could no longer be
achieved at the barrel of a gun, or the tip of a missile. Diefenbaker’s statement also
reinforces the importance the Canadian government attached to the changes in the
power dynamic among Soviet leaders. Diefenbaker was correct to assume that
Khrushchev did not want nuclear war. As historian Kitty Newman observes,
“Khrushchev was acutely aware of the terrible impact of atomic warfare on the
human race.”64
Undersecretary Norman Robertson shared the view that the Soviets
conceived of communism’s ultimate victory not necessarily in military terms,
primarily as a consequence of the nuclear stalemate. In a memorandum to his
minister, Robertson stated,
[t]here is no doubt in my mind that the Soviet leaders still believe in
the inevitable supremacy of Communism. They believe also that their
political and economic systems are better than those of the free
nations. The evidence is, however, that they no longer think war
between themselves and the capitalist countries to be an inevitable or
even necessary step in their attempt to communize the world.
Moreover, they seem to recognize that a major war would result in
their own destruction.65
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Howard Green became secretary of state for external affairs following Smith’s
sudden death in 1959. When assessing Green’s legacy in External Affairs, historians
have typically highlighted his gladiatorial efforts in the realm of nuclear
disarmament. Yet, Green was also fundamentally aware of the USSR’s growing nonmilitary advancements and what these could mean to the world at large. With
regard to Canada specifically, Green warned that the USSR’s drive to expand export
markets was of particular concern, since many items were competitive with
Canada’s. In a speech to the Vancouver Board of Trade, Green made clear that while
NATO was initially created for the main purpose of providing security in the face of
growing Soviet military advancements, the “Soviet challenge was in the process of
change – that we are entering upon a new phase of international relations in which
[…] competitive co-existence in the economic and ideological spheres will continue
unabated.”66 In comparison to the potential threat of Soviet aggression, for which
the alliance was initially created, Green maintained that the Soviet economic
offensive was no less demanding and that all NATO member nations realized this
fact.67
The fact that the Soviet Union was growing economically was not solely
viewed as a threat, however. For instance, Green suggested it could be advantageous
to Canada: “Trade is […] a two-way business, and increased exports from the Soviet
group of countries can mean increased opportunities to sell our goods to them.
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Without in any way minimizing the risks of East-West trade, I would say that there
is no need for any suggestion of defeatism about our prospects.” In other words,
Green viewed the USSR as both a competitor and customer. Green’s logic was rooted
in his understanding that the USSR was inclined to improve its domestic standard of
living. As a result, the Soviet Union could “absorb large imports of many goods from
Western countries in return for Soviet exports.”68 The Soviet effort to increase
integration within a competitive international market, Green believed, could benefit
Canadian industries with a surplus of goods to sell. Essentially, Green believed in the
need to preserve a balance between optimism and caution when it came to potential
benefits and downfalls of the so-called economic offensive. Canadian officials’ beliefs
that the Soviet Union no longer wanted war but that it posed an economic offensive
were intrinsically linked. Though it is hardly surprising the Soviet Union sought and
pursued economic expansion and international trade, the ideological fear of the
spread of communism led Canadian officials to see these efforts as an “offensive” in
the Cold War.
CANADA, NATO, AND THE USSR’S NON-MILITARY ADVANCEMENTS

The belief that war was not inevitable is an important ideological shift that
occurred during the Khrushchev years, and speaks to the fact that Canada’s Soviet
and Eastern European policy was largely impacted by internal political
developments east of the Iron Curtain. Ideology aside, the economic and political
“threats” posed by Soviet communism were clearly entrenched in the minds of

LAC, MG32 B13, Vol. 8, File 9, File no. R4469-0-1-E, Howard Green Papers, External Affairs
Committee, “Economic Relations with the Soviet Union,” No date.
68

66
Canadian officials long before the Diefenbaker government arrived in office, and the
efforts to counter these threats in a multilateral framework can be dated to NATO’s
creation. During negotiations to establish the alliance in the late 1940s, Canadian
delegates pressed for more than simply a military coalition. Then Prime Minister
Louis St. Laurent and External Affairs Minister Lester Pearson hoped that the treaty
would also establish a basis for the gradual political and economic unification of the
North Atlantic community. 69 Many mandarins at External Affairs shared this
perspective. For instance, Norman Robertson was not insensitive to the dangers
posed by the Soviet Union, but his major interest in the proposed alliance was with
the economic and political problems it might help to resolve, and he saw the
usefulness of it as an instrument of Canadian economic foreign policy.70 As a result
of this thinking, Canadian negotiators argued for what became Article 2, close
collaboration within the alliance on cultural and social issues, and specifically
economic cooperation.
In the end, however, Article 2 proved more useful as a tool for domestic
politicking in Canada than as real grounds for alliance cooperation.71 Escott Reid, a
self-proclaimed radical mandarin, was disappointed that NATO did not make real
efforts to achieve economic, social, and cultural cooperation or to promote

69

Escott Reid, Radical Mandarin: The Memoirs of Escott Reid (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1989), 233.
70 J.L. Granatstein, A Man of Influence: Norman A. Robertson and Canadian Statecraft, 1929-68
(Deneau Publishers & Company Ltd., 1981), 236.
71 For instance, St. Laurent and Pearson felt that Article 2 needed to be strengthened in part because
an election was close on the horizon and they understood that the public would want a strong nonmilitary commitment and a promise for a strong social, economic, and cultural mandate. James Eayrs,
In Defence of Canada: Volume IV, Growing Up Allied (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1980), 121.

67
democracy within member states.72 Enthusiasm for Article 2 seemed to evaporate
once the Treaty was signed and ratified; despite the efforts by Canadian officials to
incorporate it into the Treaty, little was done to translate the Article’s aspirations
into practical accomplishments.73 It is important to note that even during the early
phases of the Cold War, as divisions were solidified and alliances formed, plans to
counter non-military advances were also a crucial component of Canadian officials’
thinking. Yet, despite the NATO alliance’s theoretical appreciation that a unified
counteroffensive against Soviet non-military advances may be advantageous, the
lack of alliance cooperation on this front persisted.
In 1959 Ford asserted, “[t]he Russians wanted to expand the areas of
Communist influence and undermine the [NATO] alliance, not by force but by means
of ‘ideological drives, trade, and aid’ and by using skillful diplomacy consisting of
‘peace, disarmament, and normalcy, including the possibility of gradually breaking
up the NATO alliance.’”74 To the USSR and Soviet bloc countries, the NATO alliance
was more than a military threat as well. Yet, when it came to each other’s respective
alliances, both East and West typically chose to emphasize publicly military threats
over potential economic perils. Perhaps both the Canadian and Soviet governments
believed that society generally found it easier to imagine their cities being leveled by
nuclear bombs than to comprehend the possible threat of a shifting global economy.
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Diefenbaker expressed concerns similar to those of Ford and Cabinet
colleagues regarding the Soviet threat to the NATO alliance. Khrushchev’s
restructured foreign policy of conciliation, he warned, “offers a better prospect of
driving wedges into the ranks of his diplomatic adversaries, of creating splits among
members of NATO.”75 Just as he believed Khrushchev wanted to splinter the NATO
alliance, Canada wanted to help pry apart the Eastern bloc from the clutches of the
Soviet Union, while simultaneously promoting further divisions between the USSR
and other communist nations, such as Yugoslavia. Indeed, the NATO alliance viewed
Soviet economic advancement as an issue to be kept at the forefront of its agenda. A
1960 press communiqué noted that the Permanent Representatives were instructed
to follow up previous studies in order to enable them to “watch the developments of
the Communist economic offensive and to concert the necessary defensive
measures.”76 While the alliance would not formulate a cohesive, collective response
against the economic advancements of the Eastern bloc, its members were willing to
discuss the matter with one another and to discuss openly how the economic
advances might impact the alliance.
In 1960, a Canadian statement on East-West relations delivered to the
Chairman of the NATO alliance noted the differing opinions expressed on the
advisability of Western leaders engaging in a preliminary discussion of trade with
the USSR at an upcoming summit meeting. Canada believed the alliance should be
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prepared to do so, since the “current Soviet trade programme has special
significance for Canada because many of the main exports of the USSR compete with
Canadian commodities.”77 Further, the statement affirmed that Canada believed
growing East-West trade relations “must be a part of any broad efforts to reach
peaceful settlement of outstanding problems between the Soviet bloc and the
West.” 78 This meant, broad discussions between Soviet Russia and Western
representatives of NATO could be pursued, but specific and detailed discussions on
particular economic and trade developments should not take place at the summit.
Individual countries should, along with the proper, national organizational bodies,
engage in bilateral conversations with Soviet bloc countries.
On the whole, Canadian representatives felt that NATO had a continuing role
to play as a forum for confidential consultation on the economic field, “but not as an
agency for Western action.” Combating Soviet economic advancements directly was
not the job of NATO. Rather, it was the Canadian position that “the Communist
economic challenge must be met by pursuing effective policies in the international
specialized bodies concerned with economic questions and in bilateral relations
with other countries” (emphasis added). Canada did, however, believe that NATO
should remain broadly vigilant of the Soviet economic challenge and keep it “under
close examination.”79
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Overall, the Canadian position held that NATO’s main role should be to keep a
“close watch over developments, domestic and external, in communist economic
policies, pointing [out] danger areas which deserve special attention” since the
communist economic challenge “is bound to become increasingly serious and
widespread.”80 When it came time to take active measures against the Communist
economic challenge, Canada recognized the limitations inherent in Article 2 of the
Treaty and asserted, “it was never intended that NATO should be an instrument for
the implementation of economic policies.”81 The fact that the Canadian government
wanted NATO only to provide general and broad oversight suggests Canada
considered its own direction and policy for combating the Soviet economic offensive
would be more effective and would better serve its own national interests.
BILATERAL SUMMITRY

Changing political dynamics behind the Iron Curtain prompted Canadian
officials to reconsider their Eastern European policy and promoted open politicaldiplomatic discourse. While Soviet economic expansion was certainly perceived as a
potential threat to Canadian commercial endeavors, this did not inhibit CanadianSoviet political dialogue. Frank and open discussions were a favourable course of
action pursued by the Diefenbaker government, a continuation of the approach
pursued by the previous Liberal government. In the end, however, because Canada
was tightly ensconced within NATO, progressive and meaningful bilateral political
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dialogue was inherently limited. Middle power influence could not easily be
exercised in bilateral relations with the Soviet Union because Canada was also
constrained by its military alliance.
Despite fundamentally different political and ideological positions, official
representatives from Canada and the USSR were willing to promote a cordial and
professional political relationship. Much has been made of the series of high-level
visits in 1959, including British Prime Minister Macmillan and Vice-President
Richard Nixon’s visits to Moscow, and Mikoyan’s visit to the US, for instance. This
bilateral summitry, as Diefenbaker’s foreign policy steward and liaison between the
Prime Minister’s office and the DEA Basil Robinson suggests, contributed to a
significant reduction in East-West tensions. 82 Meetings between the great and
middle powers, however, have remained relatively unexamined, despite their
contribution to international political relations.
The significance of great power-middle power bilateral meetings must not be
over-exaggerated. At the same time, they should not be ignored, since they highlight
the very real role middle powers played. The news that Khrushchev was going to
visit the United States in 1960 raised immediately the question whether he should
be invited to Canada. According to Basil Robinson, Diefenbaker kept weighing the
arguments for and against this possibility. On the positive side, such visits made for
good publicity; they were consistent with his well-advertised belief in the value of
personal contacts; and public opinion, on the whole, favoured an invitation to
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Khrushchev. And on a much more personal note, if Diefenbaker were to be involved
in a meeting with Khrushchev, he would, in Robinson’s words, “be entering into an
exclusive fraternity of leaders who had gone into the ring with Khrushchev. Such an
occasion would, in theory at least, consummate his standing on the world stage and
would match, if not surpass, anything Pearson had done publicly in relations with
the Soviet government.” As for potential negative consequences, many of the East
European groups in Canada – Hungarian, Ukrainian, and those from the Baltic
regions – would be bitterly opposed to any gesture which might be interpreted as
conciliatory towards the USSR.83
In a memorandum to Diefenbaker regarding the possibility of Khrushchev
visiting Canada, additional positive consequences not mentioned by Robinson were
outlined. For instance, since one of the underlying considerations of President
Dwight Eisenhower’s invitation to Khrushchev was the view that the visit would
provide a means of correcting Khrushchev’s profound misconceptions of political,
social, and economic life in the United States, a visit to Canada would presumably
heighten whatever influence his visit to North America might have in this respect,
particularly by providing Khrushchev with the opportunity to become acquainted
with the Western way of life as pursued by a middle power. Also, a visit could
possibly correct the misconception regarding the relationship between Canada and
the United States. A visit to Canada coming after his stay in the US would provide an
opportunity for Khrushchev to gain a better understanding of the quality of this
relationship than if he was to only visit the US. Lastly, discussions in Ottawa with
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Khrushchev on outstanding East-West issues would provide him with an indication
of the solidarity of Western views and at the same time permit him to view the
West’s position from a different perspective than may have been the case in
Washington.84
In the end, while Khrushchev never came to Canada, other high level Soviet
officials did. For instance, in November 1959, on a stopover flight to Mexico and the
US, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers Anastas Mikoyan visited Halifax.
His welcoming party included the Premier of Nova Scotia, Robert Stanfield, the
federal Minister of Fisheries, Angus MacLean, and the Chief of Protocol of the DEA,
H.F. Feaver. Minutes before landing, Mikoyan was greeted with a radio message
from Diefenbaker welcoming him to Canada.
Much to the surprise of the visiting delegation and their Canadian hosts, a
large number of journalists and radio and television operators awaited them;
Mikoyan promptly agreed to go to C.H.N.S. radio station for an interview. According
to Feaver, Mikoyan “was very adroit, evasive, amusing, forceful, voluble and
friendly.” After his interview, Mikoyan went to some effort to make a good public
impression as he seized the opportunity to talk to two groups of people. To one
group, comprised mostly of women, he had this to say:
I bring you a message from the women of the Soviet Union. They send
greetings of friendship to you women of Canada and want me to tell you
that their greatest wish is for peace throughout the world so that they and the women of all countries - can live in happiness with their
families.
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Later, a dinner was held in Mikoyan’s honour. In the end, Feaver concluded, “the
stop-over visit can be regarded as successful from both the Canadian and the Soviet
viewpoints.”85
According to Canada’s ambassador in the USSR, David M. Johnson, Mikoyan’s
brief visit to Halifax “received very full coverage in the Soviet press.” Both Pravda
and Izvestia carried full stories. According to Johnson, they paid particular attention
to Mikoyan’s discussions with “ordinary Canadians, in particular Canadian women,
and with trade union leaders from the Atlantic.”86 It is likely that Mikoyan engaged
with the Canadian crowds for propaganda purposes, not because he was a
communist, but simply a politician. Regardless, Mikoyan’s brief stop-over visit
suggests that each country was willing to encourage political cooperation, and the
willingness to cooperate filtered down from those in positions of high power.
Although Khrushchev never visited Canada and never formally met
Diefenbaker face to face, the two leaders did exchange letters in late 1958, on
Khrushchev’s initiative. Khrushchev’s letter to Diefenbaker was part of a larger
letter writing campaign to various Western leaders. In April 1958, Khrushchev
explained to Diefenbaker that the Soviet government “has decided to stop,
unilaterally, the testing of all types of atomic and hydrogen weapons from March 31,
1958.” Khrushchev then called upon the Canadian government to support its
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initiative.

87

According to Basil Robinson, while brainstorming ideas with

Diefenbaker about the direction and tone of his response, the Prime Minister
insisted on reversing the Soviet tactic of forcing Western governments into a
position of having to answer questions “by asking certain questions of Mr.
Khrushchev.” While Robinson stressed to the Under-Secretary that Diefenbaker was
just “throwing out ideas for consideration and that he was open to official
recommendations,” it was also clear that the Prime Minister was emphatic on the
decision to “take the offensive in the correspondence with the Soviet Government”
and was “attracted by the tactic of asking questions of Mr. Khrushchev.”88
The DEA and SSEA Smith agreed. Smith stated, “if we the take the offensive in
our reply it undoubtedly creates a good balance in exchanges with the Soviet Union.”
Smith then warned that it would be “unprofitable at this stage to carry this approach
to the point where we might encourage the Soviet leaders to prolong their letter
writing campaign…” In other words, Smith agreed that an “offensive” approach to
the reply was good, if a more conciliatory tone could be simultaneously pursued.
Importantly, Smith reiterated the well-established DEA policy that “initiatives
should be developed within the NATO Council.” He lamented that imaginative
approaches in this context could be difficult, but suggested,
Canada can exercise a considerable influence in an indirect way by
helping to develop programmes of action through NATO and we [the
DEA] believe that this is preferable to the taking of any special initiative
87
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in dealings with the Soviet Union which Canada might find it difficult to
carry further alone. 89
Smith’s statement that Canada could best influence global affairs within the confines
of its alliance network, a hallmark of Canadian foreign policy, is evidence that
Canadian-Soviet political relations were inherently limited. In the end, the response
to Khrushchev balanced conciliation with posing questions, the approach favoured
by both Diefenbaker and the DEA.
In his reply, Diefenbaker stated that Canada’s reaction to Khrushchev’s
announcement to stop nuclear testing has been cautious, “and that a sense of
uneasiness has modified the satisfaction we were tempted at first to entertain.”
Diefenbaker explained, “it is axiomatic that disarmament, to be significant in these
times, must be the product of negotiations and agreement among nations. The world
can hardly be expected to repose confidence in the potential results of a decision
which could be reversed overnight, and without consultation, by your government.”
He then asked Khrushchev to clarify his “position with regard to the establishment
of an international system for the verification of nuclear tests. Assuming that you
are willing to exchange views on this problem with other governments, I should be
interested to know what type of practical measures you have in mind to ensure that
tests of nuclear weapons were not being conducted anywhere in the world.”
Diefenbaker then reminded Khrushchev of his government’s refusal to carry out
mutual inspection of Arctic regions and again offered “to make available for
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international inspection or control any part of [Canada’s] territory, in exchange for a
comparable concession on your part.”90
A few weeks later, Mikoyan explained to Ambassador Johnson that
Khrushchev believed Diefenbaker’s letter was based on “a misunderstanding of
Soviet policy,” yet, “appreciated the spirit in which it was written.”91 Khrushchev
did, in fact, write back to Diefenbaker. In a rather long nine-page letter, Khrushchev
responded by focusing mainly on the United States’ position and its past actions. For
instance, to the Prime Minister’s accusations that unilateral cessation of nuclear
tests is essentially meaningless, Khrushchev rebutted by discussing in detail US
bomber flights close to the Soviet border. In light of such actions, Khrushchev
insisted, it is unfair to suggest that unilateral cessation of nuclear tests is “somehow
reduced.” Regarding Diefenbaker’s proposal for arctic inspection, Khrushchev
explained that such actions would “not even promise to completely stop the flights
of bombers with atomic and hydrogen bombs toward the Soviet Union” since it only
“relates to one sector of the external border of the Soviet Union and does not
concern other areas from which an attack on the USSR can be made and where
American air bases are located.”92
In a discussion with Soviet Ambassador, Dimitri Chuvahin immediately after
reading Khrushchev’s letter, Diefenbaker “expressed pleasure with the tone of the
90
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opening paragraphs and affirmed his belief in the value of a frank exchange of
views.”93 In essence, the general appeal for political openness is what characterized
Canadian-Soviet political relations during this period, although both governments
remained skeptical of the other’s motives. Canadian officials, including Diefenbaker,
were hesitant to present ideas and suggestions to the USSR outside the NATO
framework. The belief that outstanding international issues, such as arms control,
must be pursued by a united Western front remained at the core of Canadian policy.
As a result, bilateral political relations between Canada and the Soviet Union would
remain limited, never going beyond a rather confined exchange of broad ideas,
couched within the context of Cold War alliances. This, then, highlights the
importance of other fields in Canadian-Soviet Cold War relations, particularly
commerce and culture. This understanding may also help re-contextualize certain
other diplomatic episodes that have been critically scrutinized, specifically,
Diefenbaker’s 1960 United Nations General Assembly address.
Diefenbaker considered his speech to the United Nations on September 26,
1960 an important moment in Canadian Cold War diplomacy, but it was less
prodigious in its impact on Canadian-Soviet relations, despite one historian’s claim
that the “speech can be seen as a watershed in Canada’s Soviet policy that shattered
the Canadian strategy of accommodation.”94 Other scholars have focused on the
speech-writing (or editing) process that endured for four long days to highlight the
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turbulent relationship between the prime minister and the DEA. 95 Consistently
underlining all perspectives is the undisputed fact that Diefenbaker’s speech was
motivated by his desire to speak on behalf of what were deemed the “captive
nations.” In fact, Robinson states Diefenbaker “simply insisted on our helping him to
find dramatic language in which to attack Khrushchev, with particular reference to
Soviet domination of Ukraine and the Baltic states. That was Diefenbaker’s primary
aim.”96
Diefenbaker used the speech to launch a Cold War rhetorical assault on
Khrushchev and the Soviet Government, much like the one he accused the Soviet
leader of having delivered: “Mr. Khrushchev, in a gigantic propaganda drama of
destructive misrepresentation,” declared Diefenbaker, “launched a major offensive
in the Cold War.” Diefenbaker then continued in full Cold War tenor:
I turn now to a subject dealt with at great length by the Chairman of the
Council of Ministers of the USSR, the subject of colonialism. […]
[Khrushchev] has spoken of colonial bondage, of exploitation and of
foreign yokes. Those words, uttered by the master of the major colonial
power in the world today […] I pause to ask this question: How many
human beings have been liberated by the USSR? […] How are we to
reconcile the tragedy of the Hungarian uprising in 1956 […]? What of
Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia? What of the freedom-loving Ukrainians and
many other Eastern European peoples which I shall not name for fear of
omitting some of them? […] There can be no double standard in
international affairs. I just ask the Chairman of the Council of Ministers
of the USSR to give to those nations under his domination the right to
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free elections—to give them the opportunity to determine the kind of
government they want under genuinely free conditions.97
Western

leaders

heralded

Diefenbaker’s

speech

a

major

success,

and

congratulations flowed in. American Ambassador to the UN James Wadsworth called
it “truly magnificent.” Both President Eisenhower and British Prime Minister
Macmillan warmly approved Diefenbaker’s efforts, and “the whole episode gave
[him] a burst of exhilaration.” Not only that, “there was a general enthusiasm for the
speech from all parties, most daily newspapers, and the ethnic press.” 98
Diefenbaker’s biographer, Denis Smith explains, “Macmillan’s advisors told
Robinson ‘that Diefenbaker’s hard line with the Soviet Union had made it easier for
Macmillan to try to adopt a statesmanlike pose and thus preserve for himself some
chance of exerting a mediatory influence on Moscow.’” In the end, however, it was to
no effect, since, as Smith explains, the Soviet Union “had given up on negotiation
with the West.” Khrushchev was waiting for the change of American leadership…”99
Similarly, Diefenbaker’s address did not effectively alter the course of CanadianSoviet relations. Given that Diefenbaker and Macmillan confronted the same
international context and that Canadian-Soviet relations were fundamentally
shaped by Canada’s position within NATO, a fact readily recognized by the USSR,
Diefenbaker’s disparaging speech was merely attributed to its position within its
alliance system. While Khrushchev had not attended Diefenbaker’s speech, Soviet
representative Valerian Zorin had and walked out of the General Assembly halfway
97
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through. Jamie Glazov explains, “Pravda claimed that the Prime Minister was
mouthing the ‘chimers’ of American bourgeois propaganda, while Izvestia charged
that his statements were ‘slanderous’ and ‘a cheap masquerade.’”100 As Collins aptly
states, Diefenbaker’s “attack was biting, perhaps strident, but represented no
departure from well-established themes in Canadian-Soviet relations.” 101 While
dramatic, the speech was not nearly as pivotal as has been suggested by both
historians and Diefenbaker.
CONCLUSION

Until Stalin’s death in 1953, Canadian officials generally viewed the Soviet
Union as a hostile entity, worthy of skepticism. The changing of the Kremlin’s old
guard, however, ushered in a new era of Canadian-Soviet relations and,
subsequently, Canadian-Eastern European relations, as the USSR reduced its
hegemonic dominance over the region. Political developments east of the Iron
Curtain, then, significantly shaped the international context of Canadian foreign
policy and caused the Canadian government to reevaluate its relations with the
Soviet Union. The increased autonomy acquired by a number of Eastern European
states placed these nations on the foreign policy agenda of Canadian officials and
soon began to impact Canadian-Soviet relations, adding new dimensions and
complexities to potential policy directions.
Additionally, the Canadian government increasingly paid attention to the
Soviet Union’s non-military Cold War endeavors, particularly what was deemed the
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USSR’s economic offensive. Fear of the Soviet Union’s non-military capabilities dates
to the late 1940s, as was seen with the Canadian government’s desire to incorporate
Article 2 into the NATO treaty. Yet Khrushchev’s slow liberalization process, as well
as his emphasis on “peaceful co-existence,” meant that the Soviet economic offensive
was at least perceived as less threatening than the policies of the Stalinist regime.
Certainly, Khrushchev’s strategic motivations and intentions were not entirely
trusted, but the reality of nuclear stalemate led Canadian officials to believe the
Soviet Union would pursue global communist domination not by force, but by other
means. By cultivating closer bilateral relations with Eastern European nations, as
well as with the USSR itself, Canadian officials thought they could disrupt Soviet
hegemony in the region and ultimately contribute to the West’s fight to contain, and
even combat, Soviet communism. Moreover, this policy approach reflected a
developing awareness amongst Canadian officials that it might be possible to carve
out a niche for a middle power to effectively fight communism from behind the Iron
Curtain.
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Chapter 2

Foundations of International Friendship: Commercial Relations and Cultural
Exchanges between Canada and the USSR
An early sign that the USSR took Canada seriously as a player on the
international scene was the appointment of Dr. A. A. Aroutunian as Soviet
ambassador to Canada in late 1958, replacing Dimitri Chuvahin. According to
Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, John Watkins, “the request
for the appointment of [Aroutunian] as Ambassador […] can only be interpreted as
Soviet recognition of the growing importance of Canada in international affairs and
particularly, perhaps, in the economic field.” Watkins’ opinion about Aroutunian was
confirmed by Canada’s ambassador to the Soviet Union, David M. Johnson who
stated, “he indulged in less propaganda than most other Soviet diplomats.” Johnson
explained that most Western colleagues shared his high opinion of Aroutunian.1
By profession, Aroutunian was an economist and lawyer who worked in the
Economics Department of the Foreign Ministry before being promoted to Head of
the First European Department. Fluent in both English and French (in addition to
Russian and Armenian, his native republic), Aroutunian was described as an
amicable civil servant with a sharp mind. Watkins ended his memo by asserting,
“that in sending to Canada one of its most brilliant and personable diplomats, the
Soviet Government sincerely wishes to improve relations, increase cultural
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exchanges, and expand trade.”2 Watkins proved correct. In his conversation with the
Head of the DEA’s European Division, Henry Davis, Aroutunian explained that he
considered good trade relations and cultural exchanges two important foundations
for international friendship. The development of these two crucial cornerstones is
the subject of this chapter. By pursuing commercial and cultural relations with the
USSR, the Diefenbaker administration continued forth in the direction pursued by
the previous Liberal government. While Canadian and American policy regarding
cultural relations was closely aligned, reflecting consistency within the Western
alliance, it was American commercial policy that led Canada to pragmatically search
for new markets behind the Iron Curtain. This shows how at times Canadian
interests diverged from the American government. This chapter also highlights the
dualistic nature of Canada’s Soviet policy, and how the USSR was viewed both as a
Cold War competitor and an expedient customer.
AMERICA’S PL 480 PROGRAM

Room for political maneuver between the two nations was limited by
Canada’s firm position within the NATO alliance. Additionally, the strategic stasis
that had developed between the superpowers affected Canada’s approach to the
Soviet Union, leading it to engage in the Cold War by other means. The general Cold
War order that governed global politics should not be overstated, however, since
other factors also impacted the Canadian-Soviet relationship. Remarkably, the
effects of America’s Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954,
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commonly referred to as PL 480 or Food for Peace, is largely absent from the history
of Canada’s Soviet Policy. Arguably, aggressive giveaways by the United States under
PL 480 provoked Canada to pursue wheat sales behind the Iron Curtain. William E.
Morriss’ work, Chosen Instrument: A History of the Canadian Wheat Board: the
McIvor Years, is an important analysis that helps contextualize Canada’s broader
agricultural policies and provides a crucial framework for understanding Canada’s
economic policy toward Communist Europe specifically. 3
As Morriss explains, PL 480 was the most pervasive of the programs
instituted by the Americans to dispose of surplus agricultural products. “The
Americans,” asserts Morriss, “were about to turn the whole pattern of world grain
trade around and assume a dominant position from which they would not retreat.”4
The Canadian Wheat Board’s 1954-1955 annual report stated, “‘[t]he effect of the
United States’ disposal program […] was to considerably narrow the range of
markets for Canadian wheat and to substantially reduce the level of our wheat
exports.’” In mid-1956, the Canadian Wheat Board’s chief commissioner, George
McIver, wrote to Marvin McLain, undersecretary of agriculture in Washington,
outlining the extent of the incursion by the Americans into Canadian markets:
We have recently examined our position in fourteen countries which
have been in receipt of wheat under your disposal program. In these
countries our exports so far recorded in our crop year were at the
level of 31 per cent of our exports to the same countries in 1953-54,
3
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while the United States has increased its exports to 258.4 per cent of
the 1953-54 level. This is the sort of thing that continues to disturb us,
especially when we can and are maintaining our position in markets
where ordinary competitive conditions prevail.5
The American concessional sales program was seriously jeopardizing Canadian
wheat exports; it appears the Soviet economic offensive was not the only
commercial threat to Canada. PL 480 caused a major backlog of Canadian grain, as
silos began to bulge. The mood in Western Canada was unsettled by tensions over
international trade in wheat and the subsequent backlog of wheat; Canada was
compelled to find other markets. Historian Michael Hart explains that by 1962 “the
world’s grain trade had clearly fallen into a pattern of commercial, concessional, and
communist sales. The International Wheat Agreement (IWA) covered commercial
sales; US PL 480 covered concessional sales; and the Canadian Wheat Board6 had
become the main player in sales to communist markets.”7 Yet, wheat agreements
between Canada and Communist Europe actually originated almost a decade earlier.
As early as 1952, Canadian officials had made tentative forays with
European communist countries, with modest success selling wheat and barley to
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Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Hungary, often on credit terms.8 The sale of
wheat to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe became possible only after Stalin’s
death, since he would have preferred to starve millions of people, as he did in 1932
and 1947, instead of purchasing foreign wheat. Spending hard currency to avert
famine was a significant shift in Soviet political culture. As discussed in chapter one,
a real breakthrough in Canadian-Soviet relations occurred in 1955, when Secretary
of State for External Affairs Lester Pearson visited the Soviet Union. Although the
prospect of improved trade was of secondary importance to this diplomatic mission,
as George Ignatieff, a DEA official at the time, suggested,9 the visit nonetheless set in
motion “a pattern for negotiation with other state-trading nations, notably those of
Eastern Europe.”10 Canada and the Soviet Union reached a bilateral trade agreement
that extended most favoured nation (MFN) status to the USSR. On February 29,
1956, Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade S. A. Borisov exchanged letters with
Pearson, covering the purchase of wheat. It was announced that the Soviet Union
agreed to purchase 1.2 million to 1.5 million tonnes of wheat within the next three
years, in annual amounts ranging from four to five hundred thousand tonnes.
Essentially, the agreement linked the granting of MFN tariff treatment to Soviet
goods entering Canada with Soviet commitments to purchase Canadian wheat.11
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This proved to be an important moment in Canadian-Soviet commercial, and for that
matter political, relations.
The adverse effects of America’s wheat disposal program continued during
the Diefenbaker government. As did the notion that commercial sales to Communist
countries could very well provide fortuitous political returns. In July 1958, Finance
Minister Donald Fleming forwarded to Diefenbaker a memorandum prepared by his
department on the subject of the American surplus disposal policies. The ominous
undertones confronted by the previous Liberal government were echoed:
Exports of wheat from the United States in the 1956-57 crop year
were the highest on record and accounted for 43 per cent of world
export trade in wheat. Disposals under US government programmes
were 29 per cent of world exports. Despite this achievement, North
American stocks of wheat increased because of a decline in Canadian
exports and an increase in Canadian carryover. The conclusion is
inescapable that the US record was reached partly at the expense of
the Canadian wheat grower.12
No ideological lens was applied to the impact of America’s PL 480 program on
Canadian sales, otherwise the term “American economic offensive” might have been
fitting. Not only did America’s aggressive tactics push Canada to seek markets
behind the Iron Curtain, they highlight, from an historical perspective, that cold hard
economic and political gains were at times pursued at the expense of Cold War
alliance commitments.
RENEWING THE 1956 CANADIAN-SOVIET TRADE AGREEMENT

Four months following Fleming’s memorandum, Cabinet discussed the
renewal of the Canada-USSR trade agreement of 1956. A joint memorandum from
12
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the Minsters of Trade and Commerce and External Affairs asserted that renewing
the trade agreement would be beneficial for a number of reasons. From a domestic
agriculture point of view, a renewed agreement would be of “considerable
importance to Canada and to Western wheat producers.” Significantly, the ministers
also highlighted the political benefits:
A continuation of the Agreement would appear desirable also from the
political point of view. Political considerations played an important
part for both sides when the present agreement was negotiated in
1956. It was the view of the Canadian Government that a trade
agreement could help to establish mutual trust and reduce suspicion.
Trade agreements provide one of the few points of mutually
advantageous contact between East and West, and may help to
influence the Soviet leaders away from their isolationist approach.
Renewal of the Canada-USSR Agreement would not be without value
in this direction. On the other hand, its expiration would be more
consequential and might well be interpreted as a deterioration in our
political relations with the Soviet Union.13
The fact that the Canadian government viewed such agreements as a means to
establish mutual trust and simultaneously reduce suspicion, as well as Soviet
isolationism, was foundational to Canada’s policy toward Communist Eastern
Europe. In essence, these beliefs drove the government’s policy direction. Concern
that Soviet officials would interpret the agreement’s expiration to be a sign of
deteriorating relations is further evidence that political considerations influenced
commercial relations with the Soviet Union. Good relations with the Soviets were
important to Canadian officials because a sound relationship created opportunity
for Canada to exercise some middle power influence through East-West bridgebuilding.
13
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Ultimately, Canadian-Soviet commercial relations between 1957 and 1962
remained relatively small. While Canadian policy towards Communist Europe
during this same period may be described as decisive in relation to foreign policy
generally, this observation applies less to Canada’s commercial exports to the USSR.
Instead, Canadian-Soviet commercial relations during this period can be seen more
as a means to improve political relations. Negotiations still continued with the 1956
Canada-Soviet trade agreement renewed in 1960, but exports to the Soviet Union
were minimal at best and virtually non-existent in 1960 and 1962.14 Regardless, the
fact remains that the two nations continued negotiating and, as a result, sustained a
commercial dialogue important to the overall Canadian-Soviet relationship.
A BALANCING ACT

Viewed from the Soviet perspective, a renewal of the trade agreement was
not to be taken for granted. One of the underlying issues complicating a renewed
agreement was that the Soviets were unhappy with the large trade imbalance
between the two countries. The ongoing negotiations were indicative of the
differences between the Soviet state-trading system and Canada’s market capitalist
system. Because the Soviet government directly controlled imports and exports, it
was able to enter into agreements that committed to specific amounts of imports. In
return, the Soviets sought a more firm commitment regarding the amount of
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Canadian imports from the Soviet market.15 Given the Western capitalist system,
this was not feasible. Although Canadian officials knew the Soviets were uneasy
about the trade imbalance and wanted this addressed, initially the Canadian
position was firm. An Aide Mémoire to the Soviet Embassy reassured the Soviets
that the agreement was seen as important and stressed the desire “to encourage the
further development of mutually advantageous trade relations between Canada and
the USSR” But, the Canadians maintained that they
have noted, however, that [a previous] Soviet Aide Mémoire
makes no reference to the exchange of letters of the present
agreement under which the Soviet Union undertook to purchase
annually specified minimum quantities of Canadian wheat.
In the Canadian view this undertaking is fundamental to the
present trade arrangements and the Canadian Government attaches
particular importance to the inclusion of similar Soviet commitments
in any renewal or extension of the present Agreement.16
Simply put, Canada wanted a Soviet commitment to purchase wheat in quantities
similar to those under the 1956 agreement, and it was willing to push the Soviet
Union to obtain such a commitment.
To potentially allay Soviet apprehensions about the trade imbalance, USSEA
Norman Robertson recommended that, if the Soviets undertook good purchase
obligations, Canadian officials could indicate certain steps would be taken by the
government to encourage sales to Canada. Specifically, Robertson recommended
that Canada issue a government statement in support of expanded two-way trade;
officially support a trade mission to the USSR, in which the government would
15
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participate; and promise the assistance of the Canadian trade commissioner service
in seeking out markets, in Canada, for Soviet products.17 These were so-called
“presidential” promotions.
Prime Minister Diefenbaker also supported renegotiation and encouraged
Canadian-Soviet trade. In discussion with Soviet Ambassador Aroutunian,
Diefenbaker expressed his understanding that the USSR wished to increase two-way
trade. He explained to Aroutunian that the Alberts Group – a select group of
prominent Canadian businessmen who represented the directorates of 160
Canadian companies – had recently visited the Soviet Union and were “very much
impressed by many aspects of Soviet society.”18 This was indeed true. In fact, not
long before meeting with Aroutunian, Diefenbaker was debriefed by the group. The
men were sincerely enthralled with certain qualities of the Soviet Union, including
advances in its steel industry, electrical engineering, and research and development.
Beyond industry, the Canadian businessmen also positively noted “the brightness
and intelligence of Soviet children.” Still, some members of the group warned that
the “Soviet authorities are gathering information about the economy of the free
world and are entering into an economic war with an integrated programme.”
Overall, however, the group maintained that Canadians had much to learn from
their Soviet counterparts and, in fact, had a duty to learn from Soviet advances if
Canada was to stand a chance in ongoing commercial competition. They also
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maintained that the Russian people appeared not to harbour any animosity towards
Canada; yet, it appeared that many Canadians held negative perceptions of the
Soviet Union. According to one group member, this was because “most people in
Canada relied on newspapers for information.” Regardless, Diefenbaker encouraged
the group to express their ideas to various circles, expecting that “the presentation
of their views to the public would stimulate profitable discussion.”19
In addition to informing Aroutunian about the Alberts group, Diefenbaker
indicated that Canada was prepared to appoint a trade commissioner to Moscow.20
Clearly, Diefenbaker tried to impress upon Aroutunian the Canadian government’s
desire and willingness to expand trade with the Soviet Union, or at the very least,
export its surplus grain.
Despite Canadian officials’ assurance that steps would be taken to promote
Soviet imports to Canada in a “presidential manner,” Soviet officials were not willing
to continue the obligation to purchase a minimum quantity of Canadian wheat
annually.21 By mid-1959, negotiations seemed at a stalemate. Finally, in October,
following a visit to Canada by five Supreme Soviet deputies – including Mr. Kobanov,
a former Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade – discussions resumed. This time, it was
the Soviets who were firm. The Soviet counterproposal called on Canadian officials
to do everything in their power to ensure the value of Canadian imports from the
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USSR would annually amount to no less fifty percent of Soviet purchases. If
Canadian imports fell below this level, the Soviet undertaking to purchase Canadian
goods would be proportionally reduced.22 This became known as the 1:2 ratio.
The reason the Soviets were less eager to commit to purchasing Canadian
wheat had little to do with the political and commercial dynamics between the two
countries. Instead, the explanation for Soviet reticence relates to the notion of selfsufficiency embedded within Soviet policy. Spearheaded by Premier Nikita
Khrushchev, in 1953 the Soviets embarked on the “Virgin Lands” campaign. This
was an audacious attempt to open Kazakhstan to the plow, which would, it was
hoped, alleviate the USSR’s food shortages and once again turn the nation into an
exporter of wheat.23 The success of the campaign was sporadic. 1958 and 1959 were
particularly good years,

24

and happened to coincide with Canadian-Soviet

renegotiations. It is likely that the success of the Virgin Lands campaign had a direct
impact on the renegotiations during this time. Productivity steadily decreased
following the 1959 harvest.25 Productivity would never match a 1956 record.26 By
1963, the Canadian government would reap the benefits of the ailing campaign, a
development discussed below.
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Nevertheless, negotiations continued and while discussions were cordial,
both sides were unwilling to stray from their firm policy position. To recapitulate,
the Soviets had taken the stance that the purchase obligation was one-sided and
could not be repeated. On the Canadian side, the government maintained it would
not undertake a purchase commitment; since Soviet MFN treatment had little or no
value, a necessary equivalent for the extension of MFN treatment by Canada was a
purchase commitment on the Soviet side. In response, the Soviet government issued
the 1:2 ratio proposal. This proposal did not involve a purchase obligation for the
Canadians but did maintain one for the Soviets. The main difference was that the
obligation would be proportional (or double) that of Canadian imports from the
Soviet Union. Still unhappy with the Soviet counterproposal, Canadian negotiators
countered once more. Again, they attempted to obtain an unqualified Soviet
purchase commitment by setting out in greater detail the kind of “presidential
assistance” Canada might be able to give to the efforts of Soviet export agencies to
increase their sales in Canada. Soviet officials rejected this offer.27
Canadian officials did not want to lose the Russians as an importer of
Canadian goods. A memorandum to Cabinet from the SSEA, supported by the
Ministers of Finance and Trade and Commerce, noted how “the USSR is beginning to
play a much more active part in world trade, both as an exporter and an importer,
and many of our most important trading partners (including the United Kingdom)
have already tried to ensure themselves a share of growing Soviet trade by signing
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trade agreements with the Soviet Government.”28 Put differently, Canada should do
what it can to ensure a renegotiation of the trade agreement in order to keep the
Canadian fork in the Soviet pie for potential future indulgence.
Negotiations did continue, and an agreement was eventually reached.
Essentially, the new Canadian-Soviet trade agreement was a modified version of the
1956 agreement, with the 1:2 ratio at its core. The Soviets agreed to import $24
million worth of Canadian goods, and in exchange Canada agreed to import $12
million worth of goods from the USSR. In addition, the Canadian government would
take necessary steps to encourage and assist Soviet exporters to find Canadian
markets. The agreement was far from spectacular. In fact, from the Canadian
vantage, it must have been disappointing, especially in the face of continuous
pressures from the United States’ PL 480 program, which showed no sign of abating.
The Canadian government, however, would have to wait a further three years before
a new agreement could be negotiated with the Russians.
Minister of Trade and Commerce, Gordon Churchill went to Moscow to sign
the Protocol agreement. Before he left Canada, Churchill was rather skeptical of the
Soviet Union and viewed it through a darkly tinted ideological lens. His visit,
however, had a profound impact on his perception of the Communist superpower.
Upon his return to Canada, he wrote Diefenbaker a letter detailing his “revised
opinion of the Russian leaders.” Personal contact with Soviet leaders Frol Kozlov
and Anastas Mikoyan, Canadian Ambassador David Johnson, and the Indian and
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French Ambassadors shaped Churchill’s new attitude. He came away convinced the
USSR genuinely sought peace and friendly relations and was further impressed with
Mikoyan’s honest acknowledgement that he “did not expect [the USSR] to become
self-sufficient,” which explained the desire to develop trade.
Churchill said that he doubted “very much many of the stories we have read
about Russia,” and he believed the Indian ambassador’s hypothesis that the “West is
still thinking of the Russia of Stalin’s day.” Also illuminating is Churchill’s confession
that he entertained “doubts also of American opinion concerning Russia and our
impressions of Russia are likely derived largely from American accounts.” He
suggested to Diefenbaker that Canada occupied a unique position in international
opinion and could “play a very important role in easing the tensions between Russia
and the United States.” He then urged Diefenbaker to seriously consider visiting the
USSR. Churchill’s concluding remarks are revealing: “I freely admit that this is a
changed point of view for I have been anti-Russian, but I have so many reservations
in my mind concerning American foreign policy and Big Four meetings that I
consider that something further should be done.”29
Churchill’s letter to Diefenbaker deserves careful analysis. As the only
Cabinet minister in the Diefenbaker government to visit the USSR, he was in a
unique position to advise the Prime Minister. Moreover, as Minister of Trade and
Commerce, he saw firsthand the effects of America’s PL 480 program and how it
impacted Canadian grain exports. Perhaps most telling is his change of heart
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regarding the USSR and his inherent suspicion of the United States. Churchill’s views
are a reminder that the West was not entirely homogenous, despite outward
appearances of bloc solidarity. Clearly, Churchill felt superpower diplomacy was
flawed and believed Canada had an opportunity to ease tensions by using its
position as a middle power. While Churchill’s appeal to Diefenbaker to visit the
Soviet Union came to naught, Canada was still able, in a modest and roundabout
way, to exert influence on the USSR by cultivating positive relations.
The new trade agreement committed the government to finding ways to
promote Soviet imports. During his time in Moscow, Churchill was approached
about opening a trade office in Montreal. The DEA and the Department of Trade and
Commerce agreed that this could prove advantageous, and in keeping with the
Canadian obligation to help facilitate greater two-way trade, recommended that
Canada agree. Concerns that the Soviets would use the trade office as a footing to
engage in “subversive or intelligence activities” were raised, but were not
considered sufficiently serious to derail the idea. Diefenbaker argued that this
would be to “Canada’s advantage in light of the two to one Soviet purchase
obligation,” and Cabinet agreed to allow the Soviets to establish a trade office in
Montreal.30 Interestingly, and for reasons that are unclear, the Soviets did not reply
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to Canada’s offer to establish the Montreal trade office in 1960,31 and it is unclear
whether the office was ever actually established.
After the major 1956 trade agreement, trading with the Soviet Union
staggered along. In 1961, for instance, Canada exported to the USSR $24 million
worth of goods. This represented only 0.5 per cent of Canada’s total export sales.
And despite the 1960 trade agreement that outlined the 1:2 ratio, Canada imported
only $2.7 million from the Soviet Union, truly an insignificant amount given
Canada’s total imports of $5.8 billion.32 Major changes, however, were about to take
place. In September 1963, under the new Liberal government of Lester Pearson, the
Canadian Wheat Board made its largest single sale to date to the Soviet Union. The
Canadian government agreed to sell 5.3 million long tons of wheat and 500,000 tons
of flour over the following ten and a half months.33 In that year, Canada’s exports to
the USSR rose from $3.3 million to $150 million, almost entirely due to the sale of
wheat.34 Wheat sales to the Soviet Union thereafter continued to be an integral part
of Canada’s exports.35 Although quantities fluctuated in subsequent decades, they
generally followed an upward trend.36
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While wheat exports to the USSR during this period were more a bridgebuilding exercise than a decisive moment, in terms of direct impact on CanadianSoviet political relations, they are not without significance. Broadly speaking, the
fact that wheat sales were limited due to good harvests within the Soviet Union –
partly due to the intermittent success of the Virgin Lands campaign – corroborates
the notion that Canadian relations with the Soviet Union were significantly
influenced by, and partly at the mercy of, events and trends within the USSR itself.
Additionally, the renegotiation of the 1956 trade agreement highlights the
fundamental differences between the economic systems in the two nations. Soviet
officials were never overly eager to renew the agreement, at least not when it
involved a purchase obligation comparable to the 1956 agreement. In turn, they
tried to negotiate an import commitment by Canada, something a government
cannot easily implement in an open, capitalist system. Surely, Soviet officials were
aware of this. On reflection, it is likely Soviet officials were playing the role of
shrewd businessmen, simply trying to obtain the best possible means to level out
the trade imbalance. On the Canadian side, officials sympathized with the Soviets
and agreed to promote Soviet imports to Canada in a “presidential manner.”
Perhaps most interesting are Churchill’s revelations following the signing of
the 1960 agreement. His change of heart is a testament, as he freely admitted, to the
influence that both the popular media and the United States at large had on
Canadian perceptions of the Communist superpower. Additionally, Churchill’s visit
highlights the importance of personal contact. Both Canada and the USSR believed in
the power of personal contact as a means to reduce mutual suspicion. In an attempt
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to minimize tensions, each country pursued exchanges of various types, and they
became an integral part of Canadian-Soviet relations. While each country believed
that exchanges could be advantageous, no agreement existed between the nations in
the cultural field, and rather surprisingly, no official agreement was ever signed.
Still, even without a formal agreement between the two nations, the exchange of
peoples, ideas, and cultures came to be more fully integrated into Canadian-Soviet
relations.
CULTURAL PURSUITS

In 1955, the USSR started a proactive mission of cultural exchanges with the
creation of the Soviet All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign
Countries (VOKS). 37 Slowly, Soviet officials realized that conventional Soviet
propaganda strategies that relied heavily on anti-Americanism were not working in
the United States; this led the Soviets to rely less on negative propaganda and more
on cultural diplomacy.38 The high point in Soviet-American cultural relations was
the signing of an official cultural agreement between the two governments in
January 1958.39 The USSR and the United Kingdom also signed a cultural agreement
in 1959.40 Khrushchev, then, promoted a policy that focused less on denouncing
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Western ideology and more on promoting Soviet achievements in science,
technology, sports, and culture.41
The cultural diplomacy prong of Canada’s foreign relations with Communist
Europe was being developed before Diefenbaker came to power. According to
historian Graham Carr, how Canada could best respond to Soviet cultural initiatives
came at a watershed moment in a national discussion about public policy and the
arts. The Report of the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts,
Letters, and Sciences (1949-51), known as the Massey Report, had conveyed a new
vision for Canada’s cultural development in which the state would play a vital role.
The final chapter of the Report advocated a more robust international presence for
the arts and stressed the value of cultural exchanges.42
In general, the DEA supported the initiative, at least in theory. Lester B.
Pearson’s visit to the USSR in 1955 confirmed for him the Soviet desire to place
culture high on the international agenda. Pearson was exposed to Russian cultural
life and “concluded that it was precisely because ‘the Russians come vividly to life in
an artistic or cultural atmosphere,’ that sending Canadian performers was the ‘best
way to reach Communist peoples’ and ‘lower the curtain.’”43 Later, in a highly
detailed memorandum, Pearson explained to Cabinet, “the Canadian reaction, both
official and unofficial, has been to welcome any genuine improvement of the
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atmosphere which might be created by increased exchanges.” He then outlined the
possible benefits to Canada; this approach was readily adopted by the Diefenbaker
government and is, therefore, worthwhile examining in detail.
Pearson explained that increased contacts and exchanges would have many
advantages: first, they might help to remove the Soviet misconception that Canada is
a member of an aggressive Western alliance that intends to attack the Soviet Union
and would help put new ideas into the minds of people who in general have been
kept in complete ignorance of the outside world for several decades; second, in
scientific and technical fields, in which the Soviet Union was ahead, Canadian
research and industry could gain information and learn of new innovations; third,
from an intelligence standpoint, Canada stood to gain in almost every field, since
Soviet knowledge of Canada so greatly exceeded Canadian knowledge of the Soviet
Union; lastly, as far as visits to Canada were concerned, while Canadians may not be
able to convert from Communism the sort of people selected to come to the country,
it was possible to at least show them the nation, have Canadians and Russians
interact, and explain to them Canadian policies in ways that must improve their
understanding of Canada and what freedom means, which could then have some
effect on others when they returned. Any potential negative ramifications associated
with exchanges related to the possibility of espionage and the fact that “Soviet
visitors may be used to select persons and intelligence targets for subsequent
exploitation by the Russian Intelligence Service.” Pearson, however, explained that
these risks could be “kept within bounds if the Canadian public is made aware of
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them, and if our internal security service is given sufficient resources to carry out its
task.”44 The benefits, in the end, exceeded any potential risk.
The memorandum also distinguished between the exchange of information
and visits. Action regarding the exchange of information, Pearson explained, had
been satisfactorily settled. Essentially, unclassified information could be given only
when some useful return could be anticipated. The decision in each case was a
departmental or agency responsibility, and reports were to be submitted twice a
year to the Secretary of the Security Panel summarizing the information sent. If
private organizations in Canada requested advice on the subject, they were also
requested to seek reciprocity as much as possible.
Decisions regarding the exchange of visits posed more difficult problems and
was, Pearson admitted, still evolving. He asserted, “It is not sufficient for us merely
to reciprocate visits proposed by the Soviet Government. We must take the initiative
ourselves in fields of special interest to us, in order, among other things, to forestall
undesirable initiatives from them.” It was recommended that the actions pertaining
to the exchange of information, as outlined above, become official policy.
Additionally, Pearson recommended that an Interdepartmental Panel on the
Exchange of Visits with the Soviet Bloc be established to implement policy. The
Panel was to be responsible to Cabinet through the Secretary of State for External
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Affairs, and was to consist of high-ranking officials.45 Among other things, the Panel
was to establish liaison with appropriate Government departments and agencies; to
deal with such unofficial organizations and persons and to advise the Government of
forthcoming unofficial visits in either direction and, as appropriate, to advise on and
assist with arrangements; to ensure that the Security Panel and the Joint Intelligence
Committee are informed of such visits; to initiate proposals for official or unofficial
visits to and from Soviet bloc countries; and to keep under continuous review the
subject of exchange of visits with Soviet bloc countries.46 Foremost, the Government
considered that exchanges “should be based on the principle of reciprocity, and that
there should not be a marked imbalance of visits in either direction.”47
Recommendations for a more liberal exchange policy came to a sudden halt
when the Soviets crushed the Hungarian Uprising in November 1956. Advising
Pearson, USSEA Jules Léger suggested in light of Soviet actions in Hungary, that no
immediate initiatives regarding exchanges with the USSR be taken and that the
government defer any Soviet proposals in the field. Interestingly, Léger
recommended the government “give most careful consideration to adopting a more
liberal exchanges policy towards the satellites in the light of the changing situation
in that area.” He believed much could be gained by encouraging more contacts with
45 Specifically, the Chairman of the Panel was to be the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.
Its permanent members were to consist of the Secretary of the Cabinet and the Commissioner of the
R.C.M. Police. The Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee was to attend meetings, and Deputy
Ministers and Heads of Agencies were to attend when visits of interest to them were discussed.
However, the foregoing officials were permitted to be represented by senior members of their staffs.
46 DCER, Vol. 23. Part II. 508. Memorandum from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Cabinet,
“Exchange of Visits and Information between Canada and the Soviet Union”, Ottawa, February 3,
1956. Cabinet Document No.30-56.
47 DCER, Vol. 23. Part II. 508. Aide Memoir from Jules Léger to Secretary of State for External Affairs,
Ottawa, March 28, 1956.

106
“a country such as Poland, which had made considerable progress in breaking away
from complete domination by Moscow.”48 Pearson agreed, as indicated by three
separate marginal notes.
It was not until April 1957 that the Canadian government resumed
discussions on exchanges, just ahead of the change in governments from St. Laurent
to Diefenbaker. It was still the view that Canada should pragmatically pursue
exchanges with Poland, while avoiding all exchanges with Hungary.49 By this time, a
number of Soviet requests remained outstanding, and the Canadian Department of
Transport was eager to exchange information on northern affairs and to arrange
visits related to icebreaker construction.
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with the Canadian Department of Northern Affairs, of special publications on
Northern development, produced by the Soviet Arctic Scientific Research Institute.51
But arguably the most remarkable event in Canada’s cultural diplomacy in
1957 was pianist Glenn Gould’s tour of the Soviet Union, which took place in May.
Gould became the first North American pianist to perform in the USSR, giving eight
concerts in Moscow and Leningrad.52 According to historian Graham Carr, Gould’s
tour was a huge success, and while the state played no role in the organization of the
tour, Gould’s performance showcased Canadian talent and cultural maturity.
“Pianists were the gladiators of the cultural Cold War,” states Carr, and the press
praised his performances, stressing that he was able to accomplish “what statesmen
failed to do by softening the Russians.”53 Indeed, “Gould’s tour reflected the growing
importance of cultural diplomacy as a way to exercise Cold War foreign policy by
ostensibly non-political means.”54 As well, it demonstrated to Canadian officials the
positive impact non-state actors can have on international relations and the
importance of cultural diplomacy to Canada’s foreign relations with Communist
Europe. Canadian performing artists that followed in Gould’s precedent-setting
footsteps, during the Diefenbaker years, are discussed below.
THE CULTURAL AGREEMENT DEBATE
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Although Canadian officials recognized the importance of cultural exchanges,
Canada and the USSR never actually signed a formal agreement, in contrast with the
United Kingdom and the United States, despite the efforts by individuals on both
sides of the Iron Curtain. While discussions between Canadian and Soviet officials
from 1958 to the end of 1959 suggested an agreement might actually be reached,
there were still signs both Canada and the USSR remained hesitant. By the end of
1959 and early 1960, an agreement appeared much less likely. Oddly, and for
reasons that remain disappointingly unclear, discussions on the matter appear to
have abruptly stopped.
In February 1958, Soviet ambassador Chuvahin met with SSEA Sidney Smith,
and they discussed how the two nations might increase cultural exchanges. At this
point, however, Smith explained that the government, for “purely domestic
purposes” wished to move slowly on cultural and scientific exchanges. Smith
assured Chuvahin that should “the Conservative Government [return following the
federal election], it would continue to favour expanded cultural contacts, […but]
pressure from the Soviet side on these matters during the pre-election period would
be embarrassing.” In other words, the Conservatives did not want to appear to be
schmoozing with the Soviets during an election. Chuvahin then asked if Canada
would consider the possibility of a cultural agreement similar to one recently
concluded in Washington, 55 to which Smith explained that he “personally was
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inclined at present to favour ad hoc arrangements” since with formal arrangements
there was a “tendency to consider proposals on the basis of how they fitted into the
terms of the agreement rather than on their individual merits.”56 The discrepancy in
opinion regarding the most effective way to pursue cultural exchanges is evident in
Smith and Chuvahin’s discussion, and these differences were never reconciled.
Two months later, the DEA revisited the topic of cultural exchanges with the
USSR. Léger reminded Smith that in his letter to Nikolai Bulganin, the Soviet
Chairman of the Council of Ministers, the Prime Minister expressed the willingness
of the Canadian government to develop the exchange of visits with the USSR. Léger
also clarified that “on several occasions the Soviet authorities have made it clear
that they regard our policy on the exchange of visits as less than satisfactory and
have sought to associate this with the development of trade with Canada, including
the purchase of wheat.” For Smith’s approval, the Under-Secretary submitted a
Cabinet memorandum intended to solidify Canadian policy.57 While the Liberals
were in office, Léger was the chief architect for the draft outlining Canada’s cultural
exchange policy, approved by St. Laurent’s Cabinet. Two years later, again Léger was
presenting, largely verbatim, the same policy, which meant an ad hoc approach to
cultural exchanges with as much reciprocation as possible. Like the Liberals, the
Progressive Conservatives saw the value in exchanges, from both political and
technical vantages. One stark difference was the new government’s desire to limit
Times, “Text of the Joint Communique of U. S. and Soviet Union on Cultural Exchanges,” January 28,
1958.
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publicity in the short term, given the Soviet intervention in Hungry in 1956.
Nonetheless, as was the case two years earlier under the Liberals, the Diefenbaker
Cabinet approved the proposed policy.58
Perhaps aware of the Cabinet’s recent policy decision, Chuvahin followed up
in July with Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs J. B. Watkins and
passed along a copy of an agreement the USSR had recently signed with Norway.
The Soviet ambassador suggested that Canadian officials consider “something along
the same lines.” 59 The Soviets were clearly eager to get an official cultural
agreement. The Canadians, however, remained less enthusiastic. For instance, when
discussing a note to be sent to the Soviet ambassador, Léger pointed out that the
phrasing was “intended to discourage Soviet interest in a cultural agreement, at
least at this stage.”60 This did not mean that Canadian officials were uninterested in
exchanges. Quite the opposite was true. The government gave the Soviets a
substantive list of proposed exchanges in seven different fields: an exchange of
official delegations in the field of northern affairs; the Department of Transport
wished to arrange an exchange of specialists in icebreaker design; the Department
of Fisheries wished to arrange an exchange of fisheries experts; the Department of
Mines and Technical Surveys wanted to arrange an exchange of experts in the fields
of mining and metallurgy; the Associate Director of the National Gallery of Canada
wanted to visit Soviet museums; the National Research Council was prepared to
58
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consider exchanges of delegations of scientists in the fields of chemistry, physics,
biology, mathematics, and technology; and the DEA proposed a visit by a Canadian
hockey team to play a series of games in the USSR.61 The variety of fields in which
Canada was interested demonstrates broad intradepartmental interest in the
exchanges policy. Various Canadian ministries and agencies appeared keen to
gather and share information with the Communist superpower.
The Soviets did not relent in their pursuit of an official cultural agreement. In
early 1959, the Soviet Ambassador, Aroutunian met with the Head of the European
Division, Henry Davis. During their conversation, Aroutunian stressed that cultural
relations were “the other important foundation for international friendship” (in
addition to commercial relations). He then pointed out that the Soviet Union had
three different types of cultural arrangements. First – and Aroutunian’s most
preferred – was a general cultural agreement, like the one recently concluded with
Norway and already proposed to Canadian officials as a model (as noted above). The
second type was an agreement relating to a stated programme of exchanges over a
specific period, which was the type concluded with the United States. The third, and
the Soviets least preferred, was an ad hoc arrangement on specific visits.
Davis, however, explained to Aroutunian the reasons why Canada was not
attracted by the proposal for a general agreement. First, Canada had no general
cultural agreement with any country. Davis stressed that Canada’s “constitutional
position was such that the Federal Government lacked authority in many fields
61
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which a cultural agreement would normally cover.” Second, no federal agency
existed for developing cultural exchanges, nor were any funds devoted to promoting
them. For these reasons, Davis explained, officials did not believe a cultural
agreement would contribute on the Canadian side to the development of cultural
contacts. Moreover, Davis defended Canada’s position by stating how an agreement
might actually “be misleading, and hence damaging to [Canadian-Soviet] relations,”
particularly since the government “was in no position to take any initiative.”
Aroutunian explained that “he understood the point [Davis] had made,” but insisted
that a general agreement would be useful. The Ambassador assured Davis that an
agreement “could be proposed in terms which would take account of the Canadian
situation.” While Davis gave no commitment to an agreement, he expressed the
government’s willingness to at least examine a Soviet proposal should one be
forthcoming.62
After Davis’ discussion with Aroutunian, it seemed likely that the Soviets
would present some kind of draft agreement. None came, however, and Canadian
officials were rather unimpressed, as outlined in Norman Robertson’s despatch to
Canadian Ambassador Johnson in Moscow: “Although we consider that a reasonable
balance has been maintained in the official visits exchanged thus far, […] our note of
August 19 constitutes the first official initiative taken by the Canadian Government
[…] and we regard the Soviet Government's failure to respond to it as an inexcusable
delay.” Robertson then instructed Johnson “to take the first opportunity available at
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a senior Foreign Office level […] to clarify our position as outlined above.”
Furthermore, Ambassador Johnson was to note that Canada might be prepared to
consider an agreement along the lines of the USSR-USA agreement, if the Soviets
cared to present such a proposal. Regardless, Canadian officials “expected to get an
early and adequate response from the Soviet Government to the exchange proposals
put forward in our note of August 19, 1958.”63
Shortly after, Johnson replied to Ottawa and divulged a fascinating
revelation. After talking with Mikoyan and Mr. Belokhvostikov,64 Johnson learned
that it was not the Soviet Foreign Ministry,
but [Yuri] Zhukov, the Chairman of the State Committee for Cultural
Relations with Foreign Countries, who is anxious to conclude an
agreement with [Canada]. Neither Mikoyan nor Belokhvostikov
seemed to know much about the subject when I spoke to them. Mr.
Zhukov, I am told, thinks that his future career depends upon the
number of cultural agreements he can conclude.65
Johnson’s explanation perhaps reveals more about the Soviet bureaucracy than it
does about Canadian policy initiatives. The fact that Mikoyan, the Deputy Chairman
of the Council of Ministers, knew little about a Canadian-Soviet cultural agreement
reveals a real likelihood of lack of coordination between Soviet departments.
Moreover, Zhukov’s belief that his future career depended upon the number of
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agreements signed by the USSR highlights a persistent issue during the Soviet
period: the notion that quantity often trumped quality.66
The final sign that a cultural agreement could come to fruition came from
Davis. In a memorandum to the DEA’s Information Division, he explained that he
finally had the chance to talk with Aroutunian about the status of “negotiations,” if
that is in fact what they could be called. By no means was he optimistic. Davis was
convinced Soviet officials intentionally avoided agreeing to exchanges proposed by
Canada that would balance those that were of prime importance to them. He cited,
for instance, their continued attempt to organize visits in which they were
interested through direct contact with Canadian agencies, such as the Engineering
Institute of Canada. Davis then reiterated the constitutional limitations that affected
the Canadian position, but emphasized the government’s willingness to explore
“general statements accompanied by an agreed programme for a stated period.” He
then detailed what this might mean from the Canadian perspective:
The programme could be in two sections, one agreeing to official
visits and the other section taking note of projected non-official
visits. In respect of the latter the governments would agree to
facilitate the exchanges and this would mean, as I saw it, that they
would issue the necessary visas and, for example, in the field of
education, the Canadian Government would permit professors or
students to come to Canada and for its part the Soviet Government
would give visas for the Canadians to go to the USSR.
Davis and Aroutunian then agreed a first draft should be developed, in consultation
with the Soviet Embassy. According to Davis, “the Ambassador was anxious that at
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the outset our work would be ‘private,’” because Aroutunian “did not want to have
to go to Moscow for every detail.”67 Why Aroutunian wanted to keep the work
“quiet” is unclear. But these discussions reveal an openness to enter into a possible
agreement, despite inherent limitations on the Canadian side. Canadian officials’
willingness to accommodate Soviet insistence on some kind of agreement is telling;
they were prepared to work within a rather confined constitutional framework, if it
meant pleasing Soviet officials and achieving some balance in exchanges. Of course,
Canada’s position was not entirely altruistic, given the expectation that exchanges
would expose Soviet visitors to Western modalities, build bridges between East and
West, and ultimately reduce Cold War tensions.
Davis’ memorandum, rather frustratingly, is the last piece of available
evidence of the negotiations surrounding a potential Canadian-Soviet cultural
agreement. While it is certain that no agreement ever came to fruition, it remains
unclear exactly why it was abandoned.68 Still, even without an official agreement, by
1960 Canada and the USSR began engaging in more consistent exchange programs,
but these, too, were not without their frustrations.
EXCHANGING PEOPLE AND IDEAS

Similar to the Russian frustrations regarding the trade imbalance between
the two countries, by 1960 Canadian officials were aggravated with an imbalance in
the initiation of exchanges between the two countries. Soviet authorities enjoyed
67
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the advantage of initiating exchanges of interest to them by approaching private
Canadian groups and individuals directly, while simultaneously refusing to entertain
Canadian proposals for official exchanges in fields of interest to Canada. “On
balance,” one report asserted, “Canada is not obtaining reciprocity in exchanges
with the Soviet Union.”69
One particular sore spot for Canadian officials was the Soviet refusal of an
official exchange in northern affairs. Opening the north was a major first step in the
National Development Program envisioned by the Minister of Northern Affairs and
National Resources, Alvin Hamilton. To Hamilton, “the North represented a new
world to conquer, […] a great vault, holding in its recesses treasures to maintain and
increase the material living standards which our countries take for granted.”70
According to Hamilton’s biographer, research was the first step in his plan to
develop the north.71 And given his department’s eagerness to engage in exchanges
in northern affairs with the USSR, the Russians, it was hoped, would play an
important role in this phase. Hamilton was suggested as head of a Canadian
delegation. Since the USSR earlier had noted its desire to increase exchanges on a
ministerial level, Canadian officials thought that if a minister led the delegation,
Soviet officials would be much more inclined to accept it.72

69

DCER, Vol. 27. 511. Report of Meeting with Deputy Minister of Northern Affairs and Natural
Resources, “Exchanges with the Soviet Union,” Ottawa, February 4, 1960. DEA/10438-V-14-40.
70 Hamilton’s speech to Pacific Northwest Trade Association, September 4, 1959, as quoted in,
Patrick Kyba, Alvin: A Biography of the Honourable Alvin Hamilton, P.C. (Regina: Canadian Plains
Research Center, 1989) , 124-125.
71 Kyba, Alvin, 126. For a detailed account of Hamilton’s National Development Program and
strategy, see Kyba, Alvin, 122-149.
72 DCER, Vol. 27. 511. Report of Meeting with Deputy Minister of Northern Affairs and Natural
Resources, “Exchanges with the Soviet Union,” Ottawa, February 4, 1960. DEA/10438-V-14-40.

117
Despite Aroutunian’s efforts, Soviet officials in Moscow remained hesitant.
Aroutunian indicated that he had been unsuccessful in allaying suspicions aroused
in Moscow that Canadian proposals in the field of northern affairs were connected
with the Prime Minister’s suggestion for Arctic inspection (of nuclear weapons) and
were not genuine projects for the exchange of scientific information, but more
specifically related to security intelligence.73 Aroutunian admitted that his superiors
were mistaken in their assumption that Canada’s desire for an exchange in northern
affairs was a guise for intelligence gathering; he attempted to correct the
misapprehension in order to get the visit accepted, but to no avail.74 Canada’s
inability to have an exchange in northern affairs accepted by the Soviets represents
an ongoing issue faced by Canadian officials during this period. The lack of
reciprocity and the continued imbalance of exchanges was a constant thorn in the
side of Canadian officials who wanted additional exchanges arranged. The situation
highlights, in some ways, the limited control Canadian officials had in the realm of
cultural exchanges. In 1962, Canadian Ambassador in Moscow Arnold Smith
lamented, “I doubt if Canada can expect, for many years to come, to achieve one
hundred per cent reciprocity, since the USSR is a vastly bigger country with
correspondingly greater cultural and artistic wealth to offer.” Smith then concluded,
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“the degree of reciprocity thus far achieved has been, in my judgment, far from
satisfactory,” 75 highlighting Canada’s constant struggle to achieve a balanced
exchange program with the USSR.
Despite the difficulties faced by the Canadian government, and the ongoing
lopsidedness of exchanges in favour of the Soviets, Canada was still able to pursue
worthwhile exchanges. The realm of science and technology was one fruitful avenue.
For instance, the exchange of letters between the National Research Council of
Canada (NRC) and the Academy of Science of the USSR proved to be of mutual
benefit to both nations’ scientific communities. In 1958, the Canadian Council and
Soviet Academy put forward suggestions for exchanges of scientists in order to
become familiar with the organization and state of research in the fields of physics,
mathematics, chemistry, biology, and technology in each country. As a result, a
group of senior Soviet scientists toured Canadian Government research
establishments, universities, and industrial laboratories in mid-1959. In return, a
group of Canadian scientists representing the Council toured the USSR, as guests of
the Academy. During the course of the visit to the USSR, NRC President Dr. E.W.R.
Steacie and President of the Academy, Alexander Nesmeyanov exchanged letters,
setting out the basis of an exchange program between the Academy and the NRC.76
Both parties agreed that rather than pursuing an agreement at the
government level, an exchange of letters essentially allowed the contracting parties
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to represent their specific institutions and did not directly represent their
respective governments. The exchange of letters was signed on October 28, 1959.77
Overall, the Soviet scientific community impressed the NRC, and it believed
Canadian scientists had much to gain from an exchange program. Unlike the
imbalanced nature of Canadian-Soviet exchanges generally, the NRC and the
Academy’s exchange program was quite reciprocal. For instance, with the exception
of one scientist, the Academy accepted all the proposals for visits from Canadian
scientists for the 1960-61 academic year, and the NRC assessed the agreement as
“entirely satisfactory.” 78 Additionally, the NRC explained, “all of the Canadian
visitors to the USSR have returned to Canada feeling that their visit has been well
worthwhile and that they have gained in their own fields a valuable knowledge of
Soviet scientific developments.” Having Soviet scientists in Canada working daily
with Canadian researchers also had “a direct benefit to Canadian science.”79
Exchanges between Soviet and Canadian scientists would have played an
important role in bringing the nations closer together and in improving CanadianSoviet relations generally. While very little, if anything, has been written on
Canadian-Soviet scientific exchanges during this period, American scholarship on
American-Soviet scientific exchanges does exist, and the importance of such
interactions has been well established. Traditionally, the scientific and academic
communities have been the most pro-Western segments of Russian society, and the
77
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most prominent calls for democracy and human rights have come from their
ranks.80 A former US science attaché in Moscow, John M. Joyce, stated that in what
was considered basically a conservative Soviet society, “‘the most outward-looking
people, the people most susceptible to external influence, are the scientists.’”81
Exchanging researchers and scientists, then, would have fit well with Canada’s
policy of exposing the USSR to Western practices, while also gaining knowledge of
innovative ideas. In 1959, the US National Academy of Sciences and the Soviet
Academy signed a similar agreement to the one entered into by the NRC and the
Soviet Academy. The general terms of the agreement were virtually identical to the
Canadian-Soviet exchange of letters, and provided “for short-term exchanges of
scientists to deliver lectures, conduct seminars, and gain familiarization with
scientific research, as well as long-term exchanges for scientific research and
advanced study.” 82 As historian Yale Richmond aptly points out, the scientific
exchanges “served to establish the first postwar linkages between American and
Soviet scientists, helped to increase American knowledge of Soviet science, and
prepared the way for an expansion of [science and technology] exchanges during
the détente years.” 83 Piggybacking on Richmond’s observations, it is not an
unreasonable leap to suggest that similar conclusions could be drawn about the
Canadian context.
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Also to the West’s advantage was the fact that Soviet exchange participants
appear to have been instructed to disseminate widely the results of their travel and
study abroad and did so through lectures and published papers. It is safe to assume,
therefore, that these academics “must have told their educated and perceptive
audiences much about the world beyond Soviet borders.” 84 Canadian-Soviet
scientific exchanges proved to be beneficial not only from the academic perspective,
but also from political and ideological vantages. While the Canadian government
played a limited role in academic exchanges, scholarly interaction encouraged EastWest bridge building and nurtured ties between Canadian and Soviet academic
communities.
FROM ICE RINKS TO CONCERT HALLS

While the spirit of academia is based on cooperation and collaboration, the
two nations were not afraid to harness the competitive edge of sport to promote
national pride and patriotism. Hockey proved to be a popular pastime for both
countries, as each side sought to display their respective national vitality and
prestige. As one historian puts it, “sport can serve as an unobtrusive form of
propaganda.85 Politics may bleed into sport. According to sociologist, Alex Nathan,
“international competitive sport has become an arena for ideologies, mirroring the
same tensions as are seen throughout the world on the purely political plane.”86
Rightly so, the 1972 Summit Series between Canada and the USSR has captivated
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Canadians, and the series represents the ultimate expression of “hockey
diplomacy.”87 Yet, Canadian-Soviet hockey matchups preceded the Summit Series.
While their significance may not match the 1972 series, Canadian-Soviet games
played during the late fifties and early sixties indeed remained politically and
ideologically charged, and were important opportunities for both sides to project
national greatness. Canada, in particular, could boast middle power prowess if
victorious over the Communist superpower, while simultaneously utilizing “its
position […] as a ‘peacekeeper’ to mediate the tensions between East and West.”88
On the eastern side of the curtain, sports in general, and certainly hockey in
particular, became one of the best and most comprehensible means of explaining to
the masses the advantages of socialism over capitalism.89
At the very least, the matches, as well as the lead up to the games, were a sign
that the Soviets viewed Canada as a formidable hockey opponent. Not only that, the
Soviet media used commentary from Canadian players and coaches as a means to
highlight the West’s positive perception of the USSR in general, and its advanced
sporting infrastructure in particular. For instance, one article reported the Canadian
Coach of the Kelowna Packers hockey team as praising the Moscow Sports Palace as
“One of the best I’ve ever seen. […] Excellent ventilation, good ice and, what is even
more important, soft lighting which never disturbs the players during the game.”
The Soviet article spent much time detailing the Canadians’ leisure time, describing
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the athletes’ positive impressions of the Bolshoi Theatre, the two-tiered bridge
across the Moscow River, the Kremlin, and the Circus. Additionally, the article made
a point of highlighting the skills of the Soviet players as seen through Canadian eyes.
The coach was quoted saying, “In the first place, the excellent physical fitness of
Soviet players should be noted, […] we have acquainted ourselves with the training
system of Soviet teams and consider it to be perfect.”90 The article certainly praised
the Soviet hockey system over its Canadian counterpart, but it is revealing that so
much emphasis was placed on the positive views of the Soviet system held by
Canadian athletes and coaches. In other words, because Canadian hockey was seen
as world class, the Soviets used Canadians praise as leverage to bolster their own
excellence. At the same time, however, it may have elevated Canadian hockey status
by indirectly acknowledging the importance of Canadian opinions.
Self-affirmation was not the only tactic the Soviets adopted during their
reporting on Canadian-Soviet hockey matches. In fact, in March 1959, one despatch
from the embassy in Moscow to the SSEA highlighted how “by and large, Soviet
newspapers have been quite complimentary to the team with respect to their ability
as hockey players.” In fact, after one game where the Belleville MacFarlands beat the
Soviet team at the World Championships in Prague, Ambassador Johnson explained
how “the Soviet press continues to praise [the Canadian team] and to admit their
superiority over the Russian team.” The despatch then pointed out how an article in
Sovietskaya Rossiya made this view clear when it reported, “to speak objectively,
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even before the game we could see that the Canadians surpassed our team in
technique and speed.”91 The Canadians, indeed, were seen as a formidable force on
the ice.
The popularity and spectatorship surrounding Canadian-Soviet matchups
was highlighted when the 1960 Allan Cup Champions, the Chatham Maroons, visited
the USSR to play a series of games with various Soviet teams. The Maroons had a
tough seven game lineup, and even prior to their arrival the Soviet press referenced
the impending visit by noting, “publicity material adorned many of the billboards
throughout [Moscow].” The first two games witnessed the Maroons facing-off
against the Soviet National All-Star team. The games were split one win apiece, with
Chatham winning 5-3 in the first game, but getting clobbered 11-2 in the second.
The Canadian embassy explained that many members of the legation attended the
games, and the popularity of the matches was “quite evident as all 20,000 seats in
the stadium [had] been sold out for each game.” It was also noted that the “press and
television coverage has been most extensive.” Stories appeared in Izvestia and
Sovietskaya Rossiya prior to the matchups that detailed the Canadian team and the
players, while Pravda covered post-game analysis. Of the first game, Pravda
reported, the “guests played a most skillful, assured and exceptionally wellcoordinated game.” The coverage did not stop there. The first two games against the
Soviet All-Star team were televised in their entirety, which, according to the
Canadian embassy, was an “unusual feature in that relatively little live telecasting is
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done in the Soviet Union.” Additionally, there had been at least two televised
interviews with officials accompanying the Canadian team.92
The Canadian press, however, was less enthusiastic about the Maroons’
performance against the USSR’s All-Star team. The Globe and Mail presented an
entirely different view than Pravda, by focusing on Canadian Amateur hockey
officials. One article scathingly titled, “Send Top Pro Team to USSR? One-Sided
Hockey Wins Embarrass Russians” opened with a quote from the former manager
and coach of the Chatham Maroons, John Horeck, who stated, “Mediocrity of
Canadian hockey abroad is humiliating to Canada and embarrassing to Russia.” The
main message of the article was that the Soviets were making rapid progress in
hockey, and Canada needed not only to respect this fact but to face it head on by
sending not its amateur hockey teams but teams and players from the National
Hockey League (NHL). Horeck explained that the “Russians would prefer to see
[Montreal] Canadiens or [Toronto Maple] Leafs. […] They respect our ability to play
hockey. That is why they cannot understand our sending inferior teams to Russia.
[…] They realize they’ll probably be beaten, but they’ll enjoy the game and learn
something.”93 The sense of national pride came through in the article, though there
was marked disappointment that Canada’s greatness as a hockey nation was not so
apparent in the international “arena,” so to speak. The image of Canadian dominance
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in hockey was not corroborated on the world stage, and countries like the USSR
expected more. In the context of the Cold War, the political and ideological
underpinnings of hockey were, no doubt, present both on and off the ice.
Blatant Cold War rhetoric, however, was largely absent from the coverage of
the hockey games between teams representing Canada and USSR during this period.
This does not mean, though, that their ideological and political significance were
entirely absent. Just as scientific and performing arts exchanges did not have to be
laden with Cold War jargon to be important avenues for lessening international
tensions, hockey too served as a viable means to connect two otherwise antithetical
national systems. Granted, according to some, Canadian performances in the USSR
left much to be desired, but it was clear that respect for Canadian hockey abilities
permeated Soviet society. As a result, Canadian hockey served as a modest avenue
for projecting awareness of Canada, a middle power in the Cold War, behind the
Iron Curtain.
Not only did the hockey arena provide a venue for projecting Canadian
cultural greatness, but so too did the stage. Canada’s performing artists, as with
pianist Glenn Gould in 1957, served as non-state actors who operated in the
international sphere and, “through informal penetration of foreign cultures,” were
able to “gather information, exert policy pressure, and influence public opinion.”94
As historian Jeremi Suri argues, the success of non-state actors lies in person-to-
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person contact, rather than government-to-government relations.95 Addressing USSoviet relations, Richmond notes that American ensembles and soloists touring the
Soviet Union invariably played to full houses and were likewise appreciated by both
the intelligentsia and the general public: “The intense interest of the Soviet public in
Western performing artists was amply demonstrated by sold-out halls, lines of
ticket seekers hundreds of yards long, and the storming of gates by those without
tickets.”96 Canadian Ambassador in Moscow Arnold Smith asserted there was a
genuine and very substantial Western interest in encouraging visits by Western
artists and cultural groups to various parts of the USSR,
specifically in order to increase the exposure of various sections of
this still essentially closed society to the outside world, and to
contribute to the gradual opening up of Soviet public opinion and the
progressive normalization of Western-Soviet relations. Provided we
can successfully avoid the real dangers of war, and do not blow each
other up during the next decade or two (and I think we can avoid
this), then there is I think substantial reason to believe that the
further development of exchanges in cultural and other fields
(scientific, business, technical, etc.) can provide one of the best
hopes, and indeed one of the most effective instruments, in
encouraging the development of more normal and safer
international attitudes and relations.97
Smith appeared to hold a particular soft spot for the performing arts. During his
time in Moscow, from 1960 to 1963, Canada engaged in a series of meaningful
exchanges of performing artists with his host nation, much to his delight.
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In mid-1961, the Montreal Symphony Orchestra signed an agreement with
the Soviet Ministry of Culture. Preliminary negotiations were carried out by the
Ministry of Culture and Ambassador Smith, before they were handed to Pierre
Beique of the Montreal Symphony Orchestra and Nicolas de Koudriavtzeff of
Canadian Concerts and Artists in Moscow. De Koudriavtzeff had been responsible
for the visits to Canada of many Soviet companies and individual artists. The terms
of the agreement saw the Montreal Symphony Orchestra play five concerts in
Moscow, followed by concerts in Leningrad, Riga, and Kiev. In return, Canada hosted
the Red Army Chorus for a national tour.98
The issue of reciprocity continued to hover over Canadian-Soviet exchanges
of performing artists.99 Regarding the Montreal Symphony Orchestra specifically,
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Smith highlighted the specific imbalance surrounding remuneration. In a most
revealing and highly descriptive despatch to the SSEA, Ambassador Smith explained
that all of the Montreal Symphony Orchestra concerts in Soviet cities were sold out.
Nevertheless, he lamented, that whereas the Red Army Chorus visited several cities
across Canada and earned high pay in convertible dollars (similar to several other
major Soviet artistic troupes during that year and years prior), the Montreal
Symphony Orchestra “settled for payments solely in unconvertible rubles.” Their
tour became financially possible “only because the Quebec Government, the
Montreal Arts Council, and the Canada Council all considered that a Soviet tour […]
would offer such prestigious value to Montreal and Canada that they put up a
subsidy of $50,000 to assist in the expenses.” As for the Orchestra itself, Smith
explained that much like other performing groups or individual performers, they
found it in their interests, “for reasons of prestige and publicity in the West, as well
as for understandable reasons of personal curiosity and satisfaction, to be invited to
perform in the USSR, which still has some of the glamour of the exotic unknown.” As
a result, Western artists were apt to accept Soviet contracts offering much less pay
than they normally obtained for performances in the West, or, as was often the case
for Canadian artists, to accept contracts “paying them wholly or in substantial part
in unconvertible rubles.” In contrast, Soviet officials in charge of arrangements in
this field “normally drive very hard and very successful bargains for very high pay,”
which they obtained in entirely convertible dollars, for performances in countries
like Canada and the United States.100
100
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While Canadian impresarios were left largely to fend for themselves – given
the natural arrangements of the market economy – Soviet performing artists and
groups had the weight of the Soviet government behind them, in particular that of
the Ministry of Culture and the State Committee on Cultural Relations. After all,
sending performing artists abroad was a highly organized and deliberate element in
Soviet foreign policy, motivated by the desire to further influence objectives of that
policy. Yet, an important tactic existed where the Canadian government could help
Canadian impresarios and where, in fact, Canadian officials could assist in balancing
Canadian-Soviet exchanges. Ambassador Smith explained:
The real bargaining lever for the West in this area lies frankly and
bluntly in the ability of Western governments to refuse the necessary
visas. This lever need not necessarily or normally be exercised very
bluntly or overtly, but it is precisely in the latent recognition that this
lever exists that the bargaining power of Western representatives
[…] lies, in their dealings with the Soviet government representatives
with whom they must negotiate.
In other words, Smith was suggesting that the Canadian government did retain
some power in the field of cultural exchanges on the issue of reciprocity and should
wield it, albeit in a calculated way. Smith continued and cited a relevant example of
how he personally was able to influence negotiations surrounding the agreement
between the Montreal Symphony Orchestra and the Red Army Chorus.
Ambassador Smith’s account of his role in the negotiations, while lengthy,
deserves attention:
I can state with assurance that the Soviet authorities would not have
gone through with arrangements for the visit had I not made clear to
External Affairs, “Cultural Exchanges Between Canada and the USSR,” Ottawa, November 30, 1962.
DEA/2462-E-40.
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them, discreetly but effectively, that the Canadian public would not
for long accept the idea of cultural exchanges if they thought that this
field was regarded by the Soviet authorities as a one-way street. It
was only when the Soviet authorities got the impression that unless
they completed a contract for the visit of the Montreal Symphony
Orchestra they would not be able to continue sending important
Soviet cultural troupes to Canada, that the Soviet Government
organization Gosconcert and the Soviet Ministry of Culture stopped
stalling and signed a firm contract for the visit of the Montreal
Symphony. Nevertheless, the Montreal Symphony’s Soviet tour was, I
think, a tremendous success, and it did a considerable amount to
make Canada better and more favourably known in the leading
western cities of this country. The Soviet Minister of Culture had
attached particular importance to our permission that they send the
Red Army Chorus to Canada, since the Americans had for years been
rejecting Soviet requests that it be allowed to tour the United States.
They regarded the Montreal Symphony tour here as the quid pro quo
for the Red Army Chorus.101
The significance of Smith’s role in the negotiations must not be underestimated.
Foremost, it demonstrates that even though the Canadian government did not
officially sponsor cultural exchanges, and despite the absence of an official cultural
agreement, some officials still influenced exchange arrangements and played an
active and important role in their development. Despite the lack of an official
agreement, there was opportunity for the Canadian government to exert some
influence. In addition, Smith’s support for cultural exchanges and his belief in both
their cultural and political significance are evident. In turn, this highlights the vital
role played by Canadian ambassadors in advancing Canada’s foreign policy
objectives, particularly in a cultural diplomacy context. Ambassador Smith’s
negotiations are also a small, but telling, example of how Canada made advances
when the United States did not. While the Americans had routinely rejected a tour
101

DCER, Vol. 29. 441. Despatch No. 1004. Ambassador in Soviet Union to Secretary of State for
External Affairs, “Cultural Exchanges Between Canada and the USSR,” Ottawa, November 30, 1962.
DEA/2462-E-40.

132
by the Red Army Orchestra, the Canadians proved more flexible by permitting the
tour. Consequently, while the Americans had refused to engage with this specific
initiative in cultural diplomacy, Canada was able to contribute to the West’s overall
strategy of building bridges between East and West.
The Symphony as a whole was not the only success during the Soviet tour, as
Canadian soloists captivated Soviet audiences as well. Teresa Strates, a soprano
from Toronto, was asked by Ambassador Smith to perform a solo concert at the
Kremlin Hall, while on tour with the Montreal Symphony Orchestra. Soviet Minister
of Culture Ekaterina Furtseva was reported to have “applauded the young singer
enthusiastically from her front row seat.”102
In November 1963, now as assistant undersecretary of state for external
affairs under the new Liberal government, Smith addressed the International
Council of Museum of Modern Art. In a speech titled, “The Position of the Artists in
the USSR,” he discussed the importance of freedom of expression to Soviet society.
Smith stated that Khrushchev explained to him personally “that as society becomes
technologically more advanced and more complex it is necessary […] to encourage
more initiative on the part of the increasingly widespread and increasingly educated
layers of the population.” If freedom of expression was to be slowly nurtured in the
Soviet Union, Smith explained, “much of it will be used to encourage awkward
questions and to demand also an increased normalization of Soviet life, and I think,
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less risky and less hostile attitudes to the West.” Smith saw an important link
between freedom of expression and the arts. To this point, Smith asserted:
I think that the West can help, in this vitally important matter of
which way Russia will go, precisely by the sort of activity with which
you [artists] are engaged. In my judgment cultural contacts and
exchanges on a reciprocal basis with the Soviet Union can play a role
of great strategic and political importance in the struggle for peace
and a more normal world. Getting to know more here in the West
about Russia’s literary and artistic creations enrich us. Helping their
public, and above all their intelligentsia, to learn something of
Western cultural achievement can stimulate, encourage and
strengthen the artists and certain writers and taskmasters among the
Soviet population, giving them not merely a desire for freer and more
normal international relations, but helping them to develop the moral
courage which they will need in leading and pulling their own country
toward the more open society which they desire.103
Smith’s speech is a testament that his role as ambassador to the Soviet Union
affirmed his view regarding the importance of East-West cultural contacts. It is clear
that he certainly believed in the viability and importance of such contacts.
Diefenbaker, too, was mindful of the significance of cultural exchanges to
Canadian foreign policy initiatives. The Prime Minister made public his support for
the Montreal Symphony Orchestra’s tour. The Montreal Star reported that
Diefenbaker paused during an address on Canada’s international relations to point
out that “cultural exchanges such as the tour of the Montreal Symphony Orchestra
helped greatly to create a better climate for lessening of tensions.” In addition,
Diefenbaker said that international conferences could “get nowhere without the
necessary goodwill among nations,” and that exchanges such as these helped foster
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“an atmosphere of mutual goodwill.”104 While Diefenbaker’s statement refers to the
importance of cultural exchanges, it is clear from his reference to international
conferences that they were not seen as a powerful foreign policy tool on their own;
rather, he recognized these exchanges as one element of a multi-faceted approach to
Canadian foreign policy. Also interesting is his reference to “mutual goodwill.” His
acknowledgement that cultural exchanges have the ability to “lessen tensions” is a
testament to the power of cultural “weapons” in breaking down barriers. Music
could, in effect, transcend national allegiances.
Even before artists made their way to the USSR, Diefenbaker was supportive
of their efforts to organize a tour. For instance, Alexander Brott, a conductor and
professor in the Faculty of Music at McGill University, worked to organize a
conducting tour of various Soviet orchestras, making arrangements directly through
the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa and the state concert management company
Goskoncert.105 Brott received confirmation that his tour was included in the plan for
cultural exchanges for 1962, but then heard nothing further from the Soviet
Embassy, despite numerous enquiries. 106 Ambassador Aroutunian informed the
DEA that it had been decided that Brott’s fee could not be paid in dollars, only rubles
that could not be taken out of the USSR. Given this, Aroutunian was hesitant to
inform Brott of the news, anticipating it would be upsetting. Under-Secretary
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Norman Robertson, however, advised Diefenbaker that the DEA had suggested to
the Soviet embassy that Brott be informed immediately since “the tour might be
important to him for reasons other than financial reward.”107
Diefenbaker wrote Brott personally, explaining that enquiries had been made
with the Soviet Embassy and that assurances were received from the Embassy that
the Soviets would write Brott immediately about his tour. Diefenbaker then asked
Brott to keep him updated. If the professor did not receive word from the Embassy
promptly, Brott was advised to let Diefenbaker know, suggesting that pressure
would again be applied from the Prime Minister’s office. 108 Follow up proved
unnecessary. Shortly after the initial pressure had been applied to the Soviet
Embassy, Brott received confirmation regarding his upcoming tour. Brott then
expressed his gratitude to Diefenbaker for his “sympathetic interest.”109 The fact
that the Prime Minister was personally willing to support Brott and his proposed
tour of the Soviet Union further supports the notion that cultural exchanges were
viewed as an important component of Canadian relations with the USSR during the
Cold War.
CONCLUSION

While Canada was entrenched firmly within the Western bloc in the Cold
War and politically supported its NATO allies, it carved out a more independent
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position with the USSR in the economic and cultural realms. The appointment of
Aroutunian as Soviet ambassador confirms the notion that Canada began to occupy
a more important place in the USSR’s foreign policy. While the Soviets hoped to
improve relations with Canada, the Americans were aggravating their North
American ally through the implementation of the PL 480 program. The United
States’ giveaway program substantially reduced Canada’s ability to export wheat
and ultimately led Canada to seek out new export markets, particularly with
Communist nations.
Lester Pearson’s 1955 visit to the USSR was not primarily driven by
commercial factors, yet it set in motion a bilateral trading relationship that would
later prove important for Canadian wheat growers and Canadian-Soviet relations
generally, beginning with a formal trade agreement in 1956. Renewing the 1956
Trade Agreement was important not only for domestic agriculture but also for
foreign policy, since it was believed that commercial relations built mutual trust and
reduced suspicions. Negotiations were by no means smooth, as the Soviets sought
an import quota from the Canadian government, and the Canadians sought a fixed
importation of Canadian wheat. In the end, a 1:2 ratio was set that targeted
Canadian imports from the USSR at half the total amount of goods exported to the
USSR. In the end, however, this agreement did not appear to be enforced. The
Diefenbaker years in Canadian-Soviet commercial relations may not have been
decisive to Canadian-Communist European relations generally, but they were a time
of bridge-building in relations between the two sides in the Cold War. Ultimately,

137
Canada and the USSR maintained economic ties important to political relations in
the uneasy Cold War environment.
In the field of cultural exchange, Canada and the Soviet Union made
impressive strides. As seen with economic relations, the Diefenbaker government’s
policy regarding cultural exchange with the USSR was rooted in earlier initiatives
set in motion by the Liberal government of Louis St. Laurent and largely developed
by Jules Léger. The Hungarian Uprising, however, dampened any potential exchange
programs between the two nations. It would take Glenn Gould’s 1957 tour of the
Soviet Union to reignite these efforts. The Progressive Conservatives essentially
took up policy from where it had been left by the Liberals, at the time of the
challenging events in Hungary. Negotiations between Canada and the USSR
regarding an official cultural exchange agreement never materialized, in spite of
consistent Soviet pressure to obtain one. Instead, a quid pro quo approach to
exchanges was maintained.
Academia, hockey, and the performing arts all proved to be mutually
advantageous avenues for advancing cultural exchanges, serving the larger
Canadian policy objective of exposing Soviet citizens to Western modalities and
cultural life. Canadian officials consistently wrestled with the ongoing imbalance in
reciprocity of exchanges; in particular, Canadian Ambassador Arnold Smith worked
hard to address these imbalances. Even without a bilateral exchange agreement, at
times the Canadian government intervened in, or facilitated, negotiations to ensure
Canadian artists received fair treatment and that the Canadian cultural footprint
was left on Soviet society. Ultimately, Canadian governments in this period
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supported the expansion of exchanges in various fields and saw them as a necessary,
effective, and appropriate way for Canada to engage in Cold War diplomacy as a
middle power. Exchanges of all sorts proved a worthy avenue for Canada to build
bridges between East and West, and engage in the Cold War through other means.
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Chapter 3

Politics in the Shadows of Powerful Superpowers: Canadian-Yugoslav
Diplomatic Relations
Canada’s relations with communist Yugoslavia were politically and
ideologically charged. Despite their differences, bilateral relations were most often
positive and perceived as mutually advantageous. Importantly, the Soviet Union was
an ubiquitous element that also shaped Canada’s approach to Yugoslavia. When
John Diefenbaker’s Progressive Conservative government came to power, relations
with Yugoslavia were relatively insignificant. During the Diefenbaker government,
however, relations developed in a manner and pace unforeseen to that point; from
the late 1950s onward, Canadian-Yugoslav relations increasingly became an
important component of Canada’s Communist Europe policy, and by extension a
Cold War “battleground” on which Canada tried to challenge European communism
with non-military tactics. As a result, Canada sought to cultivate healthier political,
commercial, and cultural exchanges with Yugoslavia to expose it to Western
modalities. So, Canada saw Yugoslavia as a viable point where Soviet hegemony over
Eastern Europe might be penetrated, lessening the “threat” of global communism.
While Canada’s Yugoslav policy mirrored that of the United States in some
important respects, it did not do so passively or uncritically. The development of
Canadian-Yugoslav relations was challenging, not least because of Yugoslav
minority communities in Canada who sometimes proved politically and
ideologically motivated to oppose the relationship that Canada was trying to
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develop. This chapter explores Canadian officials’ motivations to develop closer ties
with Yugoslavia and examines the various fields in which progress was achieved.
While trade and bilateral exchanges were modest, there were problems and
varying degrees of success with both. The political atmosphere and international
climate of the Cold War meant that their importance was heightened, particularly in
the eyes of Canadian officials. They recognized that commercial and cultural
relations were not important for entirely economic and cultural reasons; rather,
they were vital for political and ideological purposes. In other words, the desire to
establish closer ties was politically motivated, and the Soviet Union was a crucial
consideration in Canada’s Yugoslav policy, and vice versa. Canada promoted
Yugoslavia’s independence and pursued closer bilateral relations in an attempt to
entice it into the Western sphere of influence and to weaken the influence of the
Soviet Union and, by extension, global communism. Cognizant of the USSR’s
ambition to have Yugoslavia within its European sphere of influence, Canadian
officials perceived a contest to “win over” Yugoslavia as a way to limit the Soviet
Union’s international influence, a contest in which a middle power such as Canada
might wield some influence. Overall, cordial relations and an increase in exchanges
between the two nations exemplified the growing importance of Yugoslavia to
Canadian foreign policy. Moreover, the effort to establish constructive and positive
relations with Yugoslavia demonstrates that this happened at a decisive moment
when Canadian officials increasingly saw Eastern Europe as an important and
influential region in international affairs and saw opportunities for middle powers
to shape the global Cold War.
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Canada had few issues with Yugoslavia during this period, so the state of
political relations tended to be governed by the international situation and, in
particular, by Yugoslavia’s position in it. In fact, Canada’s policy was especially
shaped by changes east of the Iron Curtain. Limitations existed in how Canadian
officials could best cultivate closer relations as a means of challenging the spread of
communism.

Nevertheless,

Canada’s

policy

of

closer

cooperation

was

commensurate with its middle power position. Improved relations between the two
countries highlight the Diefenbaker-Khrushchev years as a decisive moment in
Canadian-Yugoslav, and concurrently, Canadian-Eastern European, relations.
YUGOSLAVIA, THE USSR, AND THE CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE

Following in the footsteps of the United Kingdom and the United States, the
Canadian government officially recognized the Yugoslav regime in December 1945.
Ottawa initially mistrusted the new Yugoslav regime, and this made difficult the
establishment of a Canadian diplomatic mission there. Generally, the Canadian
government tended to share the American and British view that Yugoslavia was
simply part of the belligerent Soviet monolith that threatened Western security
interests. The DEA essentially characterized Yugoslav foreign policy up to the late
1940s as somewhat aggressive and dogmatic, in serving the interests of the Soviet
Union.1 Planning for a Canadian diplomatic mission in Yugoslavia began in late
1947. The government promoted its position by explaining that Canada was merely
following up on the appointment in 1942 of General George P. Vanier as minister to
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the exiled Yugoslav government in London and was following a policy of
maintaining contacts with East European states. With the exception of Greece, the
Canadian mission in Belgrade was the first one established in the Balkans.2
Yugoslavia’s leader, Joseph Tito, had broke with – or depending on one’s
perspective, was excommunicated by the USSR. Diplomat John Holmes stated that
the schism was good for the West, but he cautioned the government against
assuming that the crisis was indicative of an opportunity for a quick Western victory
in the Cold War.3 Relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR entered a period of
rapprochement following Nikita Khrushchev and Nicolai Bulganin’s visit to Belgrade
in 1955. In an effort to attract Yugoslavia back into the Soviet sphere of influence,
the two Soviet leaders acknowledged Soviet responsibility for the rupture of
relations after 1948.4 Efforts to mend this split continued following the Twentieth
Party Congress in 1956 and Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin’s “cult of
personality.”5 The high point of reconciliation came when Tito journeyed to the
Soviet Union in 1956 and both countries agreed to reestablish direct relations
between communist parties as well as between states.6 Cooperation did not last for
long, however, and Soviet-Yugoslav relations soon soured again following the Soviet
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Union’s intervention in Hungary. Additionally, Tito’s last minute decision not to
attend the summit meeting of communist leaders in Moscow on the occasion of the
fortieth anniversary of the Russian Revolution, and Yugoslavia’s refusal to sign the
Twelve-Party Declaration in November 1957, further marked the development of a
deep schism from which retreat was difficult.7 By not signing the Twelve-Party
Declaration, Yugoslavia refused to acknowledge the Soviet Union as the uncontested
leader of the Communist world. It also highlights Yugoslavia’s refusal to recognize
that – despite Moscow’s (and Peking’s) insistence – the Communist struggle for
world power hinged on the basis of two camps.8 Essentially, this epitomized the
fundamental basis of Yugoslavia’s foreign policy: the doctrine of active co-existence
between all nations, irrespective of differences in ideology or economic and political
systems.
The Canadian embassy in Belgrade paid close attention to these
developments and saw the growing wedge between Yugoslavia and the Soviet bloc
as an inter-communist Cold War. Indeed it was. To the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia’s
revisionism was treacherous, particularly from an ideological point of view.
Consequently, this period – exemplified by Yugoslavia snubbing the Twelve-Party
Declaration – marks a crucial moment when Canadian officials strategically and
pragmatically cultivated stronger bilateral relations with Yugoslavia. The
Diefenbaker years coincided with strained Soviet-Yugoslav relations, which created
7
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the opportunity for Canada to promote closer Canadian-Yugoslav relations. To
Canadian officials, Yugoslav independence represented something more than an
inter-communist quarrel; it represented a potential catalyst to challenge
communism from the inside. This was essentially the underlying agenda that drove
Canada’s Yugoslav policy.
America’s Yugoslav policy was undoubtedly more complex than Canada’s,
arguably because of its role as “leader of the free world” and as the assumed first
line of defence against Communist infiltration. As well, the United States provided
substantial aid to Yugoslavia beginning in 1948 and led efforts to lure Tito into the
Western camp. America’s general policy toward Yugoslavia, while fluid in practice,
followed the general principles established in National Security Council (NSC)
Report 5805, from February 1958. According to NSC 5805, the Tito-Kremlin break
in 1948, and the consequent departure of Yugoslavia from the Soviet bloc, served US
interests in two major ways: the continued denial to the USSR of important strategic
positions and other assets, and the political effects, on both sides of the Iron Curtain,
of a break in the “monolithic” Communist bloc. In order to preserve these gains, NSC
5805 maintained
the United States extended economic and military aid to Yugoslavia. This
aid was of crucial importance in keeping the Tito regime afloat under
severe Soviet pressures and—by indicating US concern with Yugoslavia’s
independence—in discouraging any Soviet inclination to attack
Yugoslavia. A further US purpose, as the military and economic aid
programs developed, has been to utilize them to influence Yugoslavia
toward closer political, economic and military collaboration with the
West, and to encourage such internal changes in Yugoslavia as would
facilitate this orientation.
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The report also explained how US support of the maintenance of Yugoslav
independence fit into broader Eastern European policy, which had “as its objective
the eventual attainment of complete national independence by all of the Eastern
European satellites.” Importantly, the report also stated,
the example of Yugoslavia, which has successfully maintained its
independence of Soviet domination, stands as a constant reminder to the
satellite regimes, serving as a pressure point both on the leaders of these
regimes and on the leadership of the USSR. Moreover, it appears that
Yugoslavia has encouraged certain leaders in the satellites to seek
greater independence from Moscow.9
Canadian and American Yugoslav policy followed the same general approach. This is
not to say, however, that Canada was dependent on American policy initiatives. In
fact, utilized Canada’s middle power position to cultivate common ground with the
Yugoslavs. In effect, Canada and Yugoslavia shared something in common: both
nations pursued their foreign policies in the shadows of superpowers. Still,
similarities between the two also should not be overstated. After all, Yugoslavia held
a special position as a leading nation in the non-aligned movement, while Canada
was firmly entrenched in the Western orbit.
In historian Nicholas Gammer’s work, From Peacekeeping to Peacemaking:
Canada’s Response to the Yugoslav Crisis, he argues that Canadian policy towards
Yugoslavia during the 1950s and 60s was anchored by the idea that through
collaboration smaller states could regain their voice and greater control over their
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own futures through international cooperation and international organizations.10
While championing national sovereignty was indeed an important element of
Yugoslavia’s foreign policy, and Canada was acutely aware of this, it is important to
recognize that Yugoslavia itself was also an important component of Canada’s Soviet
policy equation, since Yugoslav independence fueled a rupture within the Eastern
bloc. Canada’s hope, and indeed belief, that a divided communist world could
contribute to its eventual collapse was very real; it is important, therefore, to take
into account this expectation when assessing Canadian-Yugoslav relations.
Canadian officials viewed Yugoslavia as a major dilemma for the Soviet bloc.
The significance of its independence was clear in the eyes of Canadian officials,
including Ambassador George Ignatieff (1956-58), who remarked, “Tito’s heresy, if
not suppressed, may well mark the beginning of the dissolution of the Communist
empire as a result of the fundamental conflicts of interest between the central
leadership and its constituent nations at the periphery.”11 Ignatieff explained that if
the USSR “did not succeed in breaking down Yugoslavia’s will to independence, they
are bound to face more trouble in the long run not only from Poland and Hungary,
but also from the Germans who have lived under their control as well.”12 The
potential for Yugoslavia to disrupt the communist alliance was indeed fortuitous
10 Gammer, From Peacekeeping to Peacemaking, 37. Gammer’s assertion that Canadian-Yugoslav
relations should be viewed in this framework is entirely justified, given the larger focus of his study
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Prospect,” October 15, 1958.
12 LAC, RG25, Vol. 8144, File 5475-FA-44-40 part 1, Despatch Ambassador in Belgrade to UnderSecretary of State for External Affairs, “Yugoslav External and Internal Policy in Retrospect and
Prospect,” October 15, 1958.
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from the West’s perspective, and Canadian officials believed this was a worthwhile
foreign policy objective. Ignatieff explained that
[s]ince the Yugoslavs are the least dogmatic of all Communists, they are
[…] the most apt to benefit from visitors from the Western world by
breaking down prejudices and understanding our way of life. It is well
to bear in mind that the quarrel of the Yugoslavs with the other
Communists has made significant breaches in the ideological walls
separating this country from the West. Every advantage should,
therefore, be taken to try and expose the Yugoslavs to the thinking and
ways of the Western world and to establish a vested interest in this
country in building up a better understanding with the countries of the
West.13
Ignatieff maintained that Canada was in a particularly good position to influence
Yugoslav policy because, whether in the artistic, commercial, or diplomatic realms,
all forms of contact were welcome. Ignatieff further asserted that Canada was in a
special position to contribute to such beneficial contacts because “Canadians on the
whole, not belonging to one of the major powers which have intervened in this area,
are more likely to be trusted.”14 This line of thinking was consistent throughout the
tenure of all Canadian ambassadors during the Diefenbaker years. Succeeding
Ignatieff as Ambassador in 1959, Robert Ford also recognized the importance of
Yugoslav independence, which could have potentially significant political, social, and
economic implications. He asserted that Canada “can exert a greater influence in
keeping Yugoslavia independent and oriented away from the Soviet bloc than many
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other countries of much greater size and importance in the NATO alliance.” 15
Consequently, Canada strongly supported and promoted Yugoslav independence by
cultivating closer relations on all fronts, and these efforts became the foundation
upon which Canada built its Yugoslav policy.
IGNATIEFF AND THE HUNGARIAN REFUGEE CRISIS

Canadian ambassadors played a particularly important role in establishing
closer relations and were vital to their success. When Ignatieff was first appointed
Ambassador in 1956, he quickly understood the underlying importance of his
mission in Belgrade. In his memoirs, he explained that in his “thirty-three years in
the foreign service, this was the only time when the Prime Minister and members of
his cabinet took the trouble to explain to me what they expected me to accomplish
or made me feel they were interested in my mission.”16 He was instructed to give the
Canadian government his assessment of Soviet intentions. For instance, was the
Soviet suppression of the Hungarian uprising simply a reaction to internal events in
that country or were they part of a broader scheme of Soviet expansionism?
Ignatieff explained “the government [also] wanted to establish a closer relationship
with this unorthodox socialist country which was trying to free itself from Stalinism,
and, in the process, embarking on all kinds of interesting political and economic
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experiments.” He was to “explore the possibility of developing trade not only with
Yugoslavia, but possibly also with other Balkan countries.”17
Yugoslavia’s Foreign Minister, Koča Popović, also appreciated Canada’s
global position and said that given its present international situation, Canada could
wield important influence, perhaps more than Canada itself realized.18 Gammer
cogently explains the Canadian-Yugoslav dynamic:
Canada and Yugoslavia found in their developing relationship a middle
power perspective. Contact with Canada provided the Yugoslavs with the
benefit of a more moderate view of Western motivations and intentions,
which Canadian officials saw as an effective tool in influencing
Yugoslavia’s behaviour, external and internal. […] Both Canada and
Yugoslavia, as their diplomats and government officials were fond of
reminding each other, lived in the shadow of a powerful neighbour.19
The fact that they each recognized the “shadow” in which the other lived suggests a
degree of respect and mutual understanding from a political perspective that
offered common ground on which the two countries could build a worthwhile
relationship.
Not only did Canada wish for closer cooperation, but Yugoslavia welcomed
closer association as well. Its flagship newspaper, Borba, expressed the country’s
pleasure with Canada’s independent foreign policy decisions. Specific reference was
paid to Canada’s vote in favour of Poland in the elections for membership on the UN
Security Council, its vote against French atomic tests in the Sahara, and its
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divergence from American policy over Cuba and China.20 Yugoslavia could prove
receptive to Canadian influence because Canadian policy positions were sometimes
perceived to be independent of the Western bloc. As well, Tito personally was aware
of Canada’s linguistic diversity and saw this as a shared attribute, “because
multiculturalism and economic regionalism were two important features of national
life which [both Canada and Yugoslavia] had in common.” 21 While cultural
differences and divisive forces would ultimately prove far more serious for
Yugoslavia than Canada, 22 the implications and challenges of cultural diversity
seemed to be one area of mutual understanding on which the two countries could
offer reciprocal respect. Additionally, in April 1958, in a lengthy exposition of
Yugoslavia’s foreign relations in the Federal Assembly, Tito “singled Canada out for
special mention (apart from the United States, Britain, and France), stating that
relations were developing normally, especially in trade matters and at the United
Nations.”23
In another indication of cordiality and deference, Ambassador Ignatieff was,
“along with the Indian and Egyptian Ambassadors, the only foreign head of mission
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to be invited to attend a celebration of Tito’s birthday.”24 It appears that at the
highest levels of the Yugoslav government Canada made a good impression. Not only
did Canadian Ambassadors notice friendlier and more open interactions, but Ottawa
also reported that the Yugoslav Embassy adopted an attitude of greater willingness
to consult with and talk to Canadian officials.25 Yugoslavia’s penchant for Canadian
opinions reflects its positive view of its position within the Western sphere. This
may likely be explained by the fact that Yugoslavia was beginning to see in Canada
an independence of action that departed from the rigidity that had tended to be
associated with Western policy,26 and its realization that Canadian foreign policy
was not necessarily a pale reflection of London’s or Washington’s.27
Cordial and more meaningful discussions coincided with more frequent
contact and a sincere desire to develop relations further, including immediate
collaboration on international crises. “As compared with previous years,” Ignatieff
explained, “there was a notable upswing in activity in relations between Canada and
Yugoslavia in 1957.” The two countries made positive strides cooperating on the
political and diplomatic fronts, with collaboration sometimes based on
humanitarian grounds. Following the USSR’s brutal suppression of the Hungarian
Uprising in 1956, 20,000 Hungarians fled to Yugoslavia and afforded one notable
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point of contact between Canada and Yugoslavia. Canada accepted more than 35,000
Hungarian refugees over the course of the St. Laurent and Diefenbaker
governments, with over 1,800 accepted from Yugoslavia in 1957 alone. This gesture
was “warmly appreciated” by the Yugoslav government.28 In fact, upon Ignatieff’s
departure from his post, Tito personally thanked him for his contribution to the
improved relationship between the two countries and singled out his work on the
Hungarian refugee crisis.29 Ignatieff’s, and by extension the Canadian government’s,
efforts to ease Yugoslavia’s refugee dilemma contributed to the increased good will
that was developing between the two countries. Yugoslavia’s role in providing
asylum for dissident Hungarians certainly would not have put it in the good graces
of Soviet authorities, and the crisis added to the growing rift between Yugoslavia
and the USSR.30 Yet, Yugoslavia’s role in facilitating refuge for Hungarian dissidents
was by no means the first point of friction between the two Communist nations.
YUGOSLAVIA AND NON-ALIGNMENT

Since the mid-fifties, Tito had been searching for a way to end Yugoslav
isolation, and his solution was the non-aligned movement, which, according to
28 RG25, Vol. 2492, File 10463-S-40, Circular Document Review of Events in Yugoslavia during 1957,
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Robert Ford, “was a stroke of genius.”31 Speaking from ambassadorial experience,
Ford illuminated how Tito was indeed a communist, “but a Yugoslav nationalist
above everything else.”32 Tito’s nationalism, however, roused serious indignation
from the hardliners in Moscow. For instance, Vyacheslav Molotov explained, “Tito ‘is
a nationalist, and that is his main defect as a communist […] he is infected with the
bourgeois spirit.’” 33

Initially, non-alignment was a way out of isolation for

Yugoslavia, but it proved even more politically expedient because it served to
dissuade the Soviets from attacking; Moscow would not want to alienate other nonaligned nations with such a hostile act. The Yugoslavs also hoped that nonalignment would contribute to their prestige, particularly in the UN, which it
certainly did.34 Yugoslavia’s isolation from the Cominform – the official forum of the
international communism movement, whose purpose was to coordinate actions
between Communist parties under Soviet direction – resulted in an independent
foreign policy that promoted non-intervention and a stance critical of “imperialistic”
spheres of influence.35
The Canadian government’s attitude toward the non-aligned bloc of nations,
and more specifically Yugoslavia’s position within it, oscillated during the
Diefenbaker period – but not, as some might expect, due to indecision by the Prime
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Minister. Generally, Canada accepted Yugoslavia’s inclinations, recognizing that nonalignment was more helpful than harmful in the battle with communism since it
provided an alternative to the Soviet model. Yugoslavia’s independence and its close
involvement with non-aligned nations went hand-in-hand,36 as non-alignment was a
cornerstone of its foreign policy. It believed that Afro-Asian countries presented
fertile ground for spreading communism “by example” and not “by conquest.”37 The
uncommitted countries of Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia also presented
a number of worthwhile markets for Yugoslavia with which to counteract the
economic offensive of the Sino-Soviet bloc.38
For the most part, Canada watched Yugoslavia’s involvement with the nonaligned group of nations from the sidelines, understanding and even sympathizing
with the domestic political and commercial necessities of its position. From an
international affairs perspective, however, the Canadian government was frequently
suspect. For instance, in the early 1960s, Ford observed,
Yugoslavia’s stance followed with only minor deviations the Soviet line
on most important issues of foreign affairs – disarmament, cessation of
nuclear tests, a German peace treaty, Berlin, the Congo, and so on. They

36 Yugoslav reaction to pressures from the Soviet bloc, such as making trade deal negotiations
difficult or suspending credits, caused it to seek friends wherever it could find them (e.g. the noncommitted group of nations; its neighbours Greece, Italy, and Austria; and the West – including
Canada).
37 LAC, RG25, Vol. 8144, File 5475-FA-44-40 part 1, Despatch Ambassador in Belgrade to UnderSecretary of State for External Affairs, “Yugoslav External and Internal Policy in Retrospect and
Prospect,” October 15, 1958.
38 RG25, Vol. 2492, File 10463-S-40, Circular Document Annual Review for Yugoslavia, 1958, February
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have only departed radically from this when their Afro-Asian friends
did so. This, of course, is no service to us.39
While Ford recognized the alignment of Soviet-Yugoslav foreign policy objectives, he
believed it was highly unlikely there was any collusion with the Soviets, even though
the result was the same. Conversely, Ford maintained that Yugoslavia’s activities in
the non-aligned movement afforded new nations an acceptable socialist alternative
to the USSR, which could then reduce Soviet influence in the third world. In other
words, third world nations following a Yugoslav model were seen as the “lesser of
two evils,” compared to those under Soviet influence. Additionally, further division
among communist states could only benefit the West. Yugoslavia’s activities in the
non-committed countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America are “probably
advantageous to the West,” explained Ford, since “[Yugoslavia] introduced a white
face among the anti-colonialists, they distracted the attention of left-wing opinion
from Moscow, [and] they represented a different, and probably more attractive,
socialist example.” Tito also likely took any occasion he could to warn these nations
against too close involvement with Moscow and Peking. While Ford cautioned that
Yugoslavia might use anti-Western propaganda to promote a Yugoslav variety of
communism, he was unclear as to “just how effective this may be.” 40 Yet, the
importance of non-aligned countries to Yugoslavia was not always consistent, and
by the early 1960s this appeared to diminish.
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In January 1962, Gordon Crean replaced Ford as ambassador in Belgrade and
had the opportunity to meet with Marshal Tito, and concluded, “actively working to
develop relations with non-aligned countries does not seem of prime importance in
Tito’s thoughts.”41 A year later, the view from Belgrade was that Yugoslavia’s policy
toward non-aligned countries had two broad perspectives: to further the socialist
cause in general, and Yugoslavia’s form in particular; and to retain an important
bargaining counter in the rapprochement with Moscow by demonstrating the
influence that Yugoslavia has in the non-aligned movement. 42 The Canadian
delegation to NATO also echoed many of Ford’s previous reservations, stating
Yugoslavia’s non-aligned policy serves the interest of Moscow – directly or
indirectly.43 Overall, however, Canadian officials were not overly concerned with
Yugoslavia’s non-alignment policy. While Yugoslav and the Soviet positions at the
UN often mirrored one another, Canada understood that their policies were often
coincidental and independently motivated. Despite such parallel orientations in
policy generally, sovereignty was recognized as the driving force behind
Yugoslavia’s positions. The Canadian delegation to the North Atlantic Council
reported that solidarity with the Afro-Asian bloc dominated Yugoslavia’s UN policy
at the seventeenth UN General Assembly, and its policy even diverged from the
Soviet bloc, particularly with regard to its future importance of the organization.44
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The Canadian government understood that Yugoslav foreign policy was
shaped by Marxist tenets; while it typically disagreed with that fundamental
framework, it frequently supported the general direction taken by Yugoslavia with
regards to the United Nations. 45 The two countries respected the principles
espoused by the UN, and Canada believed the organization was a venue where
Yugoslavia would respond favourably to Canadian initiatives. Relatedly, Canada also
recognized the UN was a platform for Yugoslavia to champion its independent global
position. As a result, Canada’s encouragement of Yugoslav independence brings into
sharper focus the rationale of Canadian support of the principles of nonintervention and the sovereignty of the state within a multilateral context.46
By 1961, Tito had successfully organized the first summit meeting for nonaligned nations, leading to the practice of greater consultation among non-aligned
nations and greater coordination of their policies in the UN. While accomplishing
nothing concrete, the summit demonstrated to both blocs the political influence Tito
could muster. How much actual influence Yugoslavia could exert on other nonaligned nations was unclear to Canadian officials. But, it was obvious that an
independent Yugoslavia was undoubtedly of great value to the West, since it
challenged the very foundations upon which world communism functioned,
including “synonymy of the interests of communism and the state interests of the
45
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Soviet Union; the unchallenged ideology of and strategic control of every party by
Moscow; and the slavish copying of all Soviet methods.” In Ford’s view, “The
Yugoslav rejection of these assumptions had an unsettling effect in Eastern Europe,
and it proved of considerable interest to the Chinese as they felt their way towards a
position of equality in the Sino-Soviet bloc.47 The Canadian government understood
Yugoslav independence to be key in their battle to contain European communism
and their aim to limit Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe.
PERSONAL DIPLOMACY

In addition to multilateral cooperation within the UN, fostering closer
bilateral diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia was integral to bringing the two
countries closer together. Henry Davis visited Yugoslavia in November 1959; the
visit was considered a success by both sides. As head of Canada’s European Division,
Davis was well positioned to critique Canadian-Yugoslav relations and to assess how
important they were to broader Canadian objectives. The main purpose of the visit
was political in nature. Essentially, Canadian officials wanted to maintain and
develop further ties with Yugoslavian officials at the highest levels.48 During his
short, two-day visit, Davis met with Ante Rukavina, Head of the American
Department, Joša Brilej, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs,
Bogdan Crnobrjna, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, and
Milovan Matić, Head of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries.
Rather unexpectedly, Davis also met with Popović, who “seemed genuine in insisting
47
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that he wished to see closer political consultations and, where possible, cooperation
between [the] two countries.”
Brilej explained that Yugoslav officials hoped that more frequent
conversations could be held between the two countries. He cited the exchange of
detailed views on the United Nations agenda before meetings of the General
Assembly as particularly valuable. The perception of each country, held by the other,
is made perfectly clear in Davis and Brilej’s conversations:
Mr. Davis said to Mr. Brilej that he had been indeed impressed by the
identity of views between our two countries on many questions. We
appreciated that the position and experience of Yugoslavia vis-à-vis the
Eastern bloc provided them with unique possibilities for interpreting
events, such as the recent changes in Soviet strategy. Mr. Brilej agreed,
but added that we occupied a comparable position with the other great
powers. Therefore, we had much to trade.49
In essence, Canada and Yugoslavia saw each other as potential sources of
information difficult to obtain anywhere else. Sharing perspectives and assessments
of international developments would be mutually beneficial. It was in the best
interests of both countries for Cold War hostilities to be kept to a minimum, as they
functioned more freely when the international climate was calm.
Reflecting on Davis’s visit, Ambassador Ford explained that it was “highly
successful in every sense.” In addition to creating an atmosphere of good-will, it was
a “definite contribution to the improvement of Canadian-Yugoslav relations,” which
“will be of great use to this Embassy…” 50 The importance of genuine, cordial
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relations to diplomacy is sometimes underestimated in international history, but
Davis’s visit to Yugoslavia is a testament to the significance both Canada and
Yugoslavia attached to personal contact as a means to maintain good diplomatic
relations. “The Yugoslavs,” explained Ford, “have a highly developed sense of
hierarchy,”51 so the visit by the Head of European Division would certainly have
demonstrated Canada’s genuine commitment to seeing relations improved.
Essentially, political consultation became increasingly important to each country
during this period, as the avenues for discourse became wider and more frequent.
Davis was also eager to have Foreign Minister Koča Popović’s visit Ottawa.
Since a visit by Popović could precede his trip to New York for the UN General
Assembly, Davis discussed how it would be expedient to have Popović and Secretary
of State for External Affairs Howard Green meet if Canada and Yugoslavia were
expecting to cooperate during the Assembly.52 This seemed fitting since Ford was
told that Popović “came back from each General Assembly more enchanted with
Canada” and was jokingly asked, “what charm [Canada] put on Mr. Popović.”53 Davis
also believed an invitation would be particularly appreciated since the US
government had not yet found it possible to invite any Yugoslav leaders to visit the
US.54 Clearly, Davis was not against scoring political points at the expense of the
the political conversations to useful ends, and his ability to impress the Yugoslavs with the
genuineness of our desire for better relations were invaluable in making the visit a success.”
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Americans. While it took more than a year after Davis first suggested a visit, Popović
came to Canada in March 1961.
Yugoslav officials were also eager to see the visit take place and emphasized
the importance attached to close and frank exchanges of views.55 US Ambassador in
Yugoslavia Karl Rankin revealed to Ford, in confidence, that Soviet Foreign Minister
Andrei Gromyko had invited Popović to the USSR, but no date was set. Popović
explained to Rankin that the Yugoslavs were reluctant to agree because the
“Russians were always trying either to enforce or entice Yugoslavia back into the
Soviet bloc.” Popović was not eager to visit Moscow “without comparable Western
visits to Ottawa and Washington.”56 Canada, therefore, was part of Yugoslavia’s
calculation to counterbalance Popović’s visit to the USSR.
But a mere balancing act was not the sole purpose of Yugoslavia’s policy
objectives. During their conversation, Popović explained to Green that Yugoslavia
was often accused of seeking to balance East and West relations but insisted it was
“attempting actively to develop constructive policies in relations to all areas and
countries” since Yugoslavia was unique to other European countries insofar as it
was pursuing an active foreign policy. Green expressed his understanding and
suggested Canada was trying to follow a somewhat similar line. 57
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During his visit, not only were diplomatic relations enhanced, but Canadian
officials viewed it as an opportune time to try and instill their views regarding
certain UN initiatives in hopes that Yugoslavia would provide a good counterweight
to Soviet policies. To Canadian officials in Belgrade, Yugoslavia’s aims at the UN
were clear: to establish firmly the position of Yugoslavia as one of the leading
members of the non-committed countries; to consolidate this group as a force at the
UN equal in influence to the Soviet and Western blocs; to persuade the Soviets to
accept Yugoslavia as a respectable member of the non-committed group; and to try
to prevent the complete isolation of the Soviets and to encourage a return to
conditions making renewed East-West contacts possible.

58

The Canadian

government, too, wanted to encourage East-West contacts and occasionally pressed
its opinion on Yugoslavia, in hopes that they would encourage the Soviet Union to
follow suit.
In advance of Green’s talk with Popović, Under-Secretary of State for External
Affairs Norman Robertson prepared a memo for the minister. Robertson explained
that in a recent conversation with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, Popović,
expressed disappointment in the tough Soviet attitude taken during debate on the
Congo Crisis at the UN. Popović explained that the tough line not only disappointed
the majority of UN members who hoped for détente, but would also almost
inevitably produce a tough reaction from the United States. Popović had further
lamented with Gromyko that there was not much hope for progress on any of the
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important issues unless the international atmosphere was improved.59 Canada and
Yugoslavia were in similar positions, in that a noose seemed to choke independent
national initiatives when Cold War tensions were amplified. Thus, some Canadian
officials hoped they could work with Yugoslavia to minimize international strain.
Robertson also advised Green to pursue apparent differences in attitude
between the Soviets and Yugoslavs, in relation to a number of specific questions
before the UN. For instance, Yugoslavia regarded disarmament as one of the most
important issues and was particularly concerned about nuclear weapons testing and
proliferation. Yugoslavia co-sponsored resolutions on both points in late 1960, and
Tito endorsed the one-treaty approach of the Soviet bloc. Yugoslavia also cosponsored the Indian draft that compromised on principles, knowing that the USSR
accepted those compromises. However, Yugoslavia was wary of accepting the Soviet
insistence on a tripartite structure in the UN as a prior condition to progress on
disarmament.60 Overall, the Yugoslavs continued to identify with neutralist opinion,
but would not oppose any substantive Soviet position. In light of this, Robertson
advised Green to take the opportunity to explain to Popović the Canadian emphasis
on the early resumption of negotiations, the addition of an impartial chairman, and
the provision of a more meaningful role for the UN through the Disarmament
Commission. To advance these positions, Robertson recommended that Green
“stress how vital it is for the interests of small countries such as Canada and
Yugoslavia that the present discussions between [American UN Ambassador]
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Stevenson and Gromyko […] lead to the development of a mutually acceptable basis
for the resumption of disarmament negotiations with the least possible delay.”61
Canada was in no direct position to press the Soviets on any of these issues, so in
hopes of swaying the Soviet position to some degree, Green was advised to employ
the common ground of middlepowerism with Yugoslavia as a means to influence the
USSR’s direction.
Green did just that. He stressed to Popović the importance attached by the
Canadian Government to the involvement of the smaller nations and their
assumption of some responsibility for disarmament matters.62 Popović agreed but
maintained that no progress had been made on disarmament: “the great powers
may have found lines of contact through which discussions may develop and there
has been some real progress in the field of nuclear testing which is helpful, but thus
far there has been no practical result in terms of actual disarmament.” Popović
emphasized the complicated nature of the negotiations and stressed the need for a
minimum of mutual faith to achieve any progress. He thought Canada and
Yugoslavia had a part to play in this respect. Green concurred and suggested that
there was some hard bargaining on this subject; the major powers, in Canada’s view,
were “adopting perhaps more extreme positions than was necessary because of the
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basic doubts which existed on both sides about the good intentions of the other.”63
The conversation between Green and Popović is revealing in how it highlights their
mutual recognition of the hardline positions of the superpowers and their common
desire to employ their own middle power positions to soften or reduce the
contentious nature of the opposing camps.
While the Popović visit did not lead to concrete proposals and discussions
remained rather superficial, it did reveal the nature of Yugoslavia’s perception of
Canada and the undercurrents of political relations between the two nations.
Yugoslav officials understood Canada’s global position as similar to their own, with
both nations operating diplomatically in the shadow of global superpowers. And,
they appreciated Canada’s attempt to develop an independent foreign policy, while
recognizing the inherent limits posed by Canada’s membership in NATO.64 In the
end, Popović’s visit to Canada should be viewed as an important development: it
promoted open discourse between the two countries and certainly improved
bilateral relations. It is also a window into the rhetorical strategies Canadian
officials used – like middlepowerism – to highlight common ground.
Shortly after Popović’s visit to Ottawa, Ford reflected on Canadian-Yugoslav
relations and suggested one of the most striking developments had been the
political consultation between the two nations at the UN, in Belgrade, and in Ottawa.
63DCER, Vol. 28. 641. Record of Conversation between Secretary of State for External Affairs and
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He wrote, “The Yugoslavs have responded with alacrity to our willingness to
exchange views [… and] we can probably expect that this habit of consultation will
have an accumulative effect on Yugoslav thinking over the years.” In reference to
Western economic aid to Yugoslavia, Ford concluded that the bulk of the burden
must naturally fall on the Americans, but that Canada “can do our bit, and I am
convinced that it can be rather important, both for our own national interests and
for the aims of the Western alliance as a whole.”65
POPOVIĆ’S VISIT AND CANADIAN-YUGOSLAV MINORITY COMMUNITIES

While Green and officials at External Affairs saw the many advantages
associated with such a visit, Diefenbaker immediately weighed them against the
potential domestic, political repercussions. As a result, the Prime Minister was more
hesitant. Popović’s visit, therefore, is a fine example of the juncture where national
foreign policy initiatives met, and often clashed, with arguments advanced by
certain minority communities in Canada.
While he was not hesitant about the visit, Davis had concerns about certain
Serbian émigré groups, the same groups who would voice their opinions directly to
Diefenbaker and his ministers. During an informal conversation, Davis asked the
Secretary of the Yugoslav Embassy, Mr. Velasevic, about the possible reaction of the
Canadian-Yugoslav community to the Popović visit. Velasevic explained that the
embassy believed since Popović was only visiting Ottawa there would be no
difficulty, particularly with limited advance notice of the visit. The Secretary went
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on to explain that if Popović were to visit Toronto, for instance, the Serbian émigré
organization there “might make trouble.”66 Overall, the Yugoslav embassy was not
overly concerned about potential rabble rousing by Yugoslav ethnic communities.
Upon learning of an upcoming demonstration, however, officials revisited the
possibility of delaying the public announcement of Popović’s visit.
Shortly after, Canadian officials learned that the Canadian Serbian National
Anti-Communist Committee planned to hold a ‘“great Serbian anti-communist
manifestation and entertainment’ in Toronto…” with the intention of showing
“solidarity against communists in general […] and against Tito’s official
representatives in Canada and their agents […] and also to draw it to the attention of
the Canadian public.” Initially, the DEA thought the group might use the occasion to
publicly attack Popović or his forthcoming visit to Ottawa, if they were to know
about it, and suggested the Yugoslav embassy delay the public announcement. But in
the end, both the Yugoslav embassy and the DEA concluded that since the press
release was already confirmed, the announcement should proceed as planned.67
Potential backlash from select Yugoslav ethnic groups did not ultimately deter
official protocol, and the announcement proceeded as scheduled.
Upon hearing news of Popović’s prospective visit, a number of protests from
Members of Parliament, leaders of ethnic communities, and private citizens flowed
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into the Prime Minister’s office. 68 Diefenbaker “was seriously concerned about these
protests,” 69 but Green stood his ground. In a clear attempt to limit public
controversy, only a brief, inconspicuous encounter with Diefenbaker was arranged.
Popović was escorted from a lunch table in the Parliament Building and brought to
meet Diefenbaker, who was ostensibly passing by on his way to the House of
Commons. The encounter lasted only long enough for a handshake and the briefest
of welcomes. 70 In the end, it was Green’s “dogged determination to bridge
differences between governments and their political systems” that pushed the visit
forward.71 The minister told the Canadian permanent representative to NATO that
while “the visit did not accomplish anything concrete, it has […] served as a useful
purpose in providing occasions for a full exchange of views.”72 Green, Ford, and
Diefenbaker understood the various advantages associated with closer CanadianYugoslav relations. But it was Diefenbaker who was far more tentative about the
visit, as his opinion was more influenced by anticipated reactions from various
Yugoslav minority communities. Since historians have so frequently pointed out that
Diefenbaker was influenced by these opinions, and “perceived himself through the
68
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eyes of anticommunist voters,”73 it is essential to look closely at the letters that
flowed into the Prime Minister’s office.
Of the letters from Canadian-Yugoslav groups in Canada, the Serbian,
Croatian, and Macedonian ethnic communities were most represented. Perhaps
most interesting is that while the Serbian and Croatian communities protested
Popović’s visit, often vehemently, the Macedonian community supported it. An
analysis of the opinions of Serbian and Croatian communities surrounding Popović’s
visit reveals that the Cold War only partly shaped their political views. Serbian and
Croatian protests were intertwined with strong nationalist sentiments rooted in the
past. Yet, broader Cold War narratives were appropriated to substantiate their
position, and Cold War rhetoric was often used to support political positions
unrelated to Canada’s efforts to contain communism. Moreover, some protest letters
suggested that Diefenbaker might be abandoning his widely recognized human
rights convictions. In the end, it appears that strongly held, long-standing beliefs and
opinions about their former homeland boiled to the surface and fueled the Serbian
and Croatian passionate protests.
The Serbian and Croatian minority communities frequently referred to
Popović’s World War Two record, which was far from clean, and his murderous
past. The president of Toronto based Ravna Gora, the Serbian Chetnik Veterans
Organization, expressed his “strongest protest to the invitation of [the] Canadian
government to Koča Popović,” and considered him to be “an ordinary criminal who

73

Jamie Glazov, Canadian Policy Toward Khrushchev’s Soviet Union (Montreal & Kingston: McGillQueens University Press, 2002), 106.

170
murdered thousands of Serbian people.” 74 Other letters expressed fear that
Popović’s visit would promote Yugoslav communist agents in Canada to “undermine
the organized life of […] Serbian Canadian communities.” This same letter, from the
Toronto Branch of the Serbian League of Canada, also appealed to Diefenbaker to
remain true to his “uncompromising principles.” Playing to his human rights
convictions, the League explained they “could hardly believe [the invitation to
Popović] possible after [Diefenbaker’s] historic reply to Khrushchev in the United
Nations.”75 Other letters were shorter and more to the point:
Deeply disappointed with your decision to bring into this free country
as invited guest notorious communist and Tito Minister of Foreign
Affairs Ko[č]a Popovi[ć]. I beg you revise by all means your decision and
cancel this visit of the utmost representative of one dictatorial and
bloody government. I am submitting this appeal on behalf of all
members of Serbian Cultural Club […] but I am sure that it will be
approved and supported by all Canadians of Serbian origin.76
Disappointment, hope that the visit would be cancelled, and unity among SerbianCanadians are the main points here, and are themes that appeared in virtually all
letters sent to Diefenbaker and his ministers.
When broad Cold War themes were present in Serbian protest letters, as
with the one from the Canadian Serbian National Committee, Yugoslavia was
presented as subservient to the USSR and the “‘Trojan Horse’ for the world
communist cause.” The letter recounted (incorrectly) how the Soviets overran
Yugoslavia by force following the Second World War, and “by means of murders,
74

DCC, file MG1/VI/(846/Y94), Personal letter Geurge Uzelac to Prime Minister, March 21, 1961.
Microfilm, 429470.
75 DCC, file MG1/VI/(846/Y94), Personal letter Perovan Susovich to Prime Minister, March 21, 1961.
Microfilm, 429479.
76 DCC, file MG1/VI/(846/Y94), Personal letter Milan Lazarevich to Prime Minister, March 21, 1961.
Microfilm, 429480.

171
imprisonment, and brutal force have kept that power.”77 But human rights and
Canada’s position as leader “in the field of ‘Red Apartheid’” were the driving
messages. The letter praised Diefenbaker’s “heroic stand at the United Nations […]
in defending Freedom and Democracy against communist lies and propaganda […]
and the valiant stand taken by Canada at the recent Commonwealth Conference.”
Whether or not it was used intentionally as a rhetorical device, the praise seemed to
highlight the Committee’s disappointment in the upcoming visit, suggesting that
Canada – and Diefenbaker personally – were loosing sight of their commitment to
the oppressed peoples of the world. Shock, disappointment, and solidarity were also
expressed: “We feel that all members of the Ethnic Groups in Canada who have
experienced personally […] the tortures by the Communist Dictators, are shocked
and deeply disappointed by the act of the Government in inviting communist
dignitaries.” In the end, the letter (quite accurately and poignantly) emphasized
Diefenbaker’s personal commitment to human rights and urged him to let these
tendencies determine Canada’s policy with communist countries, to let “Canada be
the Beacon of Hope and Freedom.”78
Green supported the visit regardless of protest letters; the Canadian Serbian
National Committee wrote him personally as well. The committee warned Green
that Popović‘s invitation to visit Canada “has brought the strongest resentment of
77
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the citizens of Canada of Serbian descent…” The letter also portrayed Tito and
Popović as Nazi sympathizers and stressed that their goals were communist
revolution and world domination,79 which is untrue. In fact, Tito led the Yugoslav
Partisan movement against the Nazis, and accumulated a vast and loyal following.80
It seems the authors of the protest letters either believed misguided ideas, or were
hoping Canadian officials were uneducated on the subject.
Croatian groups who protested Popović’s visit focused on his Second World
War record and stressed that he was “one of the worst war criminals, and virtually a
fugitive of International Justice and Retribution.” In rather grisly detail, one letter
highlighted (whether accurate or not) some of Popović’s war crimes. For instance,
as commanding general of the communist army, the letter charged, Popović “issued
orders to remove 3,000 wounded, disabled Croatian soldiers […] and killed them all,
on the 8th and 9th of May 1945.” The letter continued:
It was he, Koča Popović, present Foreign Minister of Tito’s Yugoslavia,
who ordered the slaughtering of 16,000 Croatian soldiers and civilians
in Dugo Selo near Zegreb and the death of 3,000 peasants in the region
near Nova Gradiska – and committed many other unscrupulous and
simply genocidal, outrageous crimes against humanity and its accepted
codes of human behaviour and decency.
In light of his record, the letter concluded, “we Canadians of Croatian descent […]
rise in protest and most vigorously denounce the coming to Ottawa of the cruel war
criminal Koča Popović.” In one final plea, the letter stressed, “we hope to rearm you
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morally against this man”,81 suggesting that the government was forsaking ethical
high ground by allowing the visit.
Diefenbaker personally met with various ethnic community groups and
replied to written protests. The general tone and wording of his responses were
consistent. Diefenbaker showed compassion and understanding for their viewpoints
but emphasized the importance of such a visit to maintaining a stable international
climate. The Prime Minister’s typical response was as follows:
I am grateful for your recent telegram and for your frank
expression of views about the visit to Ottawa of the Yugoslav Secretary of
State for External Affairs.
You will be aware that I am strongly opposed to communism and
that I am determined to do all I can to prevent the communist bloc from
attaining its worldwide objectives. I am also, as you know, fully conscious
of the suffering which have been imposed upon the peoples of Eastern
Europe by various communist governments, and it is my view that we in
Canada must do all we can to alleviate the suffering of those people.
Visits to Canada by members of the government of communist
countries do not in any sense indicate approval by the Canadian
Government of communism. Yugoslavia, however, has shown itself able
to resist foreign domination and at the United Nations, and in joint
participation in the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East.
Canada and Yugoslavia have found some common interest in preserving
peace.
I hope that you and other Canadians of Serbian origin will find
yourselves able to see this visit in this light.82
Diefenbaker’s response is revealing in that it did not attempt to reduce past
atrocities committed by communist governments. It simultaneously reaffirmed the
government’s anti-communist stance and the “colonial” nature of Soviet rule.
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Additionally, it highlighted the common ground upon which Canadian-Yugoslav
bilateral relations have been developed. Essentially, Diefenbaker utilized a Cold War
context to frame his response.
In light of personal discussion with Diefenbaker, the Canadian-Serbian
Committee “became convinced that the Canadian government, headed by Mr.
Diefenbaker, will unshakably continue with its stand in the fight against
Communism…,” explained Amerikanski Srbobran (The American Srbobran), an
American-based Serbian newspaper. It would seem the Canadian-Serbian
Committee’s reservations surrounding the visit appeared to be somewhat alleviated
after meeting with Diefenbaker. Interestingly, the Canadian-Serbian newspaper,
Glas Kanadskih Srba (Voice of Canadian Serbs) did not overemphasize the
community’s respite, but rather trumpeted the Serbian community’s active stand
against the visit. The news item focused on the letters that Canadian-Serbians sent
to the government and praised the official delegation that met with Diefenbaker.83
Another Serbian language newspaper, Kanadski Srbobran (The Canadian Srbobran),
did not draw attention to the political significance of the visit and what the
government hoped the visit would produce. Rather, similar to Voice of Canadian
Serbs, The Canadian Srbobran highlighted the Serbian community’s effort to protest
the visit and its determination to defile Popović. In a similar vein, with no clear
explanation as to why the story was told, the editorial aimed to tarnish Popović’s
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image by explaining how his nickname, the Sandman, was acquired.84 Neither of the
Canadian Serbian-languages newspapers focused on the Serbian delegation’s
reaction or response to their meeting with Diefenbaker, nor did they frame their
protests in a Cold War context; instead, their discontent was focused on their former
homeland and its leaders.
As mentioned, not all Yugoslav ethnic communities protested the visit. In
fact, Canadian-Macedonians praised the government for setting “a wonderful
example for all the communist and capitalist nations…”85 Other letters from this
community expressed their belief that the Popović visit “will serve to strengthen
friendly relations existing between our two governments, and further to help ease
tensions in a world much too dangerously fraught with them.”86 Thus, CanadianMacedonian ethnic communities viewed the visit in much the same way as Canadian
officials, at least with respect to its broader political significance.87

84 LAC, RG25, Vol. 5354, File 10277-40 part 3, “Koca Popovic – the Sand-Man – in Canada,” Kanadski
Srbobran, March 30, 1961. According to this editorial, the nickname “Sand-Man” was passed onto
Popović because his grandfather (also Koča Popović), a wealthy flourmill owner who sold flour to the
armed forces, was said to have added sand to the flour in order to increase profits. It was said that
the present “Comrade Minister Popović,” subsequently having lost “every respect in the society of
Belgrade, became a communist.”
85 DCC, file MG1/VI/(846/Y94), Personal letter Chris Vashov and Tom Shapardan to Prime Minister,
March 24, 1961. Microfilm, 429484.
86 DCC, file MG1/VI/(846/Y94), Personal letter The Executive Committee of the Toronto Metro
Committee of the Canadian Macedonian to Prime Minister, March 21, 1961. Microfilm, 429482.
87 The majority of Macedonians in Canada originated probably in about equal proportions from
Yugoslavia and Greece. The only well-organized group of Macedonians during this time was located
in Toronto. This organization hoped to see all territories inhabited by Macedonians united in a free
Macedonian State. Besides this major group, there also existed two Macedonian factions, one
following the Moscow line and the other supporting Tito. Both, however, were described as being
small and of little significance. LAC, RG6, File 10-33-1/119 Box 123, Memorandum Jean Boucher to
Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, “Appointment of Mr. Belovski, Yugoslav Ambassador to
Canada,” December 7, 1961.

176
Diefenbaker did read the letters with at least some background knowledge of
the organizations that wrote to him, and there is no evidence to suggest he
interpreted the letters with an unfiltered, biased sympathy toward the ethnic
communities. In a memo to Diefenbaker, the Prime Minister’s advisor on foreign
policy, Basil Robinson, explained that a series of letters addressed to the Prime
Minister were from groups “known to be strongly Serb-nationalist, anti-Tito, and
anti-Yugoslavia.88 With this in mind, it might be more accurate to suggest that
Diefenbaker’s reluctance and hesitation regarding Popović’s visit stemmed from his
own personal proclivities, most notably his views on communism and human rights,
rather than the protests from certain ethnic communities. Regardless, Diefenbaker
utilized the Cold War climate to justify the visit. Whether intentional or not, it
appears that this approach helped reestablish himself as the sympathetic, human
rights advocate.
Ultimately, it is difficult to assess to what degree (if any) these specific letters
influenced Diefenbaker’s actions. But given the attention paid by previous scholars89
to the impact of minority communities on Diefenbaker’s policy objectives, they are
worthwhile exploring, even if simply to glimpse the sorts of letters he received and
their rhetorical nature. Even though concrete conclusions cannot be drawn about
the significance of Yugoslav minority communities on policy development, assessing
their correspondence does suggest that deep-seeded nationalist sentiments drove
88
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most (if not all) Serbian and Croatian protest letters. Rhetoric was used by these
groups in a manner that suggests hostility was generated more by what was
happening in their home country, both in the past and present, than by the broader
Cold War confrontation and Canada’s position within it. Canadian-Macedonian
communities, by comparison, viewed the visit from a global perspective and saw it
as one component of larger Canadian policy objectives directed at reducing
international tensions and containing or defeating communism. Diefenbaker’s
conversations with and letters to groups who protested the visit demonstrate how
the government used Canada and Yugoslavia’s similar middle power positions to
justify Popović’s visit. Diefenbaker relied on the premises that he remained a
committed anti-communist and that such a visit could lessen Cold War tensions.
POPOVIĆ’S VISIT IN THE MEDIA

Secretary Velasevic expressed the Yugoslav embassy’s hope that the
Canadian press would pay considerable attention to Popović’s visit and said they
expected “to make as much as possible out of the visit in terms of CanadianYugoslav relations.”90 In the end, the Canadian press did not make much of Popović’s
visit and approached it rather unspectacularly. Reporting in major Canadian
newspapers closely followed the DEA’s official press release, highlighting Popović
and Green’s agreement “that special attention should be directed to the question of
disarmament as one of the major issues facing the world at this time.” Matter-offactly, the press release stated that the exchanges between the two ministers “were
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conducted in a friendly and informal atmosphere” and suggested that discussions
between such top officials “are a natural development” from improved relations.91
An article in the Globe and Mail framed Popović as a courageous fighter
against Nazi tyranny in the Second World War and leader of peace efforts in the
United Nations. It quoted Howard Green, who noted, “‘Yugoslavia, like Canada, is
one of the middle powers of the world today, and one of the powers which depends
so much on effective world organization.’”92 In addition to commenting on the tight
security measures taken by the RCMP, the Ottawa Citizen explained that Popović
was not entirely happy with his visit, due to his radio interview with the CBC.
Popović, the article explained, “complained that the questions asked him were
unfriendly to Yugoslavia.”93 Despite this alleged agitation, the press coverage of the
visit was typical in that it did not provide analysis on how each country functioned
within the broader Cold War context.
In Yugoslavia, however, Popović’s visit prompted “an unprecedented number
of articles in the local press about Canada, her position in world affairs, and, in
particular, about Canadian-Yugoslav relations.” All articles portrayed Canada
favourably, as most paid particular attention to its efforts to carve out an
independent foreign policy. For instance, Borba stated that although Canada was a
member of the Commonwealth and NATO, “on the international stage Canada
distinguishes herself by her special foreign policy […] and she pursues a policy
91
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based on the indispensability of recognition of changes which have occurred in this
part of the world…”94
Politika stressed that Canada’s pursuit of an independent foreign policy has
resulted in greater cooperation between the two countries, particularly in the UN.
This independent stand, the article continued, has led Canadian officials to
understand Yugoslavia’s foreign policy position.95 Interestingly, the articles stressed
that bilateral relations were underdeveloped and expressed enthusiasm for
increased connections, particularly in trade and cultural and scientific exchanges.
Politika reflected on the visits of Yugoslav atomic scientists, film experts, and
cultural artists to Canada, and hoped that these types of contacts would be
expanded, especially since “desire and readiness has have been frequently
expressed on both sides to expand mutual relations…”96
Discussing

the

trade

dimension

of

Canadian-Yugoslav

relations,

Spoljnopoliticki Bilten (Foreign Bulletin) said, “trade has showed tendencies of
increase although the volume of trade in the field of economic cooperation still does
not correspond to the real possibilities and mutual wishes.”97 Borba, too, admitted
that economic and cultural exchanges could be significantly improved but assured
readers that, on the political front, the two countries were making meaningful
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headway; such efforts were strengthened by an exchange of views between
responsible statesmen, as seen with Green and Popović.98
The news reports highlight three key points: first, there appeared to be
genuine desire on both sides to develop closer bilateral cooperation. This point is
substantiated when considered with various other factors explored below. Second,
while various kinds of exchanges, economic and cultural for example, were viewed
as significant, political influences were still considered fundamental to the bilateral
relationship. Lastly, the importance attached to Popović’s visit by Yugoslavia’s press
is telling. It reveals that Yugoslavia may have looked upon Canada as something of a
reflection of itself, highlighting for Yugoslavs the ability of a secondary power to
maneuver independently, even within the shadow of a superpower. Each country’s
press coverage highlighted the broader political significance of the visit and focused
on the importance of open discourse and mutual understanding. Frequently, the two
countries were portrayed as middle powers intent on achieving some degree of
independence in their foreign policies relative to their respective Cold War
superpowers. Ultimately, then, press coverage mirrored the broader political issues
in Canadian-Yugoslav relations.
CONCLUSION

Canadian-Yugoslav relations were relatively insignificant when the
Progressive Conservatives gained power in 1957. Canada’s relationship with
Yugoslavia, however, evolved and steadily improved over the nearly six years of the
Diefenbaker government. The rift between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia,
98
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instigated by the latter’s refusal to sign the Twelve-Party Declaration, provided a
fortuitous opportunity for Canada to cultivate stronger ties with Yugoslavia. In other
words, events east of the Iron Curtain helped shape Canada’s Yugoslav policy, as the
Soviet Union remained an ubiquitous factor in Canada’s Yugoslav policy equation.
Spearheaded by Canadian ambassadors in Belgrade, Canada was able to utilize its
middle power status to find common ground on which to build a fruitful and
mutually advantageous relationship. Yugoslavia underwent internal and external
changes as the Soviet bloc avoided any preferential treatment; consequently,
Yugoslavia looked for ways out of its isolation. As a result, Canada saw Yugoslavia as
a viable point to penetrate Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe. Canadian officials
considered Yugoslavia to be the least dogmatic of all communist countries;
therefore, it became Canada’s policy to promote and to cultivate closer political,
commercial, and cultural relations more assertively, in order to expose Yugoslavia
to Western political and socio-cultural modalities.
Because Yugoslavia was isolated, it sought company with other non-aligned
countries. Generally, Canada sympathized with and understood the political and
economic necessity of Yugoslavia’s non-alignment. In fact, Canadian officials
believed that Yugoslavia could provide an alternative socialist route for nations
already heading down that ideological path and believed that further division
amongst communist states would only be advantageous to the West. Yugoslavia
proved to be influential among the group of non-aligned nations, notably at the UN.
While Yugoslavia and the USSR’s UN policy frequently aligned, Canadian officials
believed this was mostly coincidental, and therefore were not overly concerned. At
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times, Canadian officials were optimistic that they could employ the common
ground of middlepowerism to influence certain initiatives, as seen during Green’s
meeting with Popović.
Popović’s visit to Canada is significant because it highlights the genuineness
with which both countries pursued improved bilateral relations, and demonstrates
the challenges of pursuing foreign policy objectives at odds with domestic minority
communities, the Yugoslav minority communities in Canada in this instance. Serbian
and Croatian minority communities vehemently protested Popović’s visit to Canada.
In doing so, they appropriated broad Cold War rhetoric. However, when examined
closely, it appears that these groups were viciously opposed to Popović more so
because of his World War II record than Canada’s position vis-à-vis Yugoslavia
within the Cold War context. Macedonian minority communities, in contrast,
supported the visit and echoed the Canadian government’s general policy that open
lines of communication would help bridge the divide between nations, ultimately
weakening global communism.
Canadian-Yugoslav relations were unique in that while their ideological
proclivities were fundamentally opposite, they each lived in – and perceived the
other as living in – the shadow of a powerful superpower. Middlepowerism became
common ground upon which mutually beneficial relations were built, as Canadian
officials during this period attempted to develop an independent policy
commensurate with Canada’s international position. In addition to political
courtship, less conventional forms of bilateral exchanges were pursued between the

183
two nations. Commercial and cultural exchanges were slowly integrated into the
fabric of Canadian-Yugoslav relations, as officials hoped to chip away at communism
from behind the Iron Curtain.
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Chapter 4

Peering Out from the Shadows: Canadian-Yugoslav Cultural Diplomacy &
Canada’s Economic Statecraft
The political dialogue between Canada and Yugoslavia improved during the
late 1950s and early 1960s, as each nation saw in the other a pale reflection of their
own middle power position. Simultaneously, cultural exchange came to be seen as
an effective and important way of developing closer ties between the two countries.
Cultural exchanges during this period were not overabundant, but their developing
importance was clear, as they increased in number during John Diefenbaker’s
Progressive Conservative government. Even Yugoslav Foreign Minister Koča
Popović, for instance, personally inquired with the Yugoslav mission in Canada as to
how cultural exchanges could be developed.1 Arguing to prioritize Yugoslavia, the
European Division emphasized that “we realize that [the Information Division] faces
a difficult problem in trying to reconcile competing claims for a limited amount of
funds but since the Minister [of External Affairs Howard Green] seems to be
personally interested in improving relations with Yugoslavia we think there is good
reason for taking a new look at our cultural relations.”2
The development of closer cultural ties further highlights this period as a
decisive moment and demonstrates that Canadian civil servants functioned in – and
in fact helped carve out – a progressive and multidimensional foreign policy
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framework. So, Canadian officials believed cultural ties contributed positively to
closer political relations. Therefore, in assessing the impact of these exchanges, the
focus here is less on the number of exchanges and more on the ideas that Canada
saw communist Yugoslavia as an important partner for generating cultural contacts
and viewed cultural exchange as a viable means to bring the countries closer
together. This highlights how cultural diplomacy came to be seen as a practical tool
for advancing Canada’s Eastern European policy. Given this, the various exchanges
that took place during this period will be examined and placed in their wider
political context. To both Canadian and Yugoslav officials, cultural relations were
broadly defined, casting a wide net as to what this constituted. In the specific
Canadian-Yugoslav context, though, scientific, professional, and technical exchanges
dominated, while exchanges in the arts were much less frequent.
CANADIAN-YUGOSLAV ACADEMIC EXCHANGES

Communication studies expert, Evan H. Potter, states, “fundamentally, public
diplomacy requires an official purpose. Contacts between citizens from different
countries constitutes public diplomacy only if they are supported by a government –
either directly or indirectly – for a strategic purpose.”3 Canadian ambassadors in
Yugoslavia and officials in Canada indeed supported, and were in fact a driving force
behind, Canadian-Yugoslav public and cultural diplomacy. In his review of the past
two years as ambassador to Yugoslavia, Robert Ford commended on his
predecessor’s work: “there can be little doubt that [Canadian-Yugoslav] relations
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during this period have improved considerably. Mr. [George] Ignatieff during his
tenure of this post set the process in motion and did much to increase both political
consultation and cultural exchanges.”4 Both Ford and his successor, Gordon Crean,
continued down the path forged by Ignatieff and further advanced relations
between the two countries. It is also important to note that the general policy
debates and directions related to Canada’s cultural diplomacy with the USSR were
essentially mirrored in the approach to Communist Europe generally. The driving
idea that cultural exchanges had the power to bring Eastern European nations
closer to the Western orbit by exposing them to Western practices also drove the
Canadian government’s desire to pursue exchanges with Yugoslavia.
Similar to Canada’s approach with the Soviet Union, professional and
academic exchanges were considered valuable in building bridges between East and
West. While balanced exchanges with Yugoslavia were important to Canadian
officials (as with the USSR), reciprocity was achieved more easily with Yugoslavia.
Exchanges with Yugoslavia were mostly balanced and were also intended to be of
“equal” or similar substance. For instance, in July 1958, a party of Canadian
university professors and students visited leading educational centres in the
country, and a prominent Canadian seed grower from Blenheim, Ontario visited to
investigate the possibility of meeting Yugoslavia’s requirements in hybrid corn seed
and livestock. In exchange, five Yugoslav economists and officials went to Canada on
UN Technical Assistance Fellowships to study the operation of federal and
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provincial government systems, while a delegation of municipal officials, led by the
mayor of Sarajevo, visited to learn about municipal government and transportation
problems in Canada.5 In other words, exchanging academics for government officials
was seen as entirely acceptable.
In 1959, the Institute of Social Sciences in Yugoslavia was created. During its
development, soon-to-be director Vlajko Begovic spoke with Ambassador Ignatieff
about establishing connections with similar organizations in Canada. Canadian
departments and officials considered it “most desirable” to put the new institution
in contact with various appropriate bodies. For instance, the European Division at
the DEA indicated that they considered this opportunity of exchange to “have
considerable potential significance”; not only was the exchange considered valuable
from an academic perspective, “but also because it would help to put our Embassy in
closer touch with this Institute, which is examining basic problems of contemporary
Yugoslavia.” 6 Put simply, exchanges in this realm would help facilitate greater
political understanding of the Communist state, and in turn provide more fruitful
interpretation of Yugoslavia’s international agenda. Agreeing with the wide-ranging
potential of such contacts, the DEA’s Information Division went to work contacting
various Canadian organizations that, in turn, contacted Yugoslavia’s Institute of
Social Sciences, with considerable success. The Social Science Research Council
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(SSRC) of Canada added the Yugoslav institute to its mailing list for reports.7 A
number of Canadian organizations and institutes welcomed the exchange and
provided

ongoing

publications,

including

the

Canadian

Political

Science

Association,8 the Canadian Institute of International Affairs,9 the Canadian Journal of
Economics and Political Science, 10 and the Canadian Historical Association. 11 In
exchange, many of the institutes and associations asked that the Yugoslav institute
send available publications on an ongoing basis. The open flow of information, while
modest in its direct political and ideological impact, was viewed as a viable
subcomponent of integrating Western thought into Yugoslav academic discourse.
But the academic landscape provided for more than an exchange of information.
By 1959, Canada Council grants had been established and were being
awarded to deserving overseas students (including Yugoslavs); National Research
Council (NRC) post-graduate fellowships tenable in Canada for research in
chemistry, physics, biological science, mathematics, and engineering were also
available to Yugoslav scientists. Milovan Matic, of the Cultural Exchange
7
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Commission, was pleased to know these were available to Yugoslavs.12 The NRC
fellowships, however, got off to a slow start when Yugoslav authorities blocked
certain candidates, as a means of controlling who was allowed to go to Canada;
ideological and political reasons were cited to justify their position.
While the exchange of open information was one thing, allowing academics
quick and easy access into the West was another. J.D. Babbitt, Secretary for
International Relations for SSRC, advised the DEA that several successful
postdoctoral candidates from Eastern Europe had been unable to receive
permission to leave their country to take up the fellowship. For instance, Dr. A.
Meniga, a Yugoslav scientist, was unable to obtain the necessary exit papers to come
to Canada. Babbitt asked the Under-Secretary to have Ambassador Ford explain to
the Yugoslav authorities that it was discouraging to give fellowships to Yugoslavs
only to find that they were unable to accept the award. “We must confess,” Babbitt
admitted, “that in the past several Yugoslav fellows have obtained positions in North
America at the end of their fellowships and have not returned home.” Still, Babbitt
stressed that it was “not the intention of our fellowships to bring scientists
permanently to Canada and we make no effort to encourage fellows to remain
here.” 13 Permanent settlement by Yugoslav scientists in North America was, of
course, the main trepidation of Yugoslav authorities. In addressing the situation,
Head of the European Division Henry Davis explained how
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we cannot ignore the impression that the Yugoslav authorities may
have of these fellowships as a means by which bright Yugoslav scholars
and technicians may escape their responsibilities as Yugoslav citizens
and establish new careers in North America. While there is no certainty
that this is a reason for the difficulties which the Yugoslav authorities
are placing in the way of some candidates who wish to come to NRC, but
it seems to us a possibility.14
Aware of the sensitivity of the situation, yet still wanting NRC fellowships to be
awarded to Yugoslav scientists, Davis recommended that Ford have an informal
discussion with the appropriate Yugoslav authorities, suggesting that perhaps, on
the Yugoslav side, a commitment to return to Yugoslavia for a specified period
following the termination of the fellowship would be a way of circumventing any
possibility of Yugoslavs remaining in North America immediately following their
fellowship.15 Davis’ recommendation, while perhaps naïve, is a telling example of
how the Canadian government did intervene in such matters, even though it did not
officially sponsor cultural exchanges and did not have a formal exchange agreement
with Yugoslavia. Also, it highlights the sensitive nature of such exchanges, given the
Yugoslav authorities’ concern that they may lose a good scientist to the West.
The NRC consulted Josip Kratohvil, a Yugoslav scientist who was granted a
fellowship in Canada and later found employment at Clarkson College in New York,
with the expectation he might shed light on the Yugoslav system and Dr. Meniga’s
situation. Kratohvil revealingly replied,
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It appears […] that Dr. Meniga has some very good ‘friends’ who
care very much that he stays in Zagreb. All those stories about new
regulations for professional people going abroad, etc., are fakes,
transparent excuses for preventing particular individuals to leave the
country. Others are going without much difficulty. […] Meniga finally
[spoke to] comrade Uzelac, who is the secretary-general of the newly
formed Council for Scientific Research of the People’s Republic of
Croatia. This comrade had a very ‘convincing’ reason why Meniga
cannot go to Ottawa. He declared that […] ‘we cannot allow that
foreigners interfere into our personal policy and to contact whom they
wish for fellowships, since it happens that they (foreigners) invite
people’s enemies or their children and refuse the candidates we
suggest.’ […] When Meniga asked if this means he is also regarded as [a]
‘people’s enemy’ the comrade hurried to convince him that he is not,
but ‘it is a matter of principles.’16
Belgrade reassured Ottawa that they had heard a great deal from officials in the
Foreign Ministry and elsewhere regarding the desirability of exchanges between the
two countries and agreed that an informal discussion was appropriate. The
Canadian embassy strategically wanted the Yugoslavs to suggest a solution so that
the embarrassingly high proportion of award winners staying in Canada might not
be raised. The Yugoslav embassy in Ottawa reminded the Under-Secretary that
passport decisions were made by local, rather than federal, authorities and
acknowledged that, on a number of occasions, the Foreign Ministry had been
obviously embarrassed by the obstructiveness of their colleagues in the Ministry of
the Interior. 17 Indeed, Canadian diplomats in Belgrade believed the Yugoslav
Foreign Ministry would likely welcome ammunition in the form of evidence that the
tough attitude taken by the passport authorities was interfering with the
development of relations with another country. “Whether or not they would win the
16
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argument is hard to say,” Canadian officials admitted, but they still considered it
“worth a try.”18 After this letter, the document trail goes cold, and it is unclear
whether Dr. Meniga ever made it to Ottawa to take up his fellowship.
Nevertheless, the example of Dr. Meniga is telling. It highlights the
importance Canadian officials attached to the NRC fellowships for breaking down
barriers with Yugoslavia, reveals their willingness to engage in diplomacy to
facilitate exchanges by non-governmental organizations, and demonstrates how the
bilateral relationship was still very much governed by ideological proclivities, a
reality that underscored the occasional fragility of the relationship. Ultimately, Dr.
Meniga’s case did not appear to have any detrimental effect on the development of
cultural and academic exchanges. Canadian professors visited and lectured in
Yugoslavia, and contacts were gradually established between universities. The
tempo of exchanges in mid-1961 could be judged by the fact that in April an
important gift of Canadian books to the University of Belgrade took place.19
TECHNICAL AND DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES

Exchanges outside the realm of academia occurred as well. Dr. Vilfan,
Secretary-General to President Tito, explained that Yugoslavia was particularly
interested in exchanges between the two countries on the technical level, especially
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in the fields of agriculture, mining, and power.20 In the late 1950s, the Yugoslav
government tentatively inquired about the possibility of completing with Canada an
agreement for the exchange of information on the peaceful uses of atomic energy.
One notable example is the exchange of nuclear science information and personnel.
Yugoslavia, at this point, was still relatively underdeveloped but was making serious
strides to industrialize and modernize. In fact, “the Yugoslav economy maintained
an impressively high rate of growth during the years 1953 – 1965.”21 An informal
arrangement was developed under which Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL)
sent published and unclassified papers to the atomic energy authorities in
Belgrade.22 Then, in late 1959, the Yugoslav embassy in Ottawa, acting on behalf of
the Yugoslav Federal Commission for Nuclear Energy, expressed interest in
cooperating with the equivalent body in Canada. Specifically, the Commission
wanted to exchange “experience or the giving of technological aid, which is
necessary in the preparation of the crude into the refined [uranium] product.” In
turn, AECL contacted Eldorado Mining and Refining Limited, since the work
appeared to be more closely related to their area of expertise.23 Subsequently, the
DEA became the intermediary between Eldorado and the Yugoslav Federal
Commission for Nuclear Energy, promoting and arranging visits.
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In response to the inquiry, Eldorado president, William Gilchrist, reported
back that his company would be happy to forward any published and unclassified
papers specifically connected to their line of work in the treatment of ores. He also
assured the government that he was “quite happy to arrange a tour of treatment
plants should [the Yugoslav Federal Commission for Nuclear Energy] wish to send
anyone to Canada.”24 As a result, in late March, a delegation of Yugoslav scientists
came to Canada (and the United States) where they visited the Atomic Centre at
Chalk River, the uranium processing factory at Port Hope, the laboratory of the
Ministry of Mining of Canada, and other laboratories of the State Atomic Energy
Corporation.25 The Yugoslav national newspaper, Borba, dedicated a short article to
the delegation’s visit. It highlighted the delegation’s conversation with the chairman
of the Canadian Atomic Power Corporation, J. Lorne Gray, during which they
discussed the possibility of promoting cooperation in the field of atomic power
between Canada and Yugoslavia.26
Following the delegation’s return to Yugoslavia, Ambassador Ford held a
dinner in its honor and reported on its impressions. The delegation was very
impressed with both the hospitality it received and what was described as Canada’s
advanced research and practical application of atomic energy. The Yugoslavs were
very much flattered by their visit with Secretary of State for External Affairs Howard
Green and Under-Secretary Norman Robertson; overall, Ford concluded that the
24
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visit was very helpful in improving Canadian-Yugoslav relations.27 Witnessing firsthand Canada’s nuclear energy capabilities impressed the delegation. Common
ground was found, as both countries insisted on including adequate safety measures
for atomic reactors. The USSR had recently supplied Yugoslavia with an atomic
reactor but imposed no safeguards. Canada’s emphasis on safety set it apart from
the Soviet Union, elevating its reputation as a leader in atomic energy and, perhaps,
providing Canada with more influence on Yugoslavia in atomic matters.28
Relations were further promoted by visits of high-ranking politicians and
ministers, which in turn shed light on the condition and future potential of
Canadian-Yugoslav commercial relations. In late 1960, Yugoslav Minister of
Agriculture and Forestry Dr. Slavko Komar visited Canada, primarily for economic
and political purposes. During his visit, Komar had the opportunity to meet with
Diefenbaker. According to Ottawa and Canadian officials in Belgrade, the meeting
with the Prime Minister was “the key to the visit,” as it “could not have been
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described as a success if the call on Mr. Diefenbaker had not taken place.”29 For
reasons that are unclear, it seems Diefenbaker was considerably more at ease
meeting Komar than Popović (perhaps due to the latter’s public profile). Regardless,
Komar’s visit reveals the importance Yugoslav officials attached to expanding their
commercial relations. Komar was cautiously optimistic. While “tremendously
impressed by the economic maturity of Canada,” he felt that it would be difficult to
find Yugoslav exports that would be acceptable in Canada and thought Canada’s
credits were “unrealistic.” Komar, however, was convinced both obstacles could be
overcome in three to four years. 30 He appreciated the current trade situation,
stressing that it was time “to lay the basis for a considerable increase in trade.”31
Significantly, Komar’s visit highlights the fact that both governments indeed saw
this period as an important time of transition and an opportunity to lay a foundation
for future commercial relations; this further corroborates the argument that the
Diefenbaker period was a decisive time in Canadian-Eastern European relations.
Canadian officials did not unconditionally promote exchanges with
Yugoslavia. Ottawa occasionally had reservations, particularly when it felt the Soviet
Union could reap immediate benefits. Various Canadian asbestos corporations
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agreed to a multi-week technical training program in asbestos operations for
Yugoslav specialists.32 The Inter-Departmental Panel on the Exchange of Visits with
Communist Countries, however, expressed concern from both the government and
the industry’s point of view. Canada’s position in world markets for asbestos fibre, it
was explained, had weakened over the past few years due primarily to competition
from other sources. Since the early 1950s, the Soviet Union had made “enormous
strides” and had developed to the point where it challenged Canada as the “leading
asbestos producer of the world.” Additionally, asbestos exports from Eastern
Europe increased. “This penetration” the Inter-Departmental Panel warned, “has
captured markets from the Canadian industry.”33
It was also the opinion of Departmental experts that the USSR’s recovery of
short fibre grades asbestos was not as advanced as Canadian industry. Yugoslavian
deposits, however, did “contain an appreciable proportion of short fibre asbestos.”
This was cause for concern:
[I]t may be presumed that recovery of short fibre, that is the
milling process to recover them, will be one of the larger items of
interest during the proposed visit [by Yugoslav specialists]. Information
so learned could, without difficulty, reach the Russian industry. Since
the latter country intends or plans to increase its production by
expanding the Bazhenova operations, and developing an important new
deposit in Kazakhstan to an estimated two million tons per annum, or
roughly twice the current production level in Canada, Russia will be in a
position to compete more strongly with Canada in world markets.
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For this reason, the Inter-Departmental Panel believed that supporting a training
program that provided Yugoslavs with technical knowledge in the asbestos industry
could worsen Canada’s position in the global market; as a result, they recommended
the proposed training program be withdrawn or, at most, that “a token three to four
days visit” be offered.34 The Asbestos Fibre Division of Johns-Manville Corporation
concurred and offered the Yugoslavs the chance to study their mining and ore
depressing techniques, but denied access to the milling process of short fibres.35
This was a rare instance when Yugoslavia was perceived as a clear surrogate
for the USSR, potentially enabling the Soviets to obtain information that could, in
turn, directly challenge Canadian industry. This also exemplifies how the USSR was
ever-present in Canada’s dealings with Yugoslavia. Typically, Canadian officials
wanted to promote relations with Communist Europe to challenge Soviet influence.
This example demonstrates how occasionally it proved more advantageous not to
promote cooperation, if doing so jeopardized Canada’s ability to squarely combat
the Soviet economic offensive. That the Inter-Departmental Panel urged the
asbestos industry not to provide training to Yugoslav specialists also illustrates how
seriously Canada viewed the economic offensive and the potential ramifications it
posed to Canadian industry.
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ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Unlike Canadian-Soviet cultural relations, which saw a healthy number of
exchanges in the arts, there were fewer such exchanges between Canada and
Yugoslavia. Records suggest these types of exchanges did not appear to be pursued
as assiduously, especially compared to Canadian-Soviet exchanges. This is not to
say, however, that exchanges in the arts were considered unimportant or that they
did not take place at all. Beginning in the early 1950s, the Yugoslav government
discarded the Soviet attitude toward art, and socialist realism was no longer the
dominant genre of expression.36 More similar artistic styles likely contributed to the
exchange of art exhibitions between Canada and Yugoslavia, since Yugoslav artwork
was, according to Davis, “of high quality and Western in inspiration.”37 For instance,
in February 1959, Yugoslavia sent a graphic art exhibit to Canada’s National Gallery,
and Canada sent an Eskimo art exhibition that toured six major Yugoslav cities.
While modest, the exchange of art exhibits represented cultural diplomacy on a new,
and rather underdeveloped, plain in Yugoslavia, one that had the potential to
provide new linkages between the two nations, inspired by artistic expression.
During a 1959 conversation between Ford, Popović and Edvard Kardelj (then
Acting President), Kardelj broached the subject of improving cultural relations. Ford
explained that he was a personal friend of pianist Glenn Gould and hoped to
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persuade him to play in Yugoslavia. To Ford’s surprise, both Kardelj and Popović
had Gould’s records and were keen to have him play in their country. 38
Unfortunately for Ford (and Kardelj and Popović), Gould never went for reasons
that are unclear. Nevertheless, Ford’s hope of having Gould play in Yugoslavia was
clearly aligned with the positive impacts his tour had on Canadian-Soviet relations a
few years prior; classical music was seen to have the real ability to transcend
national boundaries and create common linkages. The attempt to arrange a visit by
Gould is also a testament to Ford’s desire to further improve Canadian-Yugoslav
cultural relations through the arts and to his belief in the impact that such visits
could have.
While examining various exchanges is important and uncovers an interesting
juncture where ideological barriers could be surmounted, what is most revealing is
the prominence officials attached to the various exchanges as well as their belief
that cultural diplomacy was a viable means to bridge political and ideological
divides. Both Canadian and Yugoslav officials, on a number of occasions, credited
various exchanges with advancing political relations between the two countries.
Canada’s cultural exchanges with Yugoslavia, while supporting traditional foreign
policy objectives, focused less on immediate outcomes. Whether it was through art
exhibitions, cooperation in atomic energy research, academia, technical research, or
visits by high officials, the two countries cooperated in a number of fields from
within a middle power framework. The shadow of the Cold War indeed loomed
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large in both countries’ consciousness, and they each saw cultural diplomacy as a
practical method of bypassing, and even breaking down, ideological barriers.
A NEW LANDSCAPE FOR CANADIAN ECONOMIC STATECRAFT

As mentioned, political motivations were the driving force behind CanadianYugoslav relations during this period, as each country used middlepowerism not
only to find common ground but also to jockey for position within their respective
ideological blocs. Trade between the two countries was another important avenue
for fostering closer relations. Commercial deals and ventures were not without their
hiccups, and trade volume paled in comparison with Western nations (particularly
the US). But it was less the revenue that was generated and more the connections
and integration into Western markets that Canadian officials saw as important.
Additionally, exposing Yugoslavia to Western business practices was considered an
added benefit. After all, international commercial relations are rarely isolated from
political considerations.
During the late Stalinist period, as Yugoslavia became increasingly alienated
from the Eastern bloc as a result of its firm stance toward its own independent road
to socialism, its economy, while never entirely firm, became even more fragile.
Immediately following Yugoslavia’s expulsion from the Cominform – and the Soviet
economic boycott of 1948 – a state of “virtual economic siege descended on the
country.”39 At the time, Ambassador Ignatieff observed if “the countries of the Soviet
bloc mean to indulge in an all-out trade war on Yugoslavia, such developments
would have dire consequences on [Yugoslavia’s] economy.” And since the Soviet
39
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Union’s economic pressure on Yugoslavia showed little sign of abating, it was
“understandable that Yugoslavia would turn to the West for economic help.”40 In
fact, following Tito’s break with Stalin in 1948, the United States alone had
furnished the Yugoslav government with over $1.5 billion in military and economic
assistance.41 While the Canadian government did not provide economic assistance
to Yugoslavia, keeping economic doors open was part of a broader strategy of trying
to orient Tito’s regime in the direction of greater political and economic
liberalization. As a result, Canadian officials valued increased trade less for its
potential economic benefits and more as a means to influence Yugoslavia’s political
direction, hopefully drawing it towards the West. In other words, Canadian–
Yugoslav commercial relations demonstrate the significance of economic statecraft
in Canada’s Cold War diplomacy.
While commercial relations developed between the two nations, Canadian
officials sometimes found Yugoslavia’s economic landscape difficult to navigate; in
fact, Yugoslav officials were not unsympathetic. The Cold War not only pitted EastWest political systems and militaries against each other, but witnessed the
emergence of radically different and competing economic systems as well.
Essentially, the Yugoslav system could be described as “decentralized socialism
mixed with market forces.” Typical of socialist economic systems during the time,
Yugoslav leaders were committed to rapid economic development “based on the
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extensive growth of state industrial enterprises and on the Soviet pattern of central
planning.” 42 The Yugoslav system could not be described as a free enterprise
economy, as the West understood this term. There was some scope for enterprise
and initiative, but within severely circumscribed limits. Ignatieff used the term
“guided enterprise” to describe Yugoslav economic practices.

43

Detailed

administrative control from the centre had been abolished, and the main purpose of
planning was to establish what proportions of the national income should be
allocated to investment and to consumption. Ignatieff maintained that the system
provided room for the initiative of enterprises in the establishment of new
industrial undertakings, but recognized that they were limited by the size of
investment funds.44 Both economists and Yugoslav officials became increasingly
aware, by the early 1960s, that the fast-growing Yugoslav economy was not
producing the desired results. Not only was the Yugoslav economic system different
from both the Soviet and Western systems, “but it also had to deal with both
systems and compete successfully with the [Western free-enterprise system] in
world markets.” And, signals from these world markets indicated “that the Yugoslav
system was not measuring up to Western standards of efficiency.”45
Regardless, a controlled system determined the direction of trade and the
kinds and quantities of imports and exports. This system of comprehensive control
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ensured that the domestic industrial programme received priority and protection,
both in terms of maintaining an artificial price structure between the domestic
market and the foreign market, and within the domestic market between industrial
production and agricultural production. Available foreign exchange was allocated
either directly to importers who brought in high priority capital equipment and raw
materials or to different importers, all the while guided by the overriding
requirements of the domestic economy.46
SEARCHING FOR A NICHE

It was in the field of raw materials and capital equipment that Canada’s
ambassadors in Yugoslavia saw real potential for the two countries to do business.
This would obviously complement Yugoslavia’s industrialization drive. To Canadian
officials, there was poetic political justification and appeal to doing business with
the Yugoslavs: Canada, a middle power rich in raw materials, could help
industrialize another middle power, one caught in the shadow of an ostensible
communist belligerent, leading to eventual Yugoslav democratization and to further
divisions within the Eastern European communist bloc. While perhaps naïve and
opportunistic, this was how some Canadian officials interpreted the importance of
close Canadian-Yugoslav commercial relations. Upon leaving his post as ambassador
in 1961, Ford explained that he was “interested in the commercial side of our work
and [saw] it as closely interlinked with the political.”47 He also maintained that as
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Yugoslavia’s economic policy became increasingly Westernized, it “apparently felt
the need to counter this by following a Soviet lead in foreign policy.” In Ford’s view,
anything Canada could do “to keep Yugoslav policy neutral would be
advantageous.”48 Commercial links, then, proved to be part of that equation. Again it
should be stressed that Canadian exports were not extensive; the importance of
commercial relations was less economical, and more political. The pervasiveness of
the Soviet Union and the Cold War in Canadian-Yugoslav relations is clearly notable
and helps to explain why economic statecraft became an integral part of Canada’s
Yugoslav policy.
At times, Yugoslavia was isolated from trading with Warsaw Pact countries
or faced severe restrictions on doing business with its communist neighbours. The
effects of Soviet rebukes were very real. The Yugoslav economy suffered from the
withdrawal of Soviet bloc credits and from the reduction of trade with Eastern
Europe.49 Canadian officials in Belgrade believed the Yugoslav government may
have exaggerated the danger of an all-out Soviet military and economic offensive as
a deliberate calculation to strengthen its argument for Western credits, but this did
not mean that Yugoslavia truly did not need the credits. In fact, Canadian officials in
Belgrade noted that Yugoslav officials were apprehensive about their economic
situation and argued that the existing climate provided a politically propitious
moment for Canada. In their view, it was in the West’s political interest to extend
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credits to Yugoslavia.50 Yugoslav Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Vladimir Velebit
explained to Ford that they (Yugoslav officials) did not want to exaggerate the
effects of the quarrel with the Soviet bloc on the their economy, but stressed that it
would be equally foolish to ignore it since it had required the scrapping of some
projects and a rather painful readjustment of trade.51 Ultimately, the Diefenbaker
government worked hard with Yugoslav officials to advance economic relations.
Yugoslavia’s purchase of Canadian pulp and paper machinery is a good case
in point that illustrates the importance of credits and the importance attached by
some Canadian officials, particularly Canada’s ambassadors in Yugoslavia, to
cultivating closer economic ties as a means of thwarting Soviet advances and luring
Yugoslavia into the Western camp. On the surface, the bilateral pulp and paper mills
deal may seem pedestrian, but the differing views of various Canadian federal
departments as to the importance of the deal is revealing. The purchase of the mills
began during Diefenbaker’s tenure, spanned three ambassadors, and was not
concluded until late 1963, by which time Lester Pearson’s Liberal government was
in power. The purchase of this equipment was complicated by the Yugoslav
requirement that the Canadian government provide a guarantee of commercial
credit under the export insurance act.
In early January 1959, representatives from Yugoslavia approached Canada’s
Ministry of Trade and Commerce regarding possible Canadian firms from whom
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they could purchase the machinery, worth approximately $24 million. Some firms
questioned whether the Yugoslav government seriously intended to purchase the
machinery. H.B. Style, President of John Inglis Co., wrote Ambassador Ford
personally expressing his hesitation.52 In a letter to Howard Green, Ford suggested
that if Style raised the matter with the minister, Green should stress that the
Yugoslav government is “extremely anxious to buy this equipment from Canada and
will give us preference over the United States and Germany.”53 Still, while the
Yugoslav government may have been sincere in its desire to purchase paper mill
equipment from Canada, not all Canadian officials were behind such projects.
Though Ambassador Ford was eager to see a deal develop between the two
countries, not all departments shared his enthusiasm. For instance, some officials in
the Ministry of Finance expressed chagrin at Ford’s “promotional activities”:
[Ambassador Ford] seems to be under the impression that we in
Ottawa are very anxious to make sales to the Yugoslavs under
Government
guarantee:
[Ford
says]
‘we
must
send
representatives to Yugoslavia’ [and] ‘Anything you could do to convince
the Canadian companies of the need to take some initiative to secure
this business would, I think, be useful.’
Of course all Departments in Ottawa are glad to see Canadian
firms get business in any part of the world. […] But in this case
Government credit is involved and Yugoslavia cannot be considered a
good risk. When the question of Government guarantees arose we in
the Department [of Finance] were only willing to agree because we
understood that [the DEA] considered that some assistance to
Yugoslavia would be politically desirable.54
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Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce John English was also concerned by Ford’s
“over eagerness,”55 and the DEA’s Economic Division soon informed the ambassador
that he was to curtail his “promotional activities” regarding the paper mills
project. 56 It is clear that Ford was unable, or perhaps reluctant, to ignore the
broader political implications of the deal. He understood the importance of such
capital equipment to Yugoslavia’s industrialization and wanted to gain political
favour with a Canadian contribution to Yugoslavia’s economic development. The
possibility of the Yugoslavs purchasing the equipment from Canada rather than the
United States was an added bonus. Although Ford was perceived by some as “over
eager” in promoting Canadian-Yugoslav business, his political intuition was in line
with many senior officials and ministers. It was well understood by all departments
that political considerations were the underlying force behind the desire for the
pulp and paper deal.
On the brink of collapse, new life was breathed into a possible deal when the
Canadian Export Credit Insurance Corporation (ECIC) issued a favourable economic
report on Yugoslavia in September 1959.57 Even the skeptical Assistant Deputy
Minister of Finance, A.F.W. Plumptre, was impressed. Additionally, Canadian Vickers
Limited (one of the companies vying for the contract) sent representatives to
Yugoslavia and made a new approach to Trade and Commerce, one more in line
with the ECIC, gaining the support of Finance Minister Gordon Churchill. He then
55
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submitted a memorandum to Cabinet suggesting the approval of export credit
insurance for Vickers, 58 which was approved. 59 The deal, however, temporarily
collapsed.
Why the Vickers-Yugoslav deal fell apart is somewhat murky. As the
company’s vice-president explained, the Yugoslav government requested too many
concessions.60 Reports from the Commercial Division at Canada’s Yugoslav embassy,
however, suggest that negotiations were delayed due to the troubles Vickers had in
arranging financing and the high interest rates involved; moreover, the Vickers
representatives did not seem enthusiastic about the deal.61 During Slavko Komar’s
(Minister of Agriculture and Forestry) visit to Canada, he suggested that memoranda
might be exchanged between the Canadian and Yugoslav authorities, expressing
their respective understandings of what happened in the Yugoslav-Vickers
negotiations. Under-Secretary Davis, however, stressed to Ford that he did not
consider this a “useful exercise” since “there continues to be rather too much
confusion within the Canadian side, as well as between Canada and Yugoslavia, as to
what actually happened and who was to blame.” Davis stressed that it would not be
easy to “reconcile the views of the various departments and agencies, the Canadian
banks and the corporations involved…” Overall, Davis concluded, an attempt to
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provide clarity on the subject would not contribute to improved Canadian business
with Yugoslavia. He hoped that the embassy would not raise the subject and that the
ideas would be “quietly dropped.”62 Davis, it appears, got his way.
Negotiations did resume in late 1963 under the new Liberal government, but
Vickers executives were now skeptical since their previous experience cost them
nearly $60,000 in preparing estimates and visits to Yugoslavia.63 Despite any last
ditch effort, no deal resulted. Nevertheless, the sustained efforts by Canadian
officials, and the Belgrade mission in particular, underline the importance Canada
attached to potential trade deals as means to cultivate closer relations with
Yugoslavia. Specifically, this episode also demonstrates Canadian officials’
awareness of the political and economic realities faced by a Yugoslav economy
struggling under the burden of the Soviet bloc’s treatment.
Government policy permitting the export of military equipment to Yugoslavia
was first developed in 1954, in consultation with the major Western powers. The
policy was based on the premise that this would help Yugoslavia to resist Soviet
pressure. “Canadian policy,” Green asserted in a submission to Cabinet, “has been to
encourage Yugoslavia in its independent attitude and to foster where possible more
friendly relations with the West.” Selling arms and military equipment
“complements other aspects of our policy toward [Yugoslavia]. […] Believing that
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the political and strategic consequences of approving these applications would be
consistent with Canada’s interests, I recommend that [the applications] be
approved.”64 Soon after, the government received an additional 35 applications from
the Levy Auto Parts Company, in the same category. Some Cabinet Ministers
believed Canada should not export arms to any country and nothing could be gained
politically by making friends with Yugoslavia. 65 Over these objections, Cabinet
approved all applications which then valued over $400,000.66

The dollar amount

of the sale, practically negligible in terms of total Canadian export sales, is less
important.

The true significance of the sale is twofold: first it highlights the

continuity of Canadian policy objectives towards Yugoslavia, across Liberal and
Progressive Conservative governments; second, it is another example of Canada’s
ability as a middle power to play some part in sustaining Yugoslavia’s more
independent stance, building bridges with the West through commercial ties.
Exportation of military equipment to Yugoslavia continued during the
Diefenbaker years. The export of military equipment closely followed Yugoslavia’s
purchase of updated F-86 Sabre fighter planes from the United States.67 According
to Ambassador Ford, Yugoslav senior officers were frustrated trying to run an air
force without tools adequate for the job. New fighter planes were expected to give a
“shot in the arm” to the air force, which had been suffering from a shortage of
64
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planes, spare parts, and other military equipment.68 The Levy Auto Parts Company
in Canada appealed to Ottawa in late 1959 for a permit to export over $63,000
worth of spare tractor, truck, car and tank parts – which included approximately
$25,000 worth of combat equipment – to Yugoslavia.
Similarly, the government received requests for export permits from
Canadair Limited for the sale of F-86 aircraft spare parts and ground handling
equipment to Yugoslavia, valuing $391,500.69 Following the same logic in policy
regarding the sale of other military equipment, Green, with the concurrence of the
Ministers of Trade and Commerce, National Defence, and Defence Production,
recommended the permit be granted. Cabinet approved the permit for export.70 The
sale of combat equipment and fighter jet spare parts highlights the overlap of
military and non-military Cold War battlegrounds. Economics and politics
intersected with military considerations, and while trade was certainly a means of
resisting Soviet economic advances in certain regions, it also supported military
strategy. Moreover, as a middle power, Canada was in a position to contribute to the
Western objective of keeping Yugoslavia from turning to the Eastern bloc for
equipment and goods.
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WHEAT EXPORTS TO YUGOSLAVIA

In terms of quantity and monetary value, Canadian wheat was by far the
most profitable commodity in Canadian-Yugoslav trade, thus mirroring CanadianSoviet commercial relations. The first significant mention of Yugoslavia’s interest in
purchasing Canadian wheat came in an exchange between Komar and Ambassador
Crean in February 1962.71 In response to this inquiry, the Canadian Wheat Board
sent a mission to Yugoslavia in April to examine more closely potential prospects.
The mission delivered a favourable report concluding, “in spite of present financial
difficulties of the Yugoslav government and the deficiencies in the milling and
baking industries, […] Yugoslavia should be considered a promising market for
Canadian wheat.”72 Previously, Yugoslavia was not considered a market that could
provide regular stable purchases; however, the report explained that now
under no circumstance should Yugoslavia be thought of as belonging to
that group of countries which are ready to buy Canadian wheat only
when other sources of supply are exhausted. On the part of the
Yugoslavs, there now exists a genuine desire to include Canadian wheat
as a permanent constituent of their grist.73
Notably, the United States was one of the “other sources”. Under the PL 480
Agreement, it had been supplying Yugoslavia with agricultural and other goods
since the early 1950s.
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Under-Secretary Norman Robertson readily recognized this and supported
the sale of Canadian wheat to Yugoslavia on credit arrangements. He maintained
that the conclusion of such a contract would afford Canada a market that, for the
past few years, had been met by shipments from the United States under PL 480.
The regular congressional review of the PL 480 program, however, placed the
Yugoslav exports in recurring jeopardy. Both the original 1954 legislation and its
expanded 1956 version contained provisions that prohibited sales to a Communist
regime. The Eisenhower administration tried hard to insert general language in the
1956 law permitting sales to Eastern Europe but was rebuffed in both the House
and Senate. As a result, it remained necessary to insert specific language in each act
exempting Yugoslavia from the general ban.74 Additionally, American reaction to the
state of Yugoslav-Soviet relations contributed significantly to fluctuations in the
annual amount of wheat exports to Yugoslavia.75 It is understandable, therefore,
that Yugoslav authorities sought more reliable export sources.
Robertson explained to Green that Yugoslavia purchased wheat from Canada
on credit both in 1952-‘53 and in 1954-’55, 76 and there was no default of payment
on either contract. Section 21 of the Export Credit Insurance Act guaranteed
74
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payment to Canadian companies by the ECIC upon a default of payment from a
purchasing government. Robertson further supported the sale on the grounds that
“the sale of wheat would also be in accordance with our general policy of taking
every available opportunity to loosen Yugoslavia’s ties with the countries of the
Soviet bloc.”77
Minister of Trade and Commerce George Hees and Minister of Agriculture
Alvin Hamilton supported the deal and explained that Yugoslav authorities wanted
to purchase up to 300,000 metric tons (11 million bushels) of wheat to be supplied
at an early date. 78 When Canadian authorities indicated that they had granted
Poland and Czechoslovakia credit terms for a period of three years, Yugoslav
officials expressed their hope that they would receive a comparable deal. Yugoslavia
was framed as a good and viable market for Canadian wheat for a few reasons. The
country had never defaulted on payment and had reached a decision, on both
economic and political grounds, to extend its purchases to other sources in order to
avoid over dependence on any one supplier.79 The official consensus was that a
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wheat deal with Yugoslavia was fully advantageous to Canada. Some officials in the
Department of Finance, however, believed Canada could squeeze the Yugoslavs into
a stiffer contract.
Finance officials believed recent events in the US Congress could help shape
the deal with Yugoslavia. Congressional action on the Foreign Aid Bill, which saw the
Senate narrowly prevent the suspension of all aid to Poland and Yugoslavia, may
have caused some concern over the future deliveries of wheat under PL 480.
Additionally, officials believed that recent indications of rapprochement by
Yugoslavia with Russia might further solidify American reluctance to assist
Yugoslavia. The Ministry of Finance maintained, “in view of these considerations
and Yugoslavs’ expressed desire to conclude a contract, terms less liberal than the
proposed ones might be possible.”80 Despite the argument that “less liberal” terms
could be stipulated, the deal went ahead with Yugoslavia offered terms similar to
those given Poland and Czechoslovakia. Put differently, political considerations
trumped financial sensitivities.
By January 1963, the deal was coming together. In the end, however,
Yugoslavia purchased 200,000 metric tons rather than the initial 300,000. Jaksa
Petric, director of the Department for North and South America of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, explained that for balance of payment reasons they simply could not
afford the additional 100,000 tons, and they did not intend to purchase the
Soviet-Yugoslav relations had remained chilly for the first two years and warmed up again noticeably
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additional amount from anyone else. Petric assured Ambassador Crean that if
Yugoslavia needed wheat next year, as a matter of government policy, it would make
the purchase from Canada. Crean indicated to Ottawa that Yugoslavia would almost
certainly have requirements for Canadian wheat irrespective of PL 480. Petric told
Crean that he regarded this purchase as the beginning of a policy of improved trade
with Canada.81
While the contract became an important transaction for export purposes, it
also served a broader purpose within Canada’s economic statecraft. In a press
release, Agricultural Minister Hamilton explained that Canada had entered
negotiations for long-term deals with five Communist countries, including
Yugoslavia. “‘What we are saying to them,’” the minister explained, “‘is this: You use
your grain for feed to build up your livestock industry. We’ll supply you with grain
for food. Their agricultural minister liked the idea.’” Hamilton continued, “such deals
would allow for long-range planning, and diversification of supply by these
countries would be to their advantage.”82 Officially, the contract was completed on 7
May 1963, less than a month after the Liberals regained power. The Liberal
government wasted little time in picking up where the Progressive Conservatives
left off. The new Minister of Trade and Commerce, Mitchell Sharp, requested
authority from Cabinet to explore the possibility of long-term arrangements for the
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sale of wheat to Yugoslavia, as well as to Poland and Czechoslovakia.83 Permission
was granted. While the examination of long-term wheat deals between Yugoslavia
and the new Liberal government is not considered here, the important fact remains
that the Diefenbaker government built upon the established policy of wheat sales on
credit established by its predecessor. The Progressive Conservatives then went one
step further than the previous government, opening negotiations for long-term
deals. The trend was subsequently resumed by its successor. Significantly, Canada
had used wheat, one of its dominant capital goods, not only to expand its
commercial relationship with Yugoslavia but also to employ economic statecraft in
an endeavor to coax Yugoslavia into the Western sphere.
Interestingly, while Diefenbaker was a prairie populist and notoriously
sought markets for Canadian wheat, no records indicate his opinion on, let alone
involvement in, the wheat deals with Yugoslavia. 84 This is unfortunate, as this
development might have revealed interesting insights into the prime minister’s
perception of Eastern Europe generally, and Canadian-Yugoslav relations
specifically. Nevertheless, the eagerness of the Canadian Wheat board, various
federal ministries, and the mission in Belgrade to see a fruitful deal concluded,
highlights Canada’s effort to build bridges between East and West and to entice
Yugoslavia into the Western orbit.
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CONCLUSION

Canadian-Yugoslav relations were relatively insignificant when the
Progressive Conservatives gained power in 1957. The bilateral relationship,
however, evolved and steadily improved over the near six years of the Diefenbaker
government. The rift between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, instigated by the
latter’s refusal to sign the Twelve Party Declaration, provided a fortuitous
opportunity for Canada to cultivate stronger ties with Yugoslavia, an approach
mirrored in Western policy generally. Events east of the Iron Curtain helped shape
Canada’s Yugoslav policy, as the Soviet Union remained a ubiquitous factor in the
Eastern European policy equation. Spearheaded by Canadian ambassadors in
Belgrade, Canada was able to utilize its middle power status to establish common
ground on which to build a fruitful and mutually advantageous relationship.
Yugoslavia was undergoing internal and external changes as the Soviet bloc treated
it as it did any other non-Warsaw Pact state, omitting if from preferential treatment;
subsequently, Yugoslavia looked for ways out of its isolation. As a result, Canada
saw Yugoslavia as a viable point where Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe might
be penetrated. Canadian officials considered Yugoslavia to be the least dogmatic of
all communist countries; therefore, it became Canadian policy to promote and to
cultivate, in a more deliberate way, closer political, commercial, and cultural
relations, aiming to expose Yugoslavia to Western political, commercial, and sociocultural modalities.
Cultural diplomacy was also used as a viable means of exposing Yugoslavia to
Western modalities, believing this would entice it into the Western sphere of
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influence. In addition to artistic, academic, and research exchanges, technical
information was exchanged in the fields of atomic energy and mining. There were
limits, however. When it was thought that the USSR, through Yugoslavia, might
access information deemed vital to Canadian industry, access for Yugoslav
specialists was restricted. Canadian officials attached significant notoriety to the
various exchanges; they firmly believed that cultural diplomacy was a viable means
to bridge political and ideological divides.
Economic ties were also expanded between the nations. While commercial
dealings were not particularly lucrative, especially relative to Canada’s total foreign
trade, their political significance, nonetheless, made them an important element in
Canadian-Yugoslav relations. Canadian officials understood the value of raw
materials and capital equipment for Yugoslavia’s industrialization process, further
underscoring the significance of Canada’s economic statecraft. The determined
pursuit of the paper mill deal between Canadian Vickers and the Yugoslav
government, in spite of the various ups and downs associated with it, highlights the
importance that Canadian ambassadors to Yugoslavia attached to the development
of fruitful commercial relations between the two countries, and underlines the
continuity of Canadian policy objectives towards Yugoslavia across Liberal and
Progressive Conservative governments. This particular deal also revealed that there
were occasional divergences in departmental opinions within the federal
government, and these differences did sometimes lead to administrative tensions in
Ottawa.
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Finally, the sale of combat equipment to Yugoslavia exemplifies the
overlap between military and non-military Cold War battlegrounds, and Canadian
wheat, which was by far the most profitable of the bilateral commercial deals, was
confirmed as a reliable commodity in Canada’s economic statecraft. It is important
to remember that Canadian-Yugoslav trade was less about the revenue generated
and more the connections and integration into Western markets that Canadian
officials saw as important. Thus, Melakopides’ notion that Canadian foreign policy
was driven by pragmatic idealism – that Canadian officials believed in
communication, cooperation, all the while showing flexibility and adaptability – can
be extended to Canada’s policy with Communist Europe. Canada’s Yugoslav policy
during this period shows that Canada, indeed, worked within a Cold War context to
combat European communism by other means.
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Chapter 5

Mending the Past & Pushing Forward: Canadian-Polish Diplomatic Relations
Perhaps one of the most striking aspects about the history of Canadian-Polish
relations is the shear scarcity of the literature. A truly comprehensive account
remains to be written. To date, Aloysius Balawyder’s The Maple Leaf and the White
Eagle: Canadian-Polish Relations, 1918-1978 is the most useful book written on the
subject. 1 While Balawyder’s study is an invaluable contribution to the history of
Canadian-Polish relations, there is much about this history that has yet to be
addressed. The following two chapters, on Canadian-Polish political, cultural, and
economic relations in the late 1950s and early 1960s, aim to fill a small void in what
can only be described as a gaping hole in the history of Canadian foreign relations
with Eastern Europe.
In the single chapter that examines Canadian-Polish relations after 1945,
Balawyder argues that relations, throughout the postwar period, generally ran their
course in the broader context of East-West relations and that successive Polish
governments, consistently subject to constraints imposed by the Soviet Union, were
not free to act as they otherwise might have. Moreover, he suggests Canada, for its
part, generally followed the lead of the United States and other Western countries in
its approach to foreign policy.2 This framework, however, suggests a degree of
passivity and indifference between the two nations that is not entirely accurate. In

1 Aloysius Balawyder, The Maple Leaf and the White Eagle: Canadian-Polish Relations, 1918-1978
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1980).
2 Balawyder, The Maple Leaf and the White Eagle, 153.
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fact, because of changes that occurred in Poland as a consequence of changes in the
USSR itself, Canadian officials actively, albeit in a limited way, engaged with Poland
to encourage its independent position and attenuate Soviet dominance over the
nation. Canada’s Polish policy, while limited in scope and maneuverability for
various reasons discussed below, mirrored Canada’s approach to Soviet and
Yugoslav relations. Examining Canadian-Polish relations during this decisive
moment in Canadian foreign policy is enlightening because it reveals how Canada
approached a Communist European nation that, unlike Yugoslavia, was firmly
entrenched in the Soviet bloc. Yet, Poland was also distinctive, given its relative
independence from Soviet control and its ambition to carve out its own foreign
policy, even if it was still squarely situated within the Communist orbit.
WLADYSLAW GOMULKA AND THE LIBERALIZATION OF POLAND

Following the Second World War, the imposition of Soviet hegemony over
Poland, the initiation of Stalinist methods of rule, and the inauguration of a planned
economy resulted in Poland’s increasing distance from the West. Then, in 1956, the
Poznań rebellion marked the beginning of change in the country. Leaders of the
United Polish Workers’ Party believed only Wladyslaw Gomulka had sufficient
prestige and support within the party to carry out political, social, and economic
reforms, without compromising the basic principles of communist doctrine. 3
Gomulka was considered a moderate and a reformer, but also a devout communist;
he rejected subservient dependence on the Soviet Union, but ensured that Poland
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would remain in the Soviet bloc.4 On October 9, 1956, the same day Gomulka was
chosen party secretary, Nikita Khrushchev led a Soviet delegation to Poland hoping
to halt the reforms. After a stormy encounter with Gomulka, Khrushchev was
convinced that acceptance of Poland’s brand of communism was better than strife
and turmoil. Khrushchev’s willingness to accede to Gomulka’s policies helped to
avert a bloody revolt, as seen in Hungary just weeks later.5 Poland, while still a
committed Communist state, had effectively avoided complete domination by the
USSR. The Canadian legation in Warsaw compared Poland’s position vis-à-vis the
Soviet Union in the 1950s to Canada’s relationship with the United Kingdom in the
mid-1860s.6 Poland wanted to “strengthen its ties” both eastward and westward,7
providing Canada with another opportunity to develop bilateral relations that might
undermine Soviet hegemony in the region, and European communism more
generally.
Catalyzed by the new Gomulka regime, the country witnessed far-reaching
liberalization. An article titled “Is this the Twilight of Marxism?” published by a
Warsaw weekly, Po Prostu, and edited by students of Warsaw University illustrated
the increasing civil discontent in Poland. The article coldly reviewed five of the main
failures of the country’s economic system and confronted official Marxist theory.
Importantly, as the Canadian Chargé d’Affaires in Warsaw noted, none of the editors

4 Ivan T. Berend, Central and Eastern Europe 1944 – 1993: Detour from the Periphery to the Periphery

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 114.
5 Balawyder, The Maple Leaf and the White Eagle, 165.
6 LAC, RG25, Vol. 7788, File 12496-40 part 1, Despatch Canadian Legation Warsaw to Under-Secretary
of State for External Affairs, February 27, 1959.
7 LAC, RG25, Vol. 7788, File 12496-40 part 1.2, Despatch Embassy Warsaw to Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs, May 18, 1960.
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were removed and the publication was spared censorship.8 This was a sign that
greater freedom of expression was becoming possible. With the release of Cardinal
Wyszynski, the Catholic Church was given greater freedom as well, including
permission to offer religious instruction in schools. Peasants were allowed to leave
cooperative farms and to engage in private farming, while artists and craftsmen
could secure licenses to set up shops and employ assistants.9 Cognizant of ensuing
domestic liberalization, Canadian officials looked to cultivate closer relations with
their Polish counterparts with the aim of encouraging Gomulka’s independent
course, which Canadian officials understood to be a vital component of Poland’s
foreign policy.
The significant changes ushered in by the Gomulka government occurred just
prior to the election of John Diefenbaker’s Progressive Conservative government. As
with their awareness of the changing tides between Yugoslavia and the USSR,
Canadian officials were also well aware of the importance attached to domestic
developments in Poland. In an April 1957 despatch to the secretary of state for
external affairs, the Canadian chargé d’affaires in Poland reflected and commented
on a recent statement by Adam Rapacki, Poland’s minister of foreign affairs.
Essentially, the despatch generally informed and outlined what would become the
basis of Canada’s Polish policy for at least the next decade. Polish foreign policy was
seen to have three parts. First was its relationship with the Eastern bloc. Friendly
relations among socialist countries were significant. In the past, unanimity among
8 LAC, RG19, Vol. 4206, File 8714-33/P762 part 1, Despatch The Chargé d’Affaires, Canadian Legation
Warsaw to Secretary of State for External Affairs, July 16, 1956.
9 Balawyder, The Maple Leaf and the White Eagle, 165.
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these states was the cornerstone of Poland’s foreign policy. Significantly, Rapacki
argued that differences between the socialist states must be recognized, and
opposition to this idea must be removed for the good of the camp. Polish diplomacy,
he insisted, had an important role to play in making this viewpoint understood.
Second was Poland’s relationship with Western capitalists. Poland wanted to
develop mutually profitable economic contacts. The Minister affirmed firmly,
however, that ‘“we will not accept any political conditions which could be imposed
on us by any capitalist country.’” Furthermore, Rapacki stated that those in the West
who hoped Poland would become a bourgeois democracy were wishful thinkers,
and those advocating this were trying to bring about the isolation of Poland in the
socialist camp. Finally, Rapacki discussed Poland’s new attitude toward émigrés.
Poland, he insisted, should encourage Poles abroad to become more closely
acquainted with the cultural achievements of Poland and to educate their children
to love Poland. This was a change in attitude that had traditionally affirmed that a
Pole abroad was a bad Pole. The aim now was to make Polish émigrés unofficial
ambassadors and trade commissioners of Poland.10
The despatch elaborated on the “neat balance which Poland must maintain
between East and West,” and that “Poland must remain independent.” The chargé
d’affaires stressed Rapacki’s inference that Poland must not be isolated from the
socialist camp. This, he argued, was significant from Canada’s point of view
since Poland, as a member of the bloc progressing slowly towards some
more acceptable form of government from [Canada’s] point of view, has
10

LAC, RG25, Vol. 7788, File 12496-40 part 1, Despatch The Chargé d’Affaires, Canadian Legation
Warsaw to Secretary of State for External Affairs, April 2, 1957.
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the opportunity to bring with it, in time, other countries in the bloc. Any
impatient efforts on our part to hasten the process may solidify the
opposition to these changes and severely limit Poland’s usefulness in
this sphere.11
One month later, a circular document on Poland’s foreign policy expressed similar
ideas. It explained that recent events in the country had resulted in greater freedom
and independence; as a result, a thorough reorganization of Poland’s foreign service
was anticipated in order to eliminate any remaining Stalinist elements.
Furthermore, it stressed that the Polish Delegation at the UN “went to considerable
lengths to develop contacts with Western delegations, and their interventions in
debate had a very different character from other communist statements.” 12
Canadian officials were, in effect, witnessing firsthand the direct ramifications of
recent Polish liberalization on that country’s foreign policy. As a result, by mid1957, Canadian officials proposed the development of a cautious policy that
encouraged Polish independence, thereby increasing potential exposure to Western
modalities, while simultaneously being careful not to provoke political resentment.
American officials, too, saw the importance of Poland’s ambition for greater
autonomy. A February 1958 national intelligence estimate suggested that Poland’s
ability to maintain its “semi-independence” would be “a key factor affecting future
political developments in Eastern Europe.” Poland was expected to be able to retain
its relative freedom from direct Soviet control, and this would have clear potential
benefits for the West. It was noted that Poland’s independent course, “together with
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Yugoslavia’s continued independence, may tend to encourage nationalist-oriented
elements in the other Satellites to seek greater autonomy.”13 It was no secret to the
West, then, that Poland was in a potentially transformative position, one that
Western nations should encourage by avoiding conflict and promoting bridgebuilding.
Poland, like Canada, functioned more freely when international tensions
were reduced, and Rapacki also expressed the importance of promoting
international stability and the consolidation of peace.14 The Canadian embassy in
Warsaw reported, “any resumption of East-West tensions is bad news for Poland:
both for the man in the street who still fears war, and for those in government who
believe that Poland should strengthen its ties in both directions.” 15 Canadian
officials could certainly sympathize with this position, and common ground was
established on this matter. Yet, while officials on both sides wanted to nurture
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closer political, cultural, and commercial ties, one long-standing issue prohibited
such developments: Polish art treasures that had been stored in Canada since WWII.
THE POLISH ART TREASURES AND CANADIAN-POLISH RELATIONS

The complicated issue of the Polish art treasures loomed large in CanadianPolish relations until the late 1950s, when visible progress on their return to Poland
was finally made. The history of the treasures highlights the fact that seemingly
nonpolitical matters were in fact politically charged in the atmosphere of the Cold
War, despite efforts by both sides to reduce political and ideological implications.
During negotiations on this issue, neither the Canadian or Polish governments
attempted to score propaganda points at the expense of the other. In fact, the
negotiations for the return of the treasures reveal an interesting attempt by two
middle powers to reduce potential negative Cold War implications. While Canadian
officials wanted to improve relations with Poland in order to lessen Soviet
hegemony over that country, the issue of the Polish art treasures was an obstacle
standing in their way. As a result, the Canadian government ultimately took the
necessary steps to break down this barrier.
In 1939, Polish officials managed to ship a collection of art treasures and
historical relics out of the country to Canada, just ahead of the advancing Nazis.16
Balawyder argues that if Poland had not fallen into the Soviet orbit, Canada would
“unquestionably have returned the treasures sooner – presumably immediately
after the conclusion of hostilities in Europe.” Canada’s failure to return the treasures
16
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promptly, according to Balawyder, “engendered a long controversy and
considerably worsened Canadian-Polish relations. […] For almost fifteen years, the
Polish government and press condemned Canada’s unwillingness or inability to
return the treasures, even taking the question to the UN and other international
forums.”17 The controversy surrounding the treasures was not resolved until the
new Gomulka regime in Poland came to power and a new Progressive Conservative
government in Canada made sincere strides to get the national relics back to their
rightful owners.18
While relations were not improved immediately after Diefenbaker became
Prime Minister, it was clear from the outset of his government that the issue of the
Polish art treasures was at the forefront of Canadian-Polish relations. The
seriousness of the issue was made especially clear when the Canadian government
suggested exchanging ambassadors and raising respective missions to embassy
status; the Polish government refused until satisfactory progress had been made on
the return of the treasures.19 During a discussion with Polish Chargé d’Affaires
Mieczyslaw Sieradzki, SSEA Sidney Smith reassured him that Canada wished to send
an ambassador to Warsaw “because we looked with sympathy upon the new
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Gomulka regime,” and that the “question of the treasures had not come up in the
Cabinet consideration of it all.” Smith also recalled the promises made by
Diefenbaker and himself to give an early answer on the subject but lamented that it
was difficult to make rapid progress since the new government was faced with
many challenges. Sieradzki’s response was straightforward: it “would be difficult for
people in Poland to appreciate such problems.”20 While agitated by the delays on the
part the Canadian government, Polish officials remained patiently level-headed on
the issue.
In December 1957, Polish officials “emphatically expressed” their desire not
to do anything that would embarrass the Canadian government. In fact, they told
Canadian officials they would be content with receiving only a portion of the
treasures, for instance those housed at the Bank of Montreal in Ottawa.21 Polish
officials suggested that such a favourable gesture by Canada would be most
important for those who were trying very hard to draw the Polish government
closer to the West. One Polish official explained frankly that “Gomulka did not yet
understand the West and that the Canadian attitude on the treasures was the sort of
20
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thing which confirmed his views about ‘Western Imperialism.’”22 The fact that the
Polish government did not publicize the issue as an example of “Western
Imperialism,” despite Gomulka’s perception that this was the case, suggests intent to
keep the controversy as depoliticized as possible. In many corners of the DEA,
however, the return of the art treasures was seen not only as an important and
necessary political gesture, but also as an initiative with potentially important
commercial benefits.
In a memorandum to the USSEA, A.J. Pick of the European Division explained
that the commencement of serious American-Polish negotiations over US aid might
cause serious difficulties for Canada’s commercial sale of wheat to Poland. As a
result, Pick stressed the importance of speedy consideration by Cabinet on the issue
of the Polish art treasures.23 This line of thinking passed upwards to Sidney Smith.
USSEA J.B.C. Watkins told the minister that the Polish request to purchase 800,000
tons of American wheat placed the Canadian government in a difficult position.
Watkins asserted,
[w]e are anxious for political reasons that Poland should secure
essential economic aid from the West, without which it will be unable to
retain the limited freedom which it secured from the Soviet Union in
October 1956. The principle of extending aid to Poland has also been
approved by the NATO Council of Ministers. We have asked the State
Department to withhold committing themselves on the quantity of
wheat to be offered until our own negotiations with the Poles have been
completed and, in the meantime, to consider the possibility of offering
other commodities in place of wheat.
22
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Since Canada was also trying to negotiate a deal with Poland to purchase an
additional 150,000 tons of wheat, there was concern an agreement with the
Americans could jeopardize the sale. Polish officials, it was suggested, should be
approached to try and seal the Canadian wheat deal, but Watkins cautioned that all
efforts might be for naught:
It is my belief, however, that none of these efforts will be successful
until the Polish Government is satisfied that it is making progress in
securing the return of that part of the Polish treasures which is in the
Bank of Montreal. Last May officials of the Department of Trade and
Commerce and the Wheat Board went to Washington to place our views
before the Polish delegation. The senior delegate, after explaining he
was not responsible for negotiations with Canada, said that had he
been, ‘he would want to talk about two Canadian surpluses: one would
be wheat; the other would be tapestries.’24
Luckily for the Canadian Wheat Board, the wheat deal negotiations were not
negatively impacted by the lack of progress made on the treasures. The seriousness
of the issue did not fade, however, and remained at the forefront of Canadian-Polish
relations in the late 1950s.
Neither the Poles nor Canadians wanted to make the issue overtly public.
This is not to say that certain quarters were not aware of the friction caused by
Canada’s retention of the treasures, or of the broader implications for East-West
relations generally. Smith, for instance, told his Cabinet colleagues that the UN
Secretary-General had told him on a personal basis “that he was trying to encourage
the Poles to adopt the same general attitude as Yugoslavia, and it would be helpful if
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Canada could release these treasures which had such great symbolic value to the
Polish people.”25
Returning the treasures was a much more complicated matter than most
realized, and intricate legal issues were involved.26 Diefenbaker explained that the
major part of the treasures were now in the Quebec Museum and beyond the control
of the Federal government. 27 Regarding the two trunks stored in the Bank of
Montreal in Ottawa, Diefenbaker believed the general feeling was that Canada
should restore part of the treasures, and that this would certainly result in improved
relations with Poland.28 In a May 1958 Cabinet meeting, the Prime Minister and
most Ministers preferred that the Polish government secure the release of the
treasures deposited with the Bank of Montreal by action in the courts, rather than
by the intervention of the Canadian government.29
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By June, however, Smith reported to Cabinet that all avenues not involving
the government had been investigated, and none had proved feasible. Smith
recommended that the federal government direct the Bank of Montreal to return the
trunks to the Polish government through the Legation in Ottawa. This gesture, he
inferred, might be of some help to Gomulka in withstanding Soviet pressure on the
subject. Smith then recommended that if
the Polish authorities agreed they would not hold the Canadian
government responsible for any damage the treasures might have
suffered and also agree to hold the government harmless from any
claims on the part of other owners of any objects in the trunks, an
indemnity agreement be made with the Bank of Montreal.
During the Cabinet discussion, it was agreed that Canada recognized the present
Polish government and its rights to the treasures. Furthermore, the issue was
recognized as a matter of international relations and a federal responsibility.
Cabinet determined that the matter should be decided with those interests in mind.
It was also noted that a decision to do nothing would discredit Canada in the UN and
elsewhere.30
As a result, the Canadian government pressed Polish Chargé d’Affaires
Sieradzki for specific guarantees, and he agreed not to hold the Canadian
government responsible for any loss, damage, deterioration, or injury suffered by
the control of the Quebec government, the Canadian government was indeed responsible for the
recovery of the treasures from the museum. According to international law the Canadian government
bore the responsibility for the actions of all Canadian officials – federal, provincial, municipal – vis-àvis a foreign government.” These observations, however, would prove to be disconcerting to the DEA,
especially since Premier Maurice Duplessis had in 1956 stated that ‘“the treasures were confined to
the government by Polish patriots and they shall never be returned to the Communist government of
Warsaw.’” The desire of the federal government to avoid federal-provincial friction is one reason it
wanted the issue to be resolved by the courts, and not by Ottawa’s “heavy hand”. Swoger, The Strange
Odyssey of Poland’s National Treasures, 147-148.
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Conclusion, “Polish Art Treasures,” Ottawa, July 2, 1958.
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the contents of the two trunks deposited in the Bank of Montreal. The use of seven
non-political figures gave the appearance of neutrality in the transfer, and on
January 9, 1959, the Bank of Montreal officially released the two trunks to Poland.31
Once the trunks were released, the Canadian government appeared less adamant
about keeping the matter quiet. The Globe and Mail reported that the DEA issued a
statement indicating, “… the two trunks of treasures, containing jeweled swords and
armour and ancient scrolls, will be returned to Polish institutions.” The article
explained that the gesture “ends some bitter diplomatic wrangling”32
Two months later, Smith instructed the Canadian Chargé d’Affaires in Poland,
G. Hamilton Southam, during his first call on Foreign Minister Rapacki, to express
the Minister’s “appreciation of the discretion with which Polish authorities have
handled the return of the two trunks of art treasures which had been deposited in
the Bank of Montreal.” Smith also asked that Southam inform Rapacki of his
“personal satisfaction that a way was found to effect the return of the trunks and
that the contents have apparently not suffered damage.” Smith also made clear he
was conscious of Polish officials’ discretion in official statements about the part
played by the Canadian government in the arrangements for the release.33 Simply
put, Smith was grateful for the depoliticized handling of the issue and was pleased
the issue had not devolved into a Cold War rhetorical assault on Canada. The return
of a part of their national heritage was greeted with much enthusiasm in Poland. An
31
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article in Trybuna Ludu described the public’s reaction upon hearing the news: “The
information concerning the prospective return of a part of the Wawel treasures to
Poland from Canada raised feeling of joy and satisfaction throughout the country.
The information concerning the treasure was […] the main subject of interest of the
majority of the people.”34 The remaining treasures were released in late December
1960 and arrived in Poland in January the next year.35 The Globe and Mail, again
reported on the event, stating,
It is excellent news that the last of the Polish art treasures, stored in
Canada for safekeeping during the war, are now on their way back to
Poland. The treasures have been a source of embarrassment to Canada,
of controversy between the Canadian and Polish Governments, and
between various groups of Poles. They are now being restored to their
rightful owner, the Polish nation, amid general goodwill, which is of far
more value to Canada than could be any art treasures.36
It appears that the Globe and Mail, too, understood the political significance of the
return of the treasures.
The controversy surrounding the Polish art treasures is interesting in that it
highlights the willingness of two middle powers in the Cold War to address a
difficult issue quietly and to minimize what otherwise could have been a public
spectacle. Both the Polish press and public were vocal in their expectations of seeing
the treasures returned, yet Polish authorities refused to use the issue for
propaganda purposes to publicly attack Canada, or the West generally; Polish
authorities minimized confrontation in order not to escalate Cold War hostilities
and divisions. From the Canadian perspective, officials understood the political
34
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significance attached to the issue. A lack of progress in returning the treasures
hampered their ability to cultivate better relations with Poland, which was
ultimately counterintuitive to their larger policy objectives.
External Affairs almost immediately found that resolving the art treasure
issue had “removed an obstacle from the improvements of Canadian-Polish
relations.”37 From Poland, Southam reported that there was even talk among Polish
officials of extending an invitation to Diefenbaker to visit Poland, and those in
charge had welcomed the suggestion. Importantly, Polish officials “did not even
raise the question of the remaining treasures as an argument against such a
gesture.” Such discussions signified the great change in attitude that had been
achieved with the return of the trunks.38
THE RAPACKI PLAN

On the whole, repatriating the art treasures had been carried out through
quiet, bilateral diplomacy. But this was not the only sign of constructive political
relations between Poland and Canada during the Diefenbaker government. Other
instances were played out in the international arena. In October 1957, Poland’s
Foreign Minister Rapacki proposed a scheme for the creation of a nuclear-free zone
in Central Europe, to encompass Czechoslovakia, East and West Germany, and
Poland. Both the manufacturing and possession of nuclear weapons would be
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excluded in this zone.39 This became known as the Rapacki Plan. Reacting to the
Polish initiative, the US State Department stated, “after careful study, our reaction is
heavily negative. While it might have some surface attraction, it poses totally
unacceptable risks. Therefore we cannot consider this scheme as basis for any
serious negotiations.” 40 While the United States and the Federal Republic of
Germany would not entertain any suggestion that West Germany be disarmed
against its will, other NATO heads of states, including Prime Ministers Gerhardsen of
Norway and Hansen of Denmark, and Foreign Ministers Selwyn Lloyd of Britain and
Smith of Canada, insisted the Rapacki Plan be seriously studied. 41 In the end,
however, NATO rejected the plan. Discussions among Canadian officials regarding
the Rapacki plan, however, remain interesting and illustrate how Canada, as a
middle power, sought to engage in discussions to support a middle power
counterpart on the other side of the Iron Curtain.
During Southam’s discussion with Rapacki, the Polish Foreign Minister
stressed that his government would attach particular importance to any
observations or suggestions the Canadian government might have, and he hoped
there might follow an exchange of views between Poland and Canada through
diplomatic channels. From a discussion he had with the Polish Chargé d’Affaires,
who in turn was relaying the views of Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Winiewicz,
John Holmes understood that the Poles were simply looking for anything but a
39
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complete rejection. Holmes explained, “Poland would be grateful if [Canada] could,
by asking for further explanations or suggesting alternatives, at least keep the
proposal alive.”42 Essentially, Poland hoped that the plan would not be summarily
dismissed and that there could be further discussions. Under-Secretary Jules Léger
sympathized with Poland’s position. In a memorandum to the minister, he explained
how “Winiewicz is one of the stronger forces in Warsaw trying to maintain Polish
foreign policy on an independent a plane as possible.” As a result, Léger hoped the
government would “give due regard to his recommendations” in drafting its reply to
Poland.43 Canada agreed to support the plan, provided it led to disarmament by the
USSR as well as by the Western powers. 44 Canadian officials, in drafting their
response, clearly knew their conditions would be unacceptable, but they did do their
part to sustain discussion and debate. In fact, as the Polish draft of the plan stood,
Canadian officials had serious reservations. Specifically, “by concentrating on
nuclear weapons to the neglect of reductions in conventional weapons, the Plan, if
adopted, would result in seriously upsetting the strategic balance in Western
Europe to the disadvantage of the North Atlantic Alliance.”45 In the end, the Rapacki
plan came to naught.
Historians Albert Legault and Michael Fortmann also note that both the
Canadians and Norwegians insisted on voicing their views strictly on behalf of their
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own countries, and not in the name of the Atlantic Alliance. Furthermore, they
explain that one of Canada’s objectives regarding the Western response to the
Rapacki plan was to “avoid the possibility that a White House spokesman would
dismiss the Plan out of hand simply because it originated in the East, without any
prior consultation from member nations of the North Atlantic Alliance.”46 In short,
Canadian officials would not officially endorse the plan, but they did not want to
reject it outright either. They considered the negative impact of a blunt rebuff on
Poland’s foreign policy objectives; it was important to keep lines of communication
open between East and West regarding disarmament, because if discourse halted,
Polish independence could be weakened. DEA official, Doug LePan explained how
Rapacki was “very disappointed with the replies of some NATO Foreign Ministers,
since they seemed to reject the Plan almost without reading it. That had not been
true, however, of either Canada or Norway,” which pleased Rapacki.47
While the Rapacki plan failed, it highlights an important dynamic between
middle powers operating in the shadows of their respective Cold War superpowers.
Poland’s appeal to Canada to help continue debate, and Canada’s efforts – even if
nominal – to meet Poland’s request, demonstrate a commonality of position and
purpose among middle powers, something of a cross-curtain brotherhood in the
Cold War. Canadian motives, of course, were not completely altruistic. In fact, quite
the opposite is true. Consistently, it was Canadian policy to nurture the
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independence obtained by the Polish October in hopes of reducing Soviet hegemony
and ultimately weakening European communism.
EMBASSY STATUS

With bilateral relations on the mend, each country aimed to improve affairs
further by raising their diplomatic missions to embassy status. In a memorandum to
the minister, Under-Secretary Norman Robertson explained that the Cabinet had
approved the appointment of an ambassador in November 1957, but progress on
the matter was halted because the Poles wanted to wait until the Bank treasures
were returned. Now that issue was resolved, Poland expressed its readiness to
proceed. Robertson argued the work of the Canadian mission in Poland was
impaired by inadequate standing: in Warsaw, Canada ranked last of all foreign
representatives. Robertson insisted that this gesture was “a necessary first step in
our policy of taking initiative […] to improve East-West relations.” He also
maintained that the “appointment of an ambassador in Warsaw, as an expression of
continuing Canadian support, would tend to encourage those Polish leaders who
favour closer relations with the West.”48 On April 29, 1960, both countries raised
their respective diplomatic missions to embassy status. G. Hamilton Southam
became Canada’s first postwar ambassador to Poland, and Zygfryd Wolniak became
Poland’s first postwar ambassador to Canada.49
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In comparing the development of Canadian-Yugoslav and Canadian-Polish
relations, there were important differences with respect to Canadian diplomatic
activity and resources in each of the countries. Whereas Canadian-Yugoslav
relations were fervently and progressively nurtured by Canada’s Yugoslav
ambassadors from 1956 onwards – through the promotion of cultural and
diplomatic exchanges and the facilitation of commercial deals – Canadian diplomats
in Poland were handicapped by tensions over the unresolved art treasures issue as
well as embassy status. Additionally, Canada’s Yugoslav ambassadors during the
Diefenbaker years were Soviet specialists, specifically George Ignatieff and Robert
Ford. Both had deep-seated interest in Soviet affairs and Yugoslavia’s position
relative to the USSR. The point of this observation is not, of course, to devalue the
roles, interests, or abilities of Canada’s charge d’affaires and ambassadors in Poland.
The fact that Poland was a member of the Warsaw Pact and a committed Soviet ally
may also have been a factor in the relatively lesser influence of Canada’s
ambassadors in Poland. In the end, however, the personalities and backgrounds of
the specific Canadian ambassadors in Yugoslavia remains important, since they did,
without doubt, play a significant role in Canadian-Yugoslav relations.
As the Canadian embassy in Poland settled in, the staff was increasingly
overloaded with visa work. As a result, the DEA submitted a report to the Ministry of
Citizenship and Immigration, based on a special three-man inspection team. The
report recommended sending a second senior clerk or a junior immigration officer
to Poland to help alleviate the workload. What appeared to be a routine
administrative upgrade, however, proved to have deeper political significance. This
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time, reservations came not from the DEA. Department of Citizenship and
Immigration Minister Ellen Fairclough expressed her concerns to then SSEA Howard
Green. Fairclough stated:
… this will be the first employee of the Immigration Branch to be posted
to an Iron Curtain country. Even though it is not proposed that the
employee be included on the diplomatic list, or even posted officially as
an immigration officer, I would expect that it would in due course
become known to the Polish authorities that the employee in question
is from the Immigration Branch on secondment to External. We would
have to consider pretty carefully, I think, the effect of this information,
should it become known. […] What would the Polish government’s
reaction be if it learned that we had seconded to the embassy staff in
Warsaw an Immigration Branch employee? I assume that we do not
wish to give any overt indication of an increased interest on Canada’s
part in Polish immigration, through posting an immigration employee
in Warsaw.50
Fairclough copied the letter to Diefenbaker for comment, to which he responded: “it
seems to me that the arguments are patent and inherent in the questions that you
have asked and they indicate that it would not be helpful at this time to accede to
the suggestion [for an additional clerk]. […] I think that on balance the
disadvantages far outweigh the benefits.”51 The importance Diefenbaker – and his
ministers – attached to sound relations with Poland is highlighted by the discussion
over this otherwise routine and mundane administrative improvement. By this time,
relations with Poland were beginning to improve significantly, and jeopardizing
them (in order to alleviate an overworked clerk) was not an option when placed in
the broader context of Canadian-Polish and East-West relations. This example is
also testament to the importance high-level Canadian officials attributed to Poland
50
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and its global role and to Canadian officials’ perceptions of how Canada could impact
international Cold War relations, vis-à-vis Poland.
CANADA, POLAND, AND THE ICSC

Indochina (Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam) had been part of the French
colonial system since the 1880s. France’s difficulties during the Second World War,
however, provided an opportunity for the Viet Minh, a national independence
coalition, to take control in North Vietnam. French attempts to reassert their
colonial administration in Indochina in the post war period faced stiff resistance
from the Viet Minh until 1954, when a ceasefire and French withdrawal were finally
negotiated under the Geneva Agreements. Vietnam was divided into a Communist
North and a Western-backed South, while Laos and Cambodia were recognized as
independent states. The Agreements established three International Commissions
for Supervision and Control (ICSC), to support the ceasefire by supervising the flow
of refugees across territories and to facilitate a reunification election in Vietnam.
Each of the three Commissions was comprised of a western, communist, and
neutralist state, with Canada, Poland, and India asked to provide the respective
representatives. According to historian Adam Chapnick, “Although the Canadian
government had not been properly consulted, and there were strong doubts among
Holmes and his colleagues as to whether elections to unify Vietnam would ever be
held, there was little option but to agree to serve.” If Canada had said no, it was
believed this “would have risked re-igniting the conflict and perhaps even
expanding it.” Yet, “the opportunity to act as a bridge-builder throughout the period
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of the ceasefire,” explains Chapnick, “was enticing” to the Canadians.52 In the view of
John Holmes, assistant under-secretary of state for external affairs at the time, the
government had a “moral obligation” to “honestly and objectively” do its best in a
difficult situation to help Vietnam address its economic and political challenges.53
Despite the involvement of four successive Canadian governments, one overriding
concern governed policy: “how best the Canadian government might contribute to
stabilizing or restoring peace in the troubled countries of Southeast Asia.” 54
Canadian officials generally viewed the assignment with limited optimism but still
recognized the theoretical value in its cause.
Despite frequent diplomatic contact between the two nations while working
on the Commission, Canadian-Polish relations in the ICSC during this period were
not especially significant to shaping their bilateral relationship. In other words, the
Canadian government’s policy to foster closer relations with Poland does not appear
to have been meaningfully impacted by their respective roles on the ICSC. Evidence
does suggest, however, that frank and open discussion did occur between the two
nations within the context of the Commission. Holmes, for instance spoke with
Polish Chargé d’Affaires Mieczyslaw Sieradzki about the situation in Laos.55 “The
most interesting part,” according to Holmes,” came when our candour led us to
discuss each other’s motives and intentions.” Holmes explained that Sieradzki “was
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prepared to accept my assurances that we wanted Laos to be neutral,” but was
“skeptical about American intentions.” Holmes sympathized: “we are all disturbed
by the uninhibited comments of some Americans about Laos.” Holmes reassured
Sieradzki he was “prepared to agree that the Poles wanted Laos to be neutral and
the area to be freed of tension. However, I had to assume that the Chinese and North
Vietnamese intention was to establish a Communist government in Laos.” Sieradzki
then asked rhetorically “if I really thought that ‘they’ [China and North Vietnam]
were so completely unrealistic.” Sieradzki assured Holmes, “with every appearance
of conviction,” that the Chinese and North Vietnam wanted nothing more than a
neutral Laotian government. Not shying away from broader communist ideological
intentions, Sieradzki admitted that, “of course, the Communists believed ultimately
it was in the interest of all countries to have Communist governments but implied
this was a long-term aim which had no particular relevance to the immediate
situation in Laos.”56 This type of forthright and candid discussion suggests that even
within the context of the ICSC, a peace observation mission deliberately composed
on the basis of opposing Cold War alliances, Canadian and Polish officials were
sincere about maintaining open and truthful lines of communication.
In addition to candid discussion between national representatives, Canadian
officials were concerned over potential harm to Polish Commission members as a
consequence of the death of the Chief of the Vietnamese Liaison Mission to the
International Commission, Colonel Hoang Thuy Nam. In October 1961, an armed
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band captured Colonel Nam. While the Canadian Delegation sent a letter to the
Vietnamese Liaison Mission expressing sympathy and hopes for Colonel Nam’s safe
return, the Polish Commissioner refused to have the Commission do anything at all.
Soon after, Colonel Nam was found dead. Fearing reprisals, the Polish Commissioner
agreed to a joint statement by the International Commission to the Vietnamese
Liaison Mission expressing condolences.57
During the next month, a campaign in South Vietnam mounted against the
International Commission, and the Polish Delegation in particular, “trying to harass
by threats to force [the] Commission to move to Hanoi or even disband altogether.”
While Canadian officials did not want the Commission disbanded, for fear of
destabilizing the region, they expressed particular concern for the safety of the
Polish Delegation and even expressed a degree of solidarity: “The Commission
cannot keep silent indefinitely on treatment of Polish Delegation.”58 The Canadian
Delegation’s concern for their Polish counterparts did not go unnoticed. SSEA Green
explained to the Canadian Commissioner that the Polish Chargé d’Affaires Henryk
Laszcz “called on the department […] on instruction from Warsaw to express thanks
and appreciation of his government for [the] helpful attitude of [the] Canadian
Commissioner over current difficulties to Polish Delegation.” Green explained that
the DEA
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indeed regard difficulties of Polish Delegation as a matter of concern to
[the] whole Commission. […] It was the [the Canadian government’s]
hope that [the] Polish Delegations present difficulties would be
overcome and that [the] ICSC would then be able to get down to
business.59
One must be cautious about drawing firm conclusions regarding the impact of such
moments of “solidarity.” Certainly, Canadian officials in Ottawa and Indochina
wanted the Vietnam Commission to continue, since its disbandment, they believed,
could destabilize the entire region; altruism was not the sole driving force behind
Canadian sympathy. Yet, given the emergent effort to engender good political
relations with Poland, Canadian officials can also be seen to have acted in a manner
that was consistent with the objective of improved bilateral relations.
CONCLUSION

The growing consensus among Canadian officials that increased contacts
with satellite countries, particularly Poland, could soften the communist doctrinal
attitude and loosen ties with the USSR was a driving force behind Canadian foreign
relations with Poland. The 1956 Poznań rebellion ushered in a series of social,
political, and cultural reforms, and Poland’s increased liberalization was marked by
a sincere desire not to be dominated by Moscow. Poland strove to keep
international tensions as low as possible in order to retain its relative independence.
As a result, the Canadian government pursued an active, if cautious, Polish policy of
engagement in an attempt to expose it to Western modalities, all the while trying to
gingerly reduce Soviet hegemony over the country. Broadly speaking, Canada’s
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Polish policy mirrored Canada’s approach to Soviet and Yugoslav relations, despite
being limited in scope and maneuverability. Unlike Yugoslavia, Poland was firmly
entrenched in the Soviet bloc, so examining Canadian-Polish relations during this
decisive moment in Canadian foreign policy is enlightening because it reveals how
Canada approached a Communist European nation that had less flexibility in its
foreign policy.
Before truly effective diplomacy could be exercised, the issue of Poland’s
national art treasures, a continuous point of grievance between the two nations
since the conclusion of the Second World War, needed to be resolved. While the
issue was politically charged, neither country tried to use the issue for political
leverage, nor did either country use it to garner ideological propaganda points. This
exemplifies the shared agenda of both governments to minimize Cold War
hostilities. The issue of the Polish art treasures was kept relatively isolated within a
bilateral framework, even as Canadian-Polish relations were not always isolated
from their broader Cold War pressures and contexts.
Canada’s modest support for Poland’s Rapacki plan was very much played
out in an international context, and it highlights an interesting dynamic between
middle powers during the Cold War. Canada’s support, while mostly gestural,
speaks to the fact that occasionally cross-curtain middlepowerism nuanced
traditional Cold War loyalties. Relations steadily improved between the two
countries, and in April 1960, both nations raised their diplomatic missions to
embassy status, a testament to the fact that each nation was taking the other
seriously. Also played out in an international context was Canada and Poland’s
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position as two of three members of the ICSC. While inherently important to the
security and stability of Indochina, Canadian-Polish relations in the ICSC were not
overly significant in shaping their bilateral relationship. Despite this, certain
situations in Indochina allowed for open candid discussions between the two
nations, and, at times, a clear sense of solidarity between the two governments was
present, even if not for entirely altruistic reasons.
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Chapter 6

The Nexus of Middlepowerism: Canadian-Polish Economic & Cultural
Diplomacy
Canadian officials strove to cultivate closer relations in hopes of influencing
Poland not only through diplomatic channels but also through cultural and scientific
exchanges. Exchanges with Poland were not as prevalent as with Yugoslavia, for
three key reasons: political relations were strained by the lack of progress made on
the return of the art treasures until 1959, Canada did not have embassy status until
April 1960, and Polish officials were much less interested in nurturing cultural
cooperation with Western countries prior to the Polish October in 1956. By the time
the Progressive Conservative government came to office in mid-1957, few seeds had
been sown to advance this kind of relationship building, despite the existence of a
clear policy direction. The early 1960s, however, witnessed a slow, but steady,
increase in cultural cooperation and exchanges between Canada and Poland, which
helped bridge the Cold War divide and nurture closer relations generally.
Canadian-Polish commercial relations progressed steadily, relatively
speaking, and opened other important avenues for influencing developments in
Eastern Europe. The sale of wheat to Poland and Canadian participation in Poland’s
annual Poznań trade fair created opportunities to penetrate the Polish market,
engendered political goodwill, and became a consistent component of Canadian
economic statecraft in the region. Canada’s relations with Poland were politically
motivated, and the debate surrounding Poland’s accession to GATT was no different.
Ottawa’s support for Polish accession into GATT was tied closely to its role in the
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Cold War and East-West relations, and reflects its broader policy of engagement as a
means to attenuate connections with the Soviet Union. Moreover, this episode
highlights Canadian officials’ preference to use multilateral organizations as a
means to achieve their foreign policy objectives in Eastern Europe.
FIRST POINTS OF CULTURAL CONTACT

In early 1960, Poland created the new Department of Cultural and Scientific
Cooperation within the Foreign Ministry. Poland’s former ambassador to the UN,
Mieczyslaw Birecki, headed the new department. Its purpose was “to coordinate the
many existing programmes of international cultural and scientific cooperation being
carried on by Polish institutions, with a view to encouraging and augmenting these
where they were most urgently needed.”1 While the department was not directly
responsible for the administration of the programmes, it served as the first point of
contact for the reception of inquiries from beyond Poland. During a conversation,
Birecki informed Chargé d’Affaires in Poland, G. Hamilton Southam that the Polish
government had not been entirely satisfied at the rate with which international
exchanges and fellowship programmes had been developed in Poland and
expressed his hope that such programmes would be facilitated by the creation of his
department. According to Southam, Birecki “seemed most interested in augmenting
all forms of cultural exchange between our two countries.”2
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Some of the first points of contact between Poland and Canada were in the
realm of academic exchanges. Polish authorities were eager to engender closer ties
that would help advance areas of research and development, fields in which the
Poles appeared to be lacking. Fellowships in the arts, humanities, and social sciences
were awarded to Polish students, but progress was slow at first. In 1958, only one
fellowship was awarded to a Polish student, with just two more in 1959. In 1960,
five Polish candidates were submitted to the Canada Council for Non-Resident
Fellowships. The Canadian National Research Council also offered fellowships in the
field of natural sciences, but these were rare in the early 1960s.3 By 1962, however,
there were signs of progress as the Polish Academy of Science forwarded to the
National Research Council fourteen applications for fellowships under the informal
exchange program. Of special interest to Polish officials, and Birecki in particular,
were courses available for foreign students at the Nuclear Reactor School, which
was established by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited at Chalk River.4
In 1960, the Canadian Legation had also arranged with the Ministry of
Culture an exhibition in Poland of the sculptures of Canadian ‘Eskimos’ that had
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toured Yugoslavia in early 1959.5 Several Polish groups were also warmly welcomed
in Canada. For instance, the Warsaw Philharmonic Orchestra toured some Canadian
cities in 1961, and the Poznan Boys Choir, the Krakow Philharmonic Orchestra, and
the Mazowsze folk dance troupe, toured in 1963.6
Informing the Polish population about Canada – its geography, people, and
cultural life – was one way the government utilized cultural diplomacy to familiarize
Poles with as many aspects of Canadian living as possible. The overall objective,
while general and modest, was to minimize negative sentiment about democracy,
capitalism, and the West. In late 1962, a month-long exhibition took place at the
Szczecin Castle. It featured photographs taken in Canada by Polish photographer
Witold Chrominski. The exhibition of Canadian photographs generated considerable
interest. For example, an official of the Polish Association of Photographers
approached the Canadian embassy to discuss the possibility of a major exchange of
exhibitions, to take place sometime in 1964. It was hoped that a well-known
Canadian photographer would come to Warsaw. In return, a high-profile Polish
photographer would present their photographs in Montreal. Southam expressed
genuine interest in the proposed project, and the Polish Ministry of Culture also
accepted the project in principle.7
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Southam’s interest in the exchange of photograph exhibitions highlights the
government’s policy of bringing the two countries closer together through cultural
interactions. Film showings also became a regular staple of the Canadian embassy’s
cultural diplomacy agenda, and were considered by Southam to be “one of the most
important of their informational activities” in Poland. In a 1963 report to External
Affairs, Southam lamented that attendance at their film showings from October to
December was less than 20,000, “which is about half the figures for the first two
quarters of [1962].” The reason for the decline in viewers, he explained, “lies in the
fact that we have had on many occasions to refuse requests from borrowers for lack
of new titles.” Poles became increasingly interested in Canadian films. In 1962,
Canadian titles had been shown to more than 100,000 Poles, but the embassy had
only received seven new titles. Southam stressed, “This […] is clearly insufficient to
cope with the ever increasing demand for our films.” He requested that the DEA
(again) ask the Canadian Film Board to send more new films on subjects as the Arts,
wildlife, sports, recreation, geography, and science. 8 The importance that the
Canadian embassy attached to Canadian film is a fine example of how officials
perceived it was possible to indirectly influence Polish perceptions of Canada, and
1962,” January 24, 1963. As early as 1961, some officials in the Information Division appeared to
want their division to be more proactive in projecting Canada’s cultural image through exhibitions.
For instance, one internal memorandum stated, “What worries me is that the initiative behind
[existing Canadian exhibitions abroad] lies elsewhere, and we seem to be fully occupied in
cooperating in response to outside initiatives that we do not get around to taking initiatives
ourselves […]. When I talk about ‘outside’ initiatives, I mean outside the Information Division in
Ottawa; the exhibition in Poland will be the result of initiatives taken by Hamilton Southam and
Donald Buchanan, of which I fully approve; but the fact remains that neither the Embassy in Warsaw
nor the National Gallery has the same responsibility as we have in the Information Division for
development of cultural relations on a global basis.” LAC, MG31 E31, Marcel Cadieux Papers, Vol. 35,
File n/a, Memorandum N.F.M Berlie to Mr. Small, “Policy for Cultural Exhibitions,” 30 May 1961.
8 LAC, RG25, Vol. 7788, File 10496-40 part 1.2, Numbered Letter Canadian Embassy, Warsaw to
Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, “Information Report for the Quarter October-December,
1962,” January 24, 1963.
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the West in general. While subtle, it was believed that such exchanges and points of
contact could help bridge the divide between the East and West, which, for
ideological and propaganda purposes, had traditionally been portrayed as regions of
unambiguous contrast.
THE CBC-INTERNATIONAL SERVICE, POLISH DIVISION

Another important element to the Canadian mission’s informational
activities was the role played by the Canadian Broadcasting CorporationInternational Service (CBC-IS) Polish division. Similar to the lack of scholarship on
Canadian-Polish relations generally, little has been written on the CBC-IS; in fact,
there is no published, comprehensive account of the CBC-IS in Eastern Europe.
Bernard Hibbitts’s unpublished master’s thesis, “The CBC International Service as a
Psychological Instrument of Canadian Foreign Policy in the Cold War, 1948-1963,” is
an informative work and provides a good framework for understanding the role
played by the CBC-IS Polish division in Canada’s policy objectives in Poland. 9
Similar to diplomatic and commercial contacts, the CBC-IS Polish division was
politically motivated. One significant difference, when compared to previous years,
was apparent by the time Prime Minister John Diefenbaker’s government came to
power: radio commentary and political motivations were much more innocuous
than had been the case prior to 1956.
CBC-IS broadcasts before 1956 generally tended to reinforce traditional Cold
War divisions and highlighted the ideological global battles that raged between East
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and West. By 1956, however, events were aligning that encouraged depoliticized
programs, most notably the Twentieth Party Congress and Khrushchev’s
denunciation of Stalin’s cult of personality.10 This direction dovetailed with the
DEA’s growing awareness of the increasing heterogeneity of various Eastern bloc
states, and its policy of encouraging and promoting their autonomy. The
increasingly depoliticized agenda of the CBC-IS complemented the DEA’s objective
of luring various Eastern bloc nations into the Western orbit by building contacts
and making connections with Eastern European communities. In terms of agenda,
the CBC-IS’s role in cultural diplomacy was the distribution of information.11
Canadian officials understood that the Cold War increasingly could be
influenced not just by the superpowers, but also by the various secondary and
middle powers. Thus, officials believed Canada should promote friendlier relations,
not confrontation. As for the CBC-IS, diplomat Robert Ford maintained that
our immediate problem is to alter the ‘tone’ of our broadcasts to this
end. We need a directive which will call for a wholly different
atmosphere. […] It is in the sustained failure to observe [the principles
of absolute objectivity in the presentation of news] that the CBC has
permitted a tone which differs mournfully from the sobriety and dignity
of Canadian public expression as a whole.12
It was within this context that the DEA decided to formulate a new directive for
CBC-IS transmissions to the Soviet Union and its satellites. The directive did not
overlook political struggle and still regarded IS activity as part of a “coordinated
10
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political offensive of the Western world,” but aggressive rhetoric and the philosophy
of aggressive Cold War language was gone. 13 The 1956 directive declared,
“broadcasts should be restrained and moderate in approach, clear and vivid in
language and style, and should show respects for the foreign listener’s intelligence,
common sense, and national feelings.”14 The considerations guiding this direction
were twofold. First, moderation was deemed “more likely to attract the listeners’
attention and therefore more likely to be effective propaganda.” Second, moderation
would make it easier to suggest to Soviet authorities that “if they are serious in their
desire to promote good relations with Canada they should put an end to the
jamming of our short-wave broadcasts.”15 Jamming was a serious problem in many
countries behind the Iron Curtain. Under the new Gomulka government, however,
jamming Western broadcasts had stopped as early as November 1956. 16 In early
January 1960, the Soviet Union stopped jamming all BBC transmissions, but then
resumed the interruptions following the U2 incident in May 1960.17
In August 1960, a joint DEA-IS report was submitted to the Treasury Board,
with five major recommendations. Most relevant here was the report’s
recommendation to maintain all East European transmissions, even though they had
been considered for termination. Significantly, this was recommended at the drastic
13
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cost of eliminating the Italian, Dutch, Norwegian, Swedish, and Danish divisions.18
The decision to keep all East European transmissions highlights the importance of
Eastern Europe to Canadian foreign policy initiatives, not to mention, the belief that
the transmissions were generating at least some positive benefits.
By the time of the Diefenbaker government, the general policy of the CBC-IS
Polish division (as it was for the IS generally) was to increase knowledge and
understanding of Canada in all its aspects. 19 The Legation in Warsaw, too,
understood the importance of a moderate tone for the broadcasts, especially since
the Gomulka period “has seen a substantial modification made to previous policy of
attempting to isolate Poland from the rest of the world.” The Legation concurred
that transmissions should “be a complementary facet to our general information
work abroad, that they should assist in projecting an image of Canada and the
Canadian way of life, [and] that they should not be regarded or used as a specialized
weapon of psychological warfare.”20 The ways in which the CBC-IS Polish division
portrayed the “Canadian way of life” were numerous.
Some material was transmitted directly from the IS Polish division in
Montreal, while other material was sent directly by the CBC-IS to Polski Radio i
Telewizja (Polish Radio and Television), the national institution that managed all
18 Hibbitts, “The CBC International Service as a Psychological Instrument of Canadian Foreign
Policy,” 178. The other recommendations included the elimination of all Western European sections
except for English, French, and German; the reduction of the Latin American service; the
inauguration of an English and French beam to Africa; and the expansion of the shortwave service to
northern Canada.
19 LAC, RG25 G2, Vol. 2221, File 9901-BA-40, Memorandum Information Division to Political
Coordination Section, “CBC-IS Contact with Radio Warsaw,” May 23, 1958.
20 LAC, RG25 G2, Vol. 2221, File 9901-BA-40, Numbered Letter The Canadian Legation, Warsaw to
Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, “CBC-IS Broadcasts to Eastern Europe,” February 17,
1959.
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Polish radio and television stations. It was not until late 1958, however, that direct
contact was made between the CBC-IS Polish division and Polish radio agencies.
Prior to 1958, transcriptions were sent by the CBC-IS to various nations through the
DEA’s Political Coordination Section. In mid-1958, the Political Coordination Section
inquired with Information Division about sending the senior announcer-producer of
the Polish section, Mr. P. Sytpniewski, to Poland. During his visit, it was hoped that
he would have unofficial and informal discussions with Radio Warsaw. 21 The
Information Division responded by asserting that
in the case of Poland we may now be in a position to make progress
towards achieving something approaching normal information activity.
[…] The low level of activity is partially our responsibility in that we do
not have enough suitable information material for Poland. This is slowly
being remedied by the production of Polish language films and a large
exhibit in Poznan.
It was argued that direct contact between the CBC-IS and Poland would be highly
satisfactory. In other countries where this was the case, the Information Division
reported seeing notable results as it puts “experts in touch with experts without the
bureaucratic filter.” The memo concluded, “in view of the easing information
situation in Poland, our desire to increase Canadian information there, but our
limited means of accomplishing this, we are of the opinion that advantage should be
taken of Mr. Sypniewski’s visit to Poland to initiate informal and unofficial liaison
with Radio Warsaw.”22
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Sypniewski’s informal discussions with Radio Warsaw led to Poland’s official
request that Polish radio organizations establish direct contact with CBC-IS Polish
division. It was hoped Canada would supply Canadian music transcriptions and
other requests of a similar nature. Under-Secretary Watkins was pleased with these
developments and expressed his satisfaction to the director of CBC-IS, C.R. Delafield,
directly:
The International Service is to be warmly congratulated on this
commendable initiative in the field of the projection of Canada in
Eastern Europe. Indeed, the extension of this kind of cultural contact is
highly desirable, and we wish not only to agree to the means of contact
discussed above, but also to provide all possible assistance and
encouragement in this regard.23
The tape recordings were passed from Delafield directly to Eliza Przastkowa, Head
of International Relations of Polski Radio i Telewizja. As for music transcriptions,
CBC-IS sent a wide variety of selections to Poland, including vocal pieces by
Jacqueline Francois and Dora Kalincwna,24 recitals of the week, performances by the
Boys’ and Men’s Choir of the Philharmonic Society of Poznan,25 and Choral Music of
the Polish Renaissance and Jazz Jamboree.26
A variety of other material was sent to Radio Warsaw, including general
news pertinent to Canada and Poland, commentary on films and film festivals, book
reviews, and sports news. For instance, a short news piece was dedicated to the
23
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Polish ship “BATORY”, which made its fiftieth trip to Canada. During a five-year
period (1957-1962), it brought with it roughly fifty thousand passengers. Members
from the CBC-IS Polish division interviewed the skipper and other passengers
aboard.27 Inherent in the news piece was the obvious cooperation between the two
nations.
Hockey was also a frequently covered topic. In 1962, Delafield sent a
program that presented “a true picture of what is hockey in Canada today.” Delafield
also took it upon himself to remind Przastkowa that the Canadian “hockey season
opens here about the tenth of October.”28 The embassy in Warsaw encouraged
Ottawa to continue to send material on hockey. The embassy reported that one item
of particular interest to Poles is “Canadian participation in the World Hockey
Championships [coming up in] Stockholm […] which has evoked a lively interest
here.”29 As a result, Delafield sent commentary on the hockey team called the Trail
“Smoke Easters” (from Trail, British Columbia), who were representing Canada in
the upcoming World Amateur Hockey Championship. “We think that it will be of
interest to Polish listeners as Poland is one of the participants of that tournament
which will take place in March,”30 commented Delafield. The CBC-IS also began to
keep Polish listeners updated with a once-a-month report from the National Hockey
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League.31 Commentary on other sports, like the International Automobile Grand Prix
of Canada,32 and those less conventional, like the Canadian Soaring Championships,
were also sent to Poland. This event seemed pertinent since the only Pole to
participate, Adam Witek, placed second, flying a glider of Polish construction.33 This
type of information, it was hoped, would have modestly contributed to projecting
the image of Canada in Communist Eastern Europe, an initiative supported by the
DEA.
The CBC-IS also tried to keep Poles informed on the exchange of visits
between the Polish Academy of Science and Canada’s National Research Council. In
1962, a three-man delegation of Canadian scientists arrived in Warsaw for a twoweek tour of Polish universities and research centres. Just months earlier, a
delegation of Polish scientists had similarly visited Canada. The transcription
contained a discussion on the National Research Council, as well as interviews with
scientists from both delegations.34
Most of the material CBC-IS sent to Poland had some kind of Polish
association. As a result, an image of Canada was modestly projected onto Poland.
The cultural realm was an ideal crossroads where ideological barriers could be
breached, or simply omitted from the commentary altogether. The material sent by
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the CBC-IS often complemented various cultural exchanges taking place between the
two countries, which in turn reinforced the importance of such exchanges.
POLISH LETTERS TO THE CBC-IS

“This is Canada calling” were the words uttered at the beginning of each
broadcast from Montreal to Poland. Yet, the Polish division was not simply an
isolated, one-way broadcasting entity sending transmissions across the Atlantic. In
fact, it received a number of letters from Polish listeners. These letters allow the
history of Canadian-Polish relations to be viewed through the window of the CBC-IS
Polish division. The letters not only attest to the fact that Poles were actually
listening, but they also suggest that Canadian broadcasting served a broader,
positive political purpose. Additionally, examining the letters sent by Poles gives a
human face to an otherwise impersonal government policy. In 1959, the Polish
Section surveyed 108 letters they received from listeners; 99 came directly from
Poland.
Many of the letters asked the CBC-IS Polish division for help finding relatives
or some other type of assistance. For instance, one listener requested that the Polish
division send birthday wishes to a brother living in Canada. The broadcast was
heard when the listener from Warsaw reported: “Many sincere thanks for your kind
help. I have learned that my brother has heard over the radio both the birthday
greetings and the music played especially for him.” Others requested help learning
English. A listener from Zarnow inquired, “encouraged by your broadcasts, I would
like to ask [… if someone could] send me regularly a Canadian English-language
weekly or monthly. I would very much appreciate a geographical magazine.” A
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request for English textbooks came from a listener in Gryfice who lamented,
“English books are difficult to obtain in Poland […] contrary to Russian textbooks,
which are plentiful on the market, piled up high in the book store, because nobody
wants to buy them.”
Other letters requested suitable pen pals. The survey indicated, “there are a
growing number of listeners who wish to correspond with Canadians of Polish
origin and others. The majority of them are young people and they often send their
letters in English.” A young collage woman from Skrzyszow stated, “I would like to
correspond with a girl aged 15 or 16. I am interested in painting, folk songs and
dance, also literatures. I also collect picture postcards.” A young girl from Bydgoszcz
appealed to the Polish section to connect her with Canadians of similar age: “I would
like to make friends, through letters, with girls and boys in grade 6 and 7. I would
appreciate it if you would refer my letter to a scout organization and tell them I
would like them to write to me in Poland.”
Other letters simply expressed their general gratitude for the broadcasts.
One listener from Bedzin stated, “Thank you in the name of all Poles for your fine
broadcasts, for your friendliness and your willingness to help.” Another listener
from Cracow expressed her satisfaction: “Since April I have been listening regularly
to Radio Canada Polish language broadcasts and find them most interesting. I know
Canada only from my school lessons. Nevertheless, books like Jules Verne’s Volcano
d’Or and Montgomery’s Anne of Green Gables left an impression, which remain to
this day.” A man from Dabrowka said, “Your constant listeners from Bialystock
province sends warmest greetings from Poland. […] Your broadcasts are very
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popular with us in Poland.” A fourth-year economic student from Poznan had this to
say about the broadcasts:
Quite by chance, I came across the Canadian broadcast, and then and
there our ‘acquaintance’ developed. Many of my friends, too, are
listening to your voice from Canada. […] we would like to hear a lot
about Canada and its life – this is what we like very much and we find a
great deal of it in the interviews, which are, perhaps, the most
interesting feature. […] Sometime […] we come across political
commentary – your commentary – which saves us reading the eternally
monotonous Polish Press, our own press. Tell us as much as you can
how things are in Canada, for we know perfectly well what is going on
here.35
Caution must be exercised when assessing the importance of these letters from
Polish listeners, and their significance should be kept within context. While it is
certainly difficult to assess the precise impact of the CBC-IS’s broadcasts on
Canadian-Polish relations, it is clear that the transcriptions and broadcasts
complemented official Canadian policy by cultivating closer ties on various fronts.
The 1956 directive to reduce, or eliminate altogether, Cold War-style rhetoric within
transmissions and transcriptions and fostering a more moderate and respectful
“tone,” was carried out under the Progressive Conservative government. Indeed, the
work carried out by the CBC-IS Polish division during the Diefenbaker government
helps to reinforce the notion that the 1957-1963 period was a decisive moment in
Canada’s foreign policy in Eastern Europe. Moreover, the broadcasts are meaningful
in that they indicate the Polish division’s work seemed to be having a positive
impact on at least some of the Polish population. Significantly, these letters highlight
the culmination of Canada’s Polish policy “on the ground” or “in the trenches,” so to
35
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speak. They demonstrate the effectiveness of one facet of Canada’s Polish policy,
nurturing closer binational ties; the CBC-IS Polish division certainly helped nudge
this goal along.
In light of Poland’s nascent policy goal of fostering an independent foreign
policy position separate from direct Soviet oversight, Canadian officials sought to
nurture such aspirations by expanding cooperation in places other than the
traditional political-diplomatic realm. Expanding cultural contacts was one piece of
Canada’s policy equation that helped project an image of Canada in Poland, thus
exposing it to Canadian social and cultural modalities. Canada’s cultural diplomacy
with Poland during this time was slow, but it steadily improved over the course of
the PC government’s time in office, partly due to the less ideologically charged
atmosphere. While cultural exchanges developed at a leisurely pace, CanadianPolish commercial relations progressed steadily, relatively speaking, and Poland
provided Canada a market behind the Iron Curtain that could prove beneficial,
particularly to Canadian farmers.
CANADIAN TRADE FAIRS IN POLAND

Poland’s limited trade with Canada in the immediate postwar period was
impeded by disagreements over the Canadian customs valuation of Polish imports.36
During the St. Laurent government, however, Canada and Poland resolved the issue,
36 Historian Aloysius Balawyder states, “On the one hand, Poland claimed that Canada, by imposing a
50 percent customs charge on such Polish exports as glassware and Christmas tree ornaments, was
in violation of the most-favoured-nations treatment accorded Poland in the commercial treaty of
1935. Canada, on the other hand, accused Poland of dumping, of offering its goods to Canadian
buyers at prices far below the world trade market prices. Since the Polish government continued to
refuse to permit Canadian officials to ascertain the value of Polish goods, Canada maintained that its
policy of imposing a custom charge was legal.” Aloysius Balawyder, The Maple Leaf and the White
Eagle: Canadian-Polish Relations, 1918-1978 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 93.
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when Canadian officials recognized that “the Gomulka government was in difficult
times” and that it “was trying to maintain some degree of independence from the
USSR and anything Canada could do to help would be useful.”

37

Such

accommodationist tactics began under the Liberal government would continue once
the Progressive Conservatives came to office.
Given the importance of Poland as an avenue for challenging Soviet
hegemony in Eastern Europe, Canadian officials promoted participation in the
annual Poznań International Trade Fair. A Canadian presence could showcase
Canadian goods and provide an effective means of penetrating the Polish market.
The DEA’s European Division argued that participation in Eastern European trade
fairs could not only improve trade relations, but also foster political goodwill.38
Beginning in 1957, Canadian exhibitions became a regular staple at Poznań,
highlighting “one or two of [Canada’s] leading export industries” that might prove
enticing to the Poles. While the general purpose of the pavilion was to promote
“trade as a vehicle for information about Canada,” immediate commercial sales did
occasionally occur. 39 For instance, during the 1959 fair, the Polish Foreign Trade
Enterprise Varimex purchased the Gammacell 220 from Atomic Energy of Canada.
The machine, used for checking the reactions of various materials to the effect of
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gamma rays, had direct application in the plastics producing industry.40 While the
commercial deals reached at Poznań were not especially lucrative, they do suggest
Canada’s awareness that such a venue might serve as a conduit for cultivating
favourable trade relations with Poland in the future.
Serving as Canadian chargé d’affaires during the XXVIII International Trade
Fair in Poznań in 1959, Southam conveyed Canadian interest in the event in the
Polish Journal, Polska Gazeta Targowa. Southam stated,
Although the volume of trade between Poland and Canada is not
large in relation to the total volume of trade of either country, the
Canadian Government fully appreciates the importance of its
development. In order to promote trade, officials of the Canadian
Legation in Warsaw are ready at any time to put Polish firms and
trading organizations in touch with Canadian firms, and vice versa, in
an effort to find markets for each country’s products.
For the past three years, the Canadian Government has
participated in the Poznan International Trade Fair to encourage trade
further. From a modest beginning in 1957 we entered a larger exhibit in
1958 and this year’s exhibit of Canadian industrial products is much
more comprehensive and displays a cross-section of products from a
number of important Canadian industries.41
It is true, outside the realm of wheat and barley, commercial sales between the two
nations were modest at best. Even the sale of Canadian wheat to Poland was not
especially striking when compared to sales elsewhere. But the significance lies less
in the quantity of wheat sold and more in the political implications of such deals.
Canadian participation in the Poznań Trade Fairs supported a key policy objective:
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bringing the two nations closer together on various fronts. The DEA’s European
Division explicitly explained the importance of Canada’s participation at trade fairs
in Eastern European countries. They were, in the view of the Division, “one of the
only means our missions there have of doing public relations work for Canada. Our
participation at [the fairs] is therefore of great interest to us provided our
informational activities are not hamstrung.”42 This acknowledgment reinforces the
notion that Canadian participation in trade fairs was more political than commercial
in nature and that officials deliberately pursued various avenues to cultivate closer
relations with Poland.

CANADIAN-POLISH TRADE RELATIONS

In his inaugural address on October 20, 1956 to the Plenary Session of the
Sejm, 43 Wladyslaw Gomulka criticized the five-year plan (1956-1961), which
prioritized industrialization and the development of heavy industry. He recognized
there was a great gap in production between the state farms and the co-operative
and private farms. While making clear his determination to develop home
industries, Gomulka regretfully admitted that Poland had no choice but to buy
grain.44 Gomulka had reason for concern. From the early 1950s until 1956, Polish
agricultural productivity had declined at an alarming rate; communist policies
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transformed Poland from an important food exporter to a desperate food
importer.45
This helps to explain why, as early as 1954, the Polish government applied to
Canada for credit purchases similar to those arranged with Yugoslavia; however,
Poland’s request was initially refused. 46 At the time, Liberal Minister of Trade and
Commerce C.D. Howe justified the decision stating, “no monies have been voted by
Parliament for the extension of such credits,” and the Yugoslav sale was indirectly
explained away by stating that “only under very special circumstances, and only on
very few occasions, had the facilities of the Export Credit Corporation been used to
facilitate the extension of private credit for wheat purchases.” 47 By mid-1955,
however, Howe modified his resistance to credit sales to Poland, and the Canadian
Wheat Board sold it 250,000 tons of wheat on the basis of fifteen percent cash with
a balance payable within one year.48
In January 1957, just months before the end of the St. Laurent government,
Polish officials approached the Canadian Legation in Warsaw to discuss Poland’s
balance owing on a contract of wheat purchases. Under authority of Section 21 of
the Export Credits Insurance Act, the Canadian government had guaranteed sales of
wheat to Poland totaling $22 million; $12.5 million remained to be paid. The Polish
government asked for the remaining balance to be deferred for one year. If Canada
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provided Poland with a two-year credit, the Poles indicated they “‘would give
Canada preference over other suppliers on future wheat purchases.’” The Minister
of Trade and Commerce recommended that “agreement be given in principle to a
deferment to Poland up to one year on existing credits only on the proviso that
Poland make additional purchases of grain from Canada.”49 The terms were agreed
to, and unlike the 1955-56 agreement, which stipulated Poland pay fifteen percent
immediately with the remaining balance paid over one year, the new agreement was
for ten percent, with the remaining to be paid over three years. “The difference is
not a significant factor in risk calculation,” explained the Minister of Trade and
Commerce, but the Poles “regard the 90% credit as important.” The agreement was
also new insofar as it “may set a new pattern for future sales of grain under export
credit insurance […] The essential difference from previous arrangements is the
commitment by the recipient countries to guarantee purchases not only for the
immediate crop year, but for a year ahead.” 50 Indeed, this marked the first ever
extended credit sale authorized by the federal government, and became known as
“Polish Credit terms.”51 Just over a month later, Polish negotiators requested an
additional 150,000 tons of wheat – in addition to the existing 150,000 tons – be
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added to the purchase of the current crop year. 52 The Canadian government
agreed.53
While Howe’s initial reluctance to revise Polish credit terms was clearly
reversed, leading to increased wheat sales to Poland in the final years and months of
the Liberal government, this may have proved to be too little and too late to address
the domestic political consequences of the financial pressures confronting Canadian
Prairie farmers. They faced an international wheat market undermined by American
wheat surpluses that were partly disposed of through gifts of international aid.54 In
fact, shortly after Gomulka's politburo election as first secretary, American
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles instructed the American ambassador in
Warsaw to inform the new government that the United States was studying
possibilities of assistance. According to historian Robert Mark Spaulding, seven
months of negotiations followed that produced an economic agreement between the
two countries, “the central element of which was ninety-five million dollars in US
economic aid to Poland. Sixty-five million dollars of the package was agricultural aid
under the terms of PL 480. Half of that amount, thirty-two million dollars, was longterm credit for immediate Polish purchases of five hundred thousand metric tons of
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US grain.”55 The US government, too, saw political value in agricultural aid, and was
willing to upset even its closest allies. Spaulding argues, “The US government was so
firmly attached to these views regarding the role of agricultural aid to Poland that
they refused to heed Canadian commercial objections to US plans.” Spaulding
succinctly summarizes Canadian-American tensions:
According to [American] Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Economic
Affairs C. Douglas Dillon, “the Canadians object vigorously, claiming that
any wheat shipment on a concessional or long-term credit basis will hurt
future Canadian sales.” Although the Americans made several high-level
approaches to the Canadian government in an effort to resolve these
differences, the Department could not convince the Canadians to drop
their objections. In a very rare break with its Canadian allies, the State
Department “determined that it is necessary to proceed with
undertakings to supply wheat to Poland despite Canada's position in the
matter.” […] [L]arge-scale Polish imports produced an unusually bitter
split among North American allies that happened also to be commercial
rivals in agriculture.56
While Canadian and American policy objectives coincided, in that they each saw the
political benefits of “agricultural statecraft,” in this instance the consequence was a
bitter commercial rivalry. This highlights the fact that Cold War alliances were not
impervious to serious tension when national self-interests were at stake.
ACCOMMODATING POLISH AGRICULTURAL NEEDS

Once Diefenbaker became Prime Minister, historian Michael Hart states,
“Prairie wheat farmers had reason to believe that someone in Ottawa would pay
attention to their problems.” Silos in the West were still filled with surplus wheat, a
situation worsened by the American PL 480 program that continued to undercut
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Canadian sales everywhere, through concessional or dumped sales. According to
Hart, “the world glut was driving prices to levels that seriously reduced Prairie
incomes. […] The Liberals had lost all but six seats on the Prairies. Now Diefenbaker
had to deliver.”57 Consequently, accommodationist tactics with communist Eastern
Europe continued under the Diefenbaker government. As has been shown in
previous chapters, these same pressures had contributed to the development of the
USSR and Yugoslavia trade deals. Ultimately, Canada’s greatest commercial success
with Poland would prove to be in the area of grain exports. Hoping to find markets
in Eastern Europe, Canada remained eager to sell its surplus wheat to Poland in
spite of America’s PL 480 program.
As of the late 1950s, selling wheat under credit agreements was of interest to
a limited number of countries, which had found short-term credit desirable because
of foreign exchange and other financial considerations.58 Positive results from the
sales to Poland led Canadian officials to further promote export of wheat to the
Communist nation. Rapid growth in Poland’s population, the industrialization of its
economy, and the gradual improvement of its standard of living were factors that
ensured a steady market for Canadian grains in Poland.59 In a memorandum to
Cabinet, Minister of Trade and Commerce Gordon Churchill supported selling
Canadian wheat to Poland and cited the DEA’s perception of the importance of the
broader political context in helping Poland during times of internal struggles:
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The Department of External Affairs reports that on October 18th (1959)
in an atmosphere of crisis the Polish Government announced an increase
of 25 percent in the price of meat, reflecting a sharp deterioration in the
food supply situation. This is a source of popular discontent, and on the
opposite side an opportunity to be exploited by Stalinists who favour
greater central control of the economy. […] In the Canadian view, there is
no doubt that the Gomulka regime is the best Polish Government the
West can hope for in present circumstances and for the foreseeable
future and it is in the West’s interest to assist this regime to maintain
stability.60
In other words, the sale of Canadian wheat to Poland was advantageous from both
commercial and political points of view, aligning as it did with the government’s
policy of helping to promote Polish stability as a means to strengthen its autonomy
within Eastern Europe. Said differently, the wheat sales were both domestic politics
with a ‘foreign policy hat on’ and were motivated by international policy initiatives.
As Spaulding aptly states, the importance of agricultural strategies “underscores the
power of agricultural factors within the larger set of political and economic relations
between Poland and the West.”61
In 1961, Polish representatives approached officials from the Departments of
Trade and Commerce and Agriculture and indicated they wished to purchase
300,000 tons of wheat under credit arrangements.62 They stated that Poland wanted
to increase trade with Canada in order “to reduce its dependency for imported
wheat requirements on the USSR and the USA.”63 Years prior in 1959, however,
Polish authorities were told the Canadian government wanted a ceiling of
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approximately $40 million, at any one time, on total export insurance coverage. As
of September 1961, Canada’s Export Credit liability for previous grain shipments to
Poland amounted to $38.9 million. Given that the maximum estimated insurance
coverage required for the purchase of 300,000 tons of wheat was an additional $25
million, the export insurance coverage for Poland would total approximately $64
million, substantially higher than the $40 million ceiling agreed to in 1959. Despite
this, both the Departments of Trade and Commerce and Agriculture recommended
that “Poland be granted the request given its excellent record with respect to
payments against previous shipments.”64 DEA officials also supported this position,
despite suggestions then being advanced in NATO for the potential use of economic
sanctions on bloc countries if access to Berlin was further threatened. It was
recognized “the sale of wheat on credit at this time to a Soviet bloc destination might
appear inconsistent” with potential NATO policy.65 Nevertheless, DEA officials felt
“recent developments should not stand in the way of this sale.”66 Cabinet made no
immediate decision.
In the meantime, Polish ambassador, Zygfryd Wolniak met with Diefenbaker
to discuss Canadian-Polish trade relations, among other things. Ambassador
Wolniak stressed Poland’s appreciation that the credit balance would exceed the
$40 million ceiling, and “according to Poland’s traditional record, due payments
would follow in due times.”67 Diefenbaker explained that the recommendations of
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the Ministers of Trade and Commerce and Agriculture were “favourable,” and that
Cabinet would consider the question soon.68 Before Wolniak had the opportunity to
write Diefenbaker expressing his gratitude for their cordial discussion, Cabinet met
and approved further credit sales to Poland.69 The 1961 Canadian-Polish wheat
agreement confirms Canada was pragmatic in its business relations with Poland.
Additionally, it is an example of Canadian independence within the broader NATO
alliance, demonstrating how officials in External Affairs, Trade and Commerce,
Agriculture, and the Prime Minister were willing to resist potential NATO alliance
policies. Officials not only understood that Poland was a good market for surplus
wheat, but also that such deals proved politically advantageous on the domestic
front.
THE CANADIAN WHEAT BOARD VISITS POLAND

Having become an important component of Canada’s export market to the
Communist world, in April 1962 the Canadian Wheat Board sent a two-man team to
Poland to investigate and analyze the Polish agricultural economy. While the task of
Mr. C.C. Boxer, Canada’s European representative of the Board, was to engage in
sales talks with the proper Polish authorities, Adolf Presber, a Canadian official of
the Board’s Technical Services and Market Research Department, was to “go beyond
the normal points of contact for foreign sales organizations,” by meeting “officials
and organizations not directly involved in the grain importing business, but
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representing that part of the country’s productive and distributive system which is
using grain, and especially wheat, as a raw material for industrial food processing.”
As Presber explained in his report on the mission to Poland, “No previous attempt
had been made to get acquainted with intermediate or end-users of Canadian wheat
in Poland.” In fact, officials were initially skeptical about whether the mission would
be well received by Polish authorities. Their skepticism was quickly dispelled. As it
turned out,
the cordiality with which the mission was actually received and the
detailed and drawn-out execution of the programme exceeded [Boxer
and Presber’s] most optimistic expectations. […] The hosts’ immense
interest in technical details of Canadian grain handling and processing
was only surpassed by their pride in their own work, and their
eagerness for comments regarding it. […] There was a marked tendency
to compare the information [Presber] could provide with their
knowledge of Russian methods and of technical progress in that
country.
From the Polish perspective, the mission was valuable as it provided insight from
one of the world’s leading agricultural experts. This was particularly important
since, as Presber explained, “Poland [is in] the throes of industrial expansion, which
is pushing her towards a place with the league of modern industrial states, but
experiencing the agonies of lagging progress in agricultural development.” As a
result of their visit, the mission made a few suggestions and voiced some
apprehensions:
[The Wheat Board and Canadian government] should try and do more
to make known to interested [Polish] government officials and technical
people the nature of the foundations on which the reputation of our
wheat has been established, and try to see that these groups receive the
reports on the quality of Canadian shipments, regularly published by
the Grain Research Laboratory. The Poles are very eager for further
exchanges of technical experience and data. It was quite evident […]
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that their admiration for Canadian quality wheat found its match in
their conviction of Russia’s lead in technical progress. Such a conviction
could have detrimental consequences for Canada if the time comes
when Russia is able to improve her export volume and grading
programmes. Continuous proof of the West’s advances in milling and
baking science might easily be a factor in persuading Poland to adhere
to its policy of ‘two-source’ supply, even when such policy is no longer
essential.70
From the mission, it was clear that Polish officials admired Canadian agricultural
techniques and products. The hope was to maintain these positive impressions in
the face of Soviet advances in agricultural techniques. Accommodating the Poles in
the area of wheat sales and working closely with them to help improve their
utilization of imported Canadian wheat complemented the government’s broader
policy objective of supporting Poland’s drive toward self-sufficiency and greater
international autonomy. Additionally, it showcased the triumphs of Western
industrial innovations in the agricultural industry. The Canadian embassy in Poland
was a proponent of the visit and was responsible for preparing the mission’s entire
programme.71
The Wheat Board’s mission undoubtedly set a precedent for how to do
business in Eastern Europe. Shortly after the visit, an article was published by the
Department of Trade and Commerce’s periodical Foreign Trade titled, “Trading with
Eastern Europe.” The article explained to readers that foreign trade in these
countries was conducted as a state monopoly, with trading carried out by a small
group of state-owned and operated foreign trade enterprises, comparable in scope
70
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and operation to substantial import/export firms in Canada. When dealing with the
foreign trade enterprises, the article explained,
personal contact is by far the most effective method of introducing a
new product. When discussing business […] a number of copies of trade
literature, specifications and price lists should be made available […] It
is sometimes possible for Canadian businessmen to achieve direct
contact not only with the trade enterprise but also with the end-users;
in this way, technical salesmanship can be made more effective.72
The personal contact and technical salesmanship of Boxer and Presber’s visit
certainly proved valuable to Canada’s Wheat Board. The Poles were altogether
impressed with the Canadians’ knowledge and willingness to engage in technical
discussions.
In September 1964, the Canadian Wheat Board sent another two-man
mission to Poland, this time for a full week. In their 1964 report, Adolf Presber (who
went to Poland on the 1962 mission) and A. Kubicek stated, “the outstanding feature
of our one weeks stay in the country was the overwhelming hospitality with which
we were received by government officials, traders, millers, bakers, and, indeed,
everybody concerned with our visit.” As a result of their visit, they recommended
Poland be included in the Boards’ 1965 Mission program. The report explained,
the use of Canadian wheat has become part of the established order for
mills and bakeries and we are convinced that regardless of further
development of the economy this state of affairs is not likely to change
[…]. As far as our competitors are concerned we found that French
wheat was considered generally unreliable in quality […] With regard to
Russia, Poland’s traditional supplier of cereals, our hosts were
manifestly uncertain as to whether they could expect a partial
restoration of the usual pattern of imports.
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Presber and Kubicek’s recognition of Canadian wheat as part of the “established
order” in Poland is in stark contrast to the 1962 report and alleviated some of the
earlier 1962 mission’s concerns over the potential improvement of Russia’s export
problems and grading programmes. According to their report, regardless of Soviet
improvements, Poland intended to continue buying Canadian wheat because of its
reliability and quality.
Similar to the Board’s 1962 report, in 1964 Presber and Kubicek explained
that the Poles made very evident their desire to establish closer relations with
technical people, and the Canadian officials recommended that the regular
publications of the Wheat Board and of the Board of Grain Commissioners be made
available to a number of Polish scientific institutions and flour mills. They claimed,
“our own welcome would not have been worn out had we extended our stay by
another two weeks, and were told time and again that visits such as ours should
continue on a regular basis.”73 The experience and expertise provided to Polish
officials and others concerned with the visit by the Canadian mission is a clear sign
of bilateral cooperation that positively buttressed both commercial and political
aspects of Canada and Poland’s relationship. As Canada sought new markets for its
wheat – particularly in the face of America’s PL 480 program – Poland became a
steady market for wheat export, albeit smaller than their relatively new Soviet and
Chinese customers.74
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The wheat sales to Poland that took place from the 1956 to 1962, which were
marked by annual short-term individual contracts, ultimately generated a series of
long-term grain agreements between the two countries, with the first negotiated in
1963. As a result, in 1964, Canada sold to Poland the largest amount of wheat
bushels to date – over $55 million worth – an amount that would not be surpassed
until 1976, when Canada sold over $63 million in wheat to Poland. Subsequent longterm grain agreements were signed in 1966, 1972, 1977, and 1979.75
Credit is given to Alvin Hamilton, Diefenbaker’s Minister of Agriculture from
1960 to 1963, for finding new markets for Canadian wheat. With his Cabinet
appointment, Hamilton assumed responsibility for the Wheat Board, which,
according to one historian, marked a breakthrough for Canadian wheat sales, since
the minister was willing to be “unconventional” and gave “officials in the Wheat
Board room to try new approaches”76 While attention is usually focused on Canada’s
wheat deals with the People’s Republic of China and the USSR during the 1960s,
wheat sales to other Eastern European Communist nations should not be
overlooked; their importance is particularly noteworthy when placed in the broader
context of Canada’s general policy toward Communist Europe.
While the Tories survived the 1962 election with a minority government,
Canadians voted in a Liberal minority government the following April. Lester B.
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Pearson’s new government was held to a minority thanks largely to Diefenbaker’s
strong support in the Prairies. Somewhat ironically, at least given the loyal support
of the prairie demographic for Conservative agricultural policy, even more wheat
was then sold under the Liberal government in subsequent years. Yet, the Tories
continued to take credit for the breakthrough in wheat sales,77 and arguably they
were justified in doing so.
CANADA, POLAND, AND GATT

Canadian-Polish wheat deals were carried out bilaterally, and this continued
until Poland was admitted into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
in 1967. Poland’s road into GATT was quite long, but the Diefenbaker government
had supported Poland during its various stages of membership and since it first
announced its desire to participate in the multilateral trading organization in 1958.
The Canadian government’s support for Poland’s participation in what was, to that
point in time, primarily a Western economic club, was motivated by both economic
and political objectives. Essentially, the debate surrounding Poland’s accession to
GATT was tied closely to its role in the Cold War and East-West relations, and
Ottawa’s support of Poland’s accession reflects its broader policy of luring in the
Poles as a means of attenuating their connection to the Soviet Union. Moreover, it
highlights Canadian officials’ desire to use multilateral organizations as a means of
buttressing its policy objectives for Eastern Europe.
In April 1958, Poland announced its desire to join GATT. If accepted, it was to
be the first Communist nation to join the organization since its inception in 1947.
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Czechoslovakia, while a member, was not Communist when it participated in the
organization of GATT.78 Since its inception, many GATT members wished to keep the
organization predominantly Western. But as historian Francine McKenzie explains,
“the desirability of keeping Communist countries out of GATT became a more
complex and pressing question in the late 1950s when Poland, Romania, Hungary,
and Yugoslavia all applied to join.”79 The move by Poland, Hungary, and Romania to
join GATT was especially politically charged given they were also founding members
of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), established by Stalin in 1949
as a means to tighten Soviet control over the satellites.80 As a result, accession into
GATT by communist nations could have repercussions on the CMEA, causing it to
loose strategic value. Considering Communist applications to enter GATT were
multidimensional, McKenzie explains some of the perplexities:
At one level, the contracting parties considered these applications in
terms of commercial compatibility with the GATT. How could countries
without a tariff structure or a free market join GATT? How could they
participate in trade negotiations that had hitherto primarily involved
the lowering of tariff barriers? Making a decision about their
admissibility based on GATT rules alone would have led to a fairly
straightforward refusal despite GATT provisions for state trading
countries.81

78

New York Times, “Poland Asks GATT Admission, Posing Problems for Trade ‘Club’”, 2 April 1958.
Francine McKenzie, “GATT and the Cold War: Accession Debates, Institutional Development, and
the Western Alliance, 1947 – 1959.” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 10, No. 3., (Summer 2008), 97.
80 Francine McKenzie states that early US assessment had predicted that “jolting” the CMEA would
weaken Soviet dominance and that “the repercussions are bound to be felt in the political, military,
and cultural spheres.” See, f.n. 79, FRUS, Vol. V, p. 53, Report to the President by the National Security
Council, “United States Policy toward the Soviet Satellite States in Eastern Europe,” December 8,
1949, in McKenzie, “GATT and the Cold War,” 97.
81 McKenzie, “GATT and the Cold War,” 97-98.
79

287
Economic considerations were not the lone driving force behind the decision of
whether or not to admit Communist nations into GATT. Political and geostrategic
considerations were also important.
From the moment Poland applied to GATT, Canada’s position revealed the
nuanced perspective of the contracting parties; Canada’s views aligned with the
executive secretary of GATT, Eric Wyndham White. Wyndham White believed that
GATT had to come to terms with state trading countries, and his position was
exemplified when the secretariat unilaterally granted Poland and Romania observer
status in 1957.82 Some members feared that Polish membership would undermine
GATT and be unfair to the contracting parties who were trying to adhere to GATT
standards; this objection, however, was often exaggerated.83 Canada had already
extended most favoured nation status to Poland, so Polish access to GATT would not
necessitate any drastic change in economic relations.84 The American position was
noncommittal and other contracting parties supported a variety of positions. Some
favoured Polish accession while others were opposed, fearing Poland might be a
stalking horse for the Soviet Union.85 A compromise was reached, which neither
shut Poland out, nor let it in. A new category of “associate state” was created for
Poland that gave it partial access to GATT forums without the commercial privileges.
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As McKenzie aptly puts it: “This in-between stage reflected different Western views
about whether isolation and containment were more effective than contact and
engagement as tactics to bring about the defeat of Communism.”86 Canada clearly
supported the latter position, preferring engagement and cooperation to temper
Polish dependence on the USSR. Polish Vice Minister of Foreign Trade, Franciszek
Modrzewski, expressed his appreciation for the part played by the Canadian
member of the working party during discussions pertaining to Polish membership:
‘“the Canadian was the most active member of all in seeking a formula for a
meaningful association for Poland.’” 87 Not only does Modrzewski’s statement
indicate Polish appreciation for Canada’s genuine desire for a meaningful
association, but it also reflects Canada’s use of multilateral organizations in its
pursuit of carrying out its foreign policy in Eastern Europe.
The DEA was even anxious about potentially delaying responses to Polish
requests. Following its admission as an “associate state,” the Polish government had
engaged in informal discussions with various contracting parties to assess whether
full membership should be pursued. Canadian officials believed the Poles would
expect a firm decision on their application to be taken at the fourteenth session in
1959. Norman Robertson expressed the DEA’s trepidation: “In this department we
are concerned about the possible effects of the long delay in dealing with the Polish
issue on the efforts of the Polish authorities to develop their political and economic

86

McKenzie, “GATT and the Cold War,” 103.
LAC, RG25, Vol. 7202 File 9533-40 part 5.2, Numbered Letter Canadian Legation, Warsaw to UnderSecretary of State for External Affairs, “Visit of Commissioner Dallas, Canadian Wheat Board,”
September 17, 1959.
87

289
relations with the West and to some extent to reduce their dependence on the
USSR.” The Under Secretary stated, “even a negative decision on the Polish
application would be preferable to a continuation of the present uncertain
situation.” Essentially, the DEA feared that any prolongation of a decision might lead
Poland to withdraw its application. 88 In the end, the DEA’s anxiety proved
unwarranted since Poland did not withdraw its application. To Canadian officials,
however, whether Poland was incorporated into GATT was considered “especially
significant since it may set a pattern for relations under GATT with the Communist
countries.” In the view of USSEA O.G. Stoner,
The formula adopted for Poland simply provides the framework for
closer relations and for consideration in GATT of particular problems
and difficulties. The exact significance of the Polish association will
therefore emerge gradually as particular problems come to be
considered and the policy of the Polish government is developed.89
In other words, the value of Poland’s association with GATT – even though this
would require a pragmatic and flexible approach to ongoing initiatives – trumped
the challenges bound to surface as a result of their state trading policies.
At GATT’s fifteenth session in November 1959, members agreed on a
declaration that stated their “desire to have the further development of their trade
relations [with Poland] guided by the objectives set out in the Preamble to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.” This meant essentially a limited
association for Poland, and that contracting parties wished to see an expansion of
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trade with Poland. The declaration would only come into force when it was accepted
by Poland and by two-thirds of the contracting parties.90 Modrzewski explained to
Southam that Polish officials sincerely hoped that Poland’s new association would
be helpful in developing its trade relations with Western countries. “The next step,”
Modrzewski noted, “was to round up the necessary ratifications by two-thirds of the
GATT’s members.”91
Southam suggested to the USSEA that since Canada “was one of the countries
which gave particular support to the idea of Poland’s association with GATT, it
would be seemly for us to be among the first countries to ratify [the declaration].”92
Howard Green agreed. On behalf of the Minister of Finance, Minister of Trade and
Commerce, and his own department, Green asserted, “it is expedient that this
declaration be signed on behalf of Canada.”93 In the end, the contracting parties kept
the declaration vague. Only a weak form of association between Poland and GATT
was formed, and there was no reference to the possibility of future, full GATT
membership for Poland. While Canadian officials took the lead in pressing for a
more meaningful formula with substantive commercial policy content, their efforts
were frustrated, mainly by the UK, various other Western European countries, and
the United States, which worked for a compromise formula that mostly favoured the
UK. Canadian officials believed the UK favoured a weak association partly due to a
90
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disinclination to forego benefits arising from their bilateral trade relations with
Poland.94 Additionally, as McKenzie explains, British officials “were sceptical that
trade ties could facilitate a diplomatic realignment, particularly because
Khrushchev’s intention to use CMEA to create ‘an integrated economic empire’ was
moving forward and Poland’s ‘freedom of manoeuvre’ seemed restricted because it
now required CMEA’s permission to import Western products.”95 Regardless, this is
another example of Canadian officials pursuing a policy at odds with its most
important allies, thus highlighting how the blocs were not always united.
The next decision for Canada was whether it would negotiate with Poland
during the course of GATT’s 1960/61 Tariff Conference. The Poles proposed to
negotiate “minimum import commitments” against tariff concession by GATT
countries. This was not in the original declaration, but the Ministry of Finance
argued that going beyond what was embodied in the recent GATT declaration would
be

in

Canada’s

economic

and

political

interest.

96

Canada’s

Permanent

Representative to the European Office of the UN in Geneva, Max Wershof, saw six
major benefits to Canada’s engagement with Poland during the Tariff Conference.
First, a closer trading relationship between Poland and GATT countries would have
important political implications as “it would bring Poland closer into the orbit of the
Western world and make a lasting contribution to improved and more stable EastWest relations.” Second, if trading arrangements could be worked out they “could
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provide a general basis for orderly multilateral trade relations between state
trading and free trading enterprise countries.” Third, the Polish proposal would
open up new opportunities for expanding trade, since
the greater multilateralization of trade with Poland, and the
corresponding decrease in bilateralism in its trade with Western
European countries would open up new opportunities for competitive
suppliers. This in our view is an important consideration for countries
such as Canada, which are efficient producers of raw materials and
agricultural products, and whose trading interests are being damaged
by bilateralism, not only in the Polish market but also in the markets of
Western European countries which exchange trade advantages with
Poland on a bilateral basis.
Fourth, negotiating with Poland would likely lead to a steady growth of the Polish
import market. In turn, this would result in increases in living standards in Poland.
And in a country with a population of nearly 25 million, sharing “the benefits of the
expansion of the Polish market is […] an important long term consideration.” Fifth,
Canada already extended MFN tariff treatment to Poland and had no quantitative
restriction against Polish exports. A number of other contracting parties, however,
had not extended MFN status to Poland (particularly the US) while others had
quantitative restrictions on Polish goods (notably most Western European nations
and the UK). If these obstacles could be reduced, the possibility for Poland to export
would increase, which would lead to an increase in its capacity to import, which
could lead to “a substantial increase in Canadian export sales to Poland.” Lastly,
since Canada already extended MFN tariff treatment to Poland, “satisfactory
commitments by Poland to purchase products in which Canada enjoys a competitive
advantage (like hard wheat, aluminum, synthetic rubber, or wood products) might
be expected in return for little or no further tariff concessions on the part of
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Canada.”97 While all but one of the beneficial factors are specifically and firmly
rooted in economic concerns, political sensitivities still informed the others and
buttressed all commercial considerations by relating them to the inescapable
political context of the Cold War.
Cabinet saw the benefits as well. In his instructions to the Canadian
delegation of the sixteenth session of GATT in May 1960, Green advised,
Cabinet has approved the Declaration associating Poland with the
General Agreement and has agreed to procedures whereby
consultations are to be conducted by individual contracting parties to
explore the possibility of Polish participation in the negotiations.
In line with the Canadian Government’s policy of exploring ways
and means of establishing mutually advantageous trading relations
with countries in the Soviet Bloc, the Canadian Delegation should be
authorized to enter into consultations with the Polish representatives at
this Session and to explore the possibility of meaningful negotiations
between Canada and Poland…98
Canada’s position regarding the accession of Poland into GATT is telling insofar as it
reveals Canada’s desire to engage with Poland through a multilateral organization.
Canada’s objective to have Poland play a more meaningful role in GATT was often
contracted by various Western nations. Regardless, Canada’s position exemplifies its
desire to engage with Poland to expose it to capitalist modalities and to attenuate
the USSR’s control over that country. Moreover, the Canadian government’s desire
for Poland to be an active member of GATT is a reminder that matters of commercial
importance were rarely isolated from political considerations.
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CONCLUSION

As bilateral Canadian-Polish relations improved, Canada engaged in a modest
cultural diplomacy program. While cultural exchanges were not as prevalent as
compared with Yugoslavia or the USSR, Canada and Poland did slowly nurture these
relations, and they became an important component of Canada’s Polish policy
equation. Whether through art exhibits, academic exchanges or film showings, the
predominant motivation was exposing the Polish population to Canada’s “way of
life.” The CBC-IS Polish division was one important element of Canada’s
informational activities, and its actions dovetailed nicely with External Affairs’
policy of increasing Polish autonomy with respect to the Soviet Union. The 1956
directive to eliminate Cold War-style rhetoric and foster a more moderate and
respectful “tone,” was carried out under the Progressive Conservative government,
and the work carried out by the CBC-IS Polish division during this time helps to
reinforce the notion that the 1957-1963 period was a decisive moment in Canada’s
foreign policy in Eastern Europe. On top of that, it highlights consistency across
Conservative and Liberal administrations.
Through direct transmissions from Montreal and by sending transcriptions
to Radio Warsaw, Canada was able to disseminate knowledge of Canada, on various
subjects, within Poland. As a result of the CBC-IS Polish division’s efforts, a modest
following of Polish listeners developed, some so engaged they would send letters to
Montreal. Often this correspondence expressed gratitude and appreciation for the
content. Many of the letters also conveyed a sense of relief, knowing that others
were listening to their struggles and providing hope. The CBC-IS Polish division
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illustrates an effective approach to Canadian cultural diplomacy, intended to
challenge and break down ideological barriers.
While Canada’s cultural diplomacy in Poland was one arrow among many in
its Cold War foreign policy quiver, commercial relations opened other important
avenues for influencing developments in Eastern Europe. Canadian participation in
Poland’s annual Poznań trade fair created opportunities to penetrate the Polish
market, engendered political goodwill, and became a consistent component of
Canadian economic statecraft in the region.
International and environmental events aligned to bring the two nations
together, as Poland needed wheat and Canada needed international consumers for
its excess grain supply. Sales with Poland were carried out under Section 21 of
Canada’s Export Credit Insurance Act, whereby the government guaranteed
payment in case a purchasing party defaulted on payment. The Canadian
government proved flexible with respect to the grain sales to Poland, as seen when
it agreed to temporarily increase the existing insurance ceiling by approximately
$24 million. Poland became an important market for Canadian grain when the
Canadian Wheat Board looked east of the Iron Curtain to bolster international sales
undermined by America’s crippling PL 480 program.
In 1962 and 1964, the Wheat Board sent a two-man delegation to Poland to
expand networks of contacts. The delegation struck an immediate rapport with
Polish officials and others involved in various stages of cereal processing. Canadian
wheat and technical knowhow in the handling and processing phases greatly
impressed the Poles, and undoubtedly contributed to Poland’s continued desire to

296
buy Canadian grain. Initially, the two nations conducted short term wheat
agreements until 1963, when the first long term contract was signed, ultimately
leading to a series of future long-term arrangements.
Most often, if not always, Canada’s relations with Poland were politically
motivated, and the debate surrounding Poland’s accession to GATT was no different.
From the beginning, Canadian support for Polish accession into GATT was tied
closely to its role in the Cold War and East-West relations. Essentially, Ottawa’s
support of Poland’s accession reflects its broader policy of engagement as a means
to attenuate connections with the Soviet Union. Moreover, this episode highlights
Canadian officials’ preference to use multilateral organizations as a means to
achieve their foreign policy objectives in Eastern Europe.
Overall, relations between Canada and Poland were governed by the nexus of
middlepowerism, as both countries wished to see international tensions eased in
order for each to exercise some degree of autonomy and national control relative to
their superpower Cold War patrons, especially given that relations were often
governed by international events beyond their control. Direct bilateral relations, as
well multilateral institutions, proved important for advancing their relationship.
Clearly, contact and engagement with Poland was preferred over isolation and
containment. Canada sought to cultivate closer ties with Poland to encourage Polish
independence, and promote Gomulka’s independent course, which Canadian
officials understood to be a vital component of Poland’s foreign policy.
Simultaneously, this policy of engagement was mutually advantageous for quite
pragmatic reasons, such as buying and selling grain. Regardless of the context –
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bilateral or multilateral – and despite the motive – political, cultural, ideological, or
economic – Poland became an important component of Canada’s policy toward
Communist Eastern Europe, an especially notable development given Poland’s
obvious alliance with the group of Warsaw pact nations.
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Conclusion
In a Cold War dominated by two superpowers, it was not always easy for
Canadian governments to navigate the waters of international relations in directions
that maximized a middle power’s freedom of maneuver. Building on the post war
foundation established by Liberal governments from the late 1940s to the mid
1950s, John Diefenbaker’s Progressive Conservative government, when it came to
office in 1957, mainly adopted a moderate stance towards the USSR and Eastern
European communism generally. Such an approach was informed by a fundamental
understanding that reduced global tensions created opportunities for more
independent directions in Canadian policy-making, both in and out of alliance
frameworks.
Why this period is significant lies not in the idea that stark policy changes
occurred under the Diefenbaker government, but in the reality that the general
policy direction toward Communist Eastern Europe remained consistent. Much of
the existing scholarship on Diefenbaker’s foreign policy unfavourably compares the
dismal failures of the Progressive Conservative leader to the so-called ‘golden age’ of
Canadian foreign policy that was shaped by preceding Liberal governments. Yet, the
progressive thinking and pragmatic policy development that began during the postwar Liberal government continued with the Progressive Conservatives, even as the
international situation changed significantly, suggesting Diefenbaker’s foreign
policy was less an aberration than has been previously argued. Canadian diplomats
and civil servants worked equally hard to cultivate closer political, commercial, and
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cultural relations with Communist Eastern Europe during Diefenbaker’s time as
Prime Minister as they did under Louis St. Laurent’s Liberal government.
Another reason why this period is important lies, again, not with policy
directions set by the Progressive Conservatives, but instead with the fact that their
time in office coincided with major international changes beyond their control, in
the Soviet Union and Communist Eastern Europe. The increased liberalization
campaign ushered in by Khrushchev encouraged the Canadian government to
pursue a policy of Cold War by “other means,” engaging in cultural and commercial
policy more proactively and aggressively. This is a policy that would have most
surely been pursued by the Liberal Party had they been re-elected in 1957.
Arguably, Canada’s international stature was at its height in the immediate
post-war period and then began to wane in the years that followed, largely due to
broader global developments well beyond its control. Still, Canada’s international
influence was not completely diminished and its foreign policy was hardly dormant
or unproductive in the 1950s and 1960s. In fact, as noted in chapter one, widely
respected diplomat Robert Ford maintained that Canada was actually entering an
era of greater flexibility in the international arena, in large part due to the strategic
stasis that had developed between the superpowers. As a moderate middle power
and a nation that shared a continent with one of two global superpowers, other
governments sometimes perceived Canada as uniquely situated to influence
international affairs. And, Canada shared many geographic and natural similarities
with its Soviet superpower neighbour, so both countries inevitably had vested
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interests in one another’s innovations and developments, further contributing to
Canada’s unique global position.
Having fully recognized the important political developments occurring east
of the Iron Curtain, most notably the changing of the Soviet old guard and
subsequent effects of this throughout Eastern Europe, the Diefenbaker government
continued the nascent approach of its predecessor and pursued a pragmatic policy
with Communist Eastern Europe. Broadly speaking, the primary goal of the
government’s policy was to attenuate Soviet control over Eastern Europe by
fostering closer ties with select Eastern European nations. Engendering closer
political, commercial, and cultural relations with the region, it was believed, would
build bridges between East and West, break down ideological barriers, and
ultimately reduce Cold War tensions. The Canadian government viewed Yugoslavia
and Poland as two important countries where Canada could cultivate closer
relations to offset Soviet influence. Recall from chapter one, for instance, SSEA
Sidney Smith’s advice to Cabinet that the government should be as forthcoming as
possible with exchanges with Poland and Yugoslavia in order to weaken the ties of
these countries with the Soviet bloc and to increase their political and commercial
links with the west. Yugoslavia, having broken with the Warsaw Pact in 1948 and
having championed the non-aligned movement, was a more obvious target of
Canada’s attention in Communist Europe; yet even Poland, firmly situated in the
Soviet bloc, was also courted. Additionally, Canada pursued closer political,
commercial, and cultural relations with the USSR as well, hoping to expose it to
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Western modalities and showcasing that the West was neither entirely homogenous
nor blindly following American foreign policy initiatives.
As the communist and capitalist camps moved ever closer to military
strategic stasis by the mid-1950s, various other “battlegrounds” would prove
important in waging the Cold War by “other means.” Of course, geostrategic and
geopolitical considerations were still very much woven into the fabric of
international policy frameworks. Other strategic policy initiatives, however, were
becoming increasingly recognized as viable means to advance a nation’s foreign
policy objectives. As a result, the Canadian government pragmatically pursued
favourable political, and ad hoc commercial, and cultural relations with the USSR,
Yugoslavia, and Poland.
Khrushchev’s revelations at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, and his
denunciation of Stalin’s cult of personality, paved the way for a new direction in
international diplomacy. Canadian officials understood that Khrushchev still
believed in the inevitable victory of communism over capitalism, but now most
believed that the Soviet Union would not pursue this end through aggressive
military means. Instead, ideological supremacy would be achieved through
economic and cultural methods.
Within the framework of Cold War by “other means,” the Canadian
government pursued a three-pronged approach to advance its policy interests:
constructive political-diplomatic engagement through traditional interactions and
exchanges of diplomats and civil servants, closer commercial relations, and the
development and implementation of cultural exchanges.
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On the political-diplomatic front, Canada’s foreign relations with the three
communist nations were quite different. When Secretary of State for External Affairs
Lester Pearson visited Moscow in 1955, this proved to be a watershed moment in
Canadian-Soviet relations. While the visit reaffirmed Pearson’s belief that the Soviet
Union’s main objective remained national security, it also opened the door to more
open political discourse, not to mention fruitful trade deals. What contemporaries
deemed the Soviet economic offensive represented the broad extent of the Soviet
Union’s non-military “threat” and epitomized for Canadian officials the new course
of Soviet foreign strategy. Other Western nations also regarded the economic
offensive as a significant issue requiring serious analysis and response. Yet while
there was open dialogue on Soviet economic tactics within the NATO alliance, its
members, particularly Canada, insisted that this economic dimension of the Cold
War could be better addressed not just through multilateral relations, but also
through direct bilateral approaches with the USSR.
With all three communist nations, Canada engaged in constructive
diplomacy. The issue of the Polish art treasures initially stunted Canadian-Polish
relations. The Polish government refused to promote its diplomatic mission to
embassy status until the treasures were at least partially returned. Yet, the issue
was kept relatively quiet, and the Polish government did not use the affair for
political propaganda purposes. This suggests an implicit mutual understanding
between middle powers: neither party would gain politically if the issue became a
Cold War spectacle. Once the issue of the Polish art treasures was resolved, the
Canadian and Polish governments pursued open communications and promoted

303
sound diplomatic relations, best illustrated by the establishment of their respective
embassies in April 1960. The Canadian government also displayed deference for the
Polish government when it entertained, at least modestly, the Rapacki Plan. For
Canadian officials, it was believed that open and respectful political dialogue was an
important first step in softening the Polish communist doctrinal attitude, which in
turn could help loosen ties with the USSR.
While diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia were politically and ideologically
charged, they were mostly positive and were seen as mutually advantageous.
Yugoslavia’s refusal to sign the Twelve Party Declaration in late 1957 signaled
Canada’s opportunity to establish closer ties with the “renegade” communist nation.
Yugoslavia’s position as unofficial leader of the non-aligned movement meant it
occasionally faced, head-on, the wrath of the Soviet bloc. Canada generally
supported Yugoslavia’s non-aligned position, since it presented a clear alternative to
Soviet communism and showcased for other Eastern European communist nations
that independence was attainable, at least theoretically. While Canada and
Yugoslavia subscribed to fundamentally different ideologies, both saw in each other
the similarity of living in the shadow of a powerful superpower; middlepowerism
became common ground on which to build a working relationship.
While high-level meetings between superpowers have received much
attention, much less has been accorded great power-middle power meetings.
Anastas Mikoyan’s brief stopover in Nova Scotia in 1959 and the genial reception he
was accorded testified to the Canadian government’s efforts to maintain a good
political rapport with the USSR. The exchange of letters between Prime Minister
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Diefenbaker and Premier Khrushchev confirmed the Prime Minister’s belief in the
value of frank exchanges of views and the Progressive Conservative government’s
desire to foster an open political dialogue with the communist superpower, despite
the fact that the ideas expressed never went beyond the general positions of each
respective alliance. The exchange of letters proved a stark contrast with
Diefenbaker’s scathing address to the UN General Assembly in 1960, during which
he fiercely criticized Soviet “imperialism” and their treatment of the region’s
“captive nations.” The speech was a public forum through which Diefenbaker could
engage in a fiery rhetorical assault on Soviet communism, but the exchange of
letters proved that he was equally capable of engaging in cordial private diplomacy.
While the Canadian government was well aware of the so-called Soviet
economic offensive and its potential implications for Canadian businesses, an almost
equally disconcerting problem came not from Canada’s communist neighbour, but
from its closest alliance neighbour to the south. The United States’ PL 480 program
significantly harmed Canadian wheat exports. As a result, the Canadian Wheat
Board sought out new markets, and Communist Eastern Europe proved itself a
viable export region. The USSR, Poland, and Yugoslavia all purchased Canadian
wheat in large quantities during Diefenbaker’s time in office. With respect to the
USSR specifically, Canadian officials expediently dropped the ideologically charged
economic offensive perspective and welcomed the USSR as an important customer.
Moreover, the Diefenbaker years should be seen more as a bridge in bilateral
relations between the two nations rather than a decisive moment. While the Liberal
government signed a groundbreaking trade deal with the USSR in 1956, such an
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agreement would not again be reached during the subsequent Progressive
Conservative government. Although, negotiations surrounding the renewal of the
1956 agreement (which saw a fraction of the trade of the previous agreement) are
telling insofar as they represented a crossroads between the USSR’s state-trading
and Canada’s capitalist economic systems. The Soviets, with grain supplies boosted
by the success of their Virgin Lands campaign, pushed hard to level a large trade
imbalance with Canada, while the Canadians sought not to commit to any kind of
purchase obligation and instead offered to promote Soviet imports in a “presidential
manner.”
The Diefenbaker government witnessed more success in both Yugoslavia and
Poland. Granted, while the amount exported to both countries was modest when
compared to Canada’s overall wheat exports, the broader political significance
cannot be overlooked. Both trade deals were carried out under Section 21 of the
Export Credit Insurance Act, which provided that the ECIC guarantee payment
should the contracting government fail to pay its bills. It is also notable that the
terms of the agreements were made more favourable for both nations, when
compared to the previous Liberal government; for instance, the Diefenbaker
government allowed the ceiling to be raised on the dollar amount of export
insurance coverage on a Polish purchase of wheat.
The two-man delegation sent to Poland by the Canadian Wheat Board in
1962 and 1964 is a fine example of Canada’s economic statecraft taken to the next
level. The delegation went beyond talk of sales and directly engaged with Poles
involved in the productive and distributive system. This unquestionably
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strengthened Poland’s commitment to purchase Canadian wheat as a deep respect
for Canadian understanding of agricultural processes was entrenched within Polish
officials and professionals.
Wheat exports to the USSR, Poland and Yugoslavia are good examples of
domestic politics ‘with a foreign policy hat on’ – as they sought to alleviate the
growing surplus of Canadian wheat – and were calculated foreign policy initiatives
designed to bridge the gap between East and West. Moreover, wheat exports to
Communist Eastern Europe were not only calculated moves in the government’s
Cold War economic statecraft with respect to the Soviet bloc, but were also
motivated by the need to address the challenging global wheat market that was
undermined by Canada’s most important ally, the United States, through its PL 480
program.
Canada also participated in Poland’s annual Poznań trade fair, largely in an
effort to penetrate the Polish market and to engender political goodwill. With
Yugoslavia, Canadian officials understood the importance of raw materials and
capital equipment to Yugoslavia’s industrialization process. As a result, Ambassador
Robert Ford pushed aggressively to see certain Canadian firms engage in business
deals with the Yugoslav government, sometimes to the annoyance of Canada’s
Ministry of Finance.
The third non-military prong of the government’s foreign policy equation
was cultural diplomacy. Cultural exchanges during this time were beginning to be
seen as a real and viable foreign policy tool. Primarily, they supported broader
political initiatives that had been defined by normal policy channels. In this period,
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the Canadian cultural footprint was indeed imbedded into select Communist
Eastern European states. Canada and the Soviet Union made impressive strides in
the realm of cultural exchanges during this period. Canada did not establish a formal
cultural agreement with the USSR, or with any nation for that matter. Instead, the
governments worked within a quid pro quo style arrangement. While the Soviets
pushed for a formal agreement, the Canadian government hesitated principally
because there was no federal agency through which to administer such exchanges
and because Canada’s federal system of government complicated matters when it
came to the subject of culture.
The Canadian government struggled to maintain equal and balanced
reciprocity of exchanges with the Soviets in this field, especially since Soviet artists,
athletes, and academics had the weight of the government behind them in the form
of the Ministry of Culture and the State Committee on Cultural Relations. Canadian
ambassadors in Moscow, notably Arnold Smith, worked hard to try and even
imbalances and suggested that the government actually exercise some power and
authority by withholding the necessary visas for Soviet artists, athletes, and
academics. Additionally, Smith himself was initially involved in the exchange of
visits between the Montreal Symphony Orchestra and the Red Army Chorus, among
others, thus highlighting that government officials both saw the importance of such
exchanges and were willing to do their part in advancing them.
Hockey also became a viable point of contact between Canada and
Communist Europe. Poland and the USSR were keen to be kept up to date on
Canadian hockey. Canadian amateur teams often visited the USSR and were greeted

308
with much fanfare by both the public at large and the media. The Poles were kept
informed through radio broadcasts.
Canadian radio broadcasts to Poland by the CBC-IS Polish Division proved to
be an important component of Canada’s informational activities in Communist
Eastern Europe, and dovetailed well with External Affairs’ desire to increase Polish
autonomy through increased exposure to Western culture and practices. Letters
sent directly to CBC-IS’s Polish Division do suggest that Polish citizens were
listening and that Canadian broadcasts were, at least modestly, building cultural
bridges between East and West.
Of the three countries examined, Canadian-Yugoslav cultural exchanges
perhaps witnessed the greatest, though still modest, success with respect to
academic and technical exchanges. NRC fellowships, while setting off at a snail’s
pace, slowly generated momentum. Yet, hanging over these exchanges was the fear
of Yugoslav authorities who worried that, once in the West, Yugoslav scientists
would never return home; this highlights the very real fact that cultural relations
were still governed by ideological proclivities.
Overall, the Diefenbaker-Khrushchev period marks a decisive moment in
Canada’s history with Communist Eastern Europe. This is not to suggest that the
period witnessed groundbreaking initiatives or that the government wielded power
beyond its moderate, middle power influence. Rather, building on the foundations
laid out by the previous Liberal government, the Progressive Conservative
government pragmatically utilized its unique position between the two global
superpowers – both within multilateral frameworks and bilaterally – to engender
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closer political, commercial, and cultural relations with select Eastern European
nations as a means of building bridges between East and West. With its goal of
attenuating the influence of European communism, the Canadian government
pursued avenues old and new, as they engaged in the Cold War by “other means.”
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